Cited by 281Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningDigital Media Forensic DetectionSecurity and Verification in Computing

SentiNet: Detecting Localized Universal Attacks Against Deep Learning Systems

Open access
Chou, Edward, Tramer, Florian, Pellegrino, Giancarlo·2020·2020 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)

Abstract

SentiNet is a novel detection framework for localized universal attacks on neural networks. These attacks restrict adversarial noise to contiguous portions of an image and are reusable with different images-constraints that prove useful for generating physically-realizable attacks. Unlike most other works on adversarial detection, SentiNet does not require training a model or preknowledge of an attack prior to detection. Our approach is appealing due to the large number of possible mechanisms and attack-vectors that an attack-specific defense would have to consider. By leveraging the neural network's susceptibility to attacks and by using techniques from model interpretability and object detection as detection mechanisms, SentiNet turns a weakness of a model into a strength. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SentiNet on three different attacks-i.e., data poisoning attacks, trojaned networks, and adversarial patches (including physically realizable attacks)-and show that our defense is able to achieve very competitive performance metrics for all three threats. Finally, we show that SentiNet is robust against strong adaptive adversaries, who build adversarial patches that specifically target the components of SentiNet's architecture.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/spw50608.2020.00025

Cites

57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Most existing robustness defenses are gradient aggregation methods mainly developed for defending against untargeted Byzantine attackers.

    “Most existing robustness defenses are gradient aggregation methods mainly developed for defending against the untargeted Byzantine attackers, such as Krum/Multi-Krum [22], AGGREGATHOR [56], Byzantine Gradient Descent (BGD) [57], Median-based Gradient Descent [23], Trimmed-mean-based Gradient Descent [23] and SIGNSGD [39].”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. J. Hendrik Metzen, T. Genewein, V. Fischer, and B. Bischoff, "On Detecting Adversarial Perturbations," ArXiv e-prints, Feb. 2017.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Chou, E., Tramer, F., & Pellegrino, G.
Affiliations
  • Carnegie Mellon University (US)
  • Helmholtz Center for Information Security (DE)
Venue
2020 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2020-05
Pages
48-54
OpenAlex
W3011696425
Cited by
281
References
57
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 62 · 2024: 62 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 6
FWCI
12.33
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
universal adversarial attacks, adversarial attack detection, adversarial patches, data poisoning, model interpretability, object detection, adaptive adversaries, deep learning security

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review