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Cited by 1,193

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?

Tirole, Jean · 1999 · Econometrica

Abstract

The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two assumptions made in the literature, namely rationality and the existence of transaction costs. Last, it argues that, contrary to what is commonly argued, the complete contract methodology need not be unable to account for standard institutions such as authority and ownership; and it concludes with a discussion of the research agenda.

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Crossref · 10.1111/1468-0262.00052

Cites

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 31

  1. Aghion P., 1987, American Economic Review, 77, 388
  2. Aghion P., 1990, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6, 381
  3. 10.1016/0014-2921(94)00050-A · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00050-a
  4. Alchian A., 1972, American Economic Review, 62, 777
  5. Anton J., 1994, American Economic Review, 84, 190
  6. Coase R., 1937, Readings in Price Theory
  7. 10.1086/250049 · doi:10.1086/250049
  8. Dye R. A., 1985, International Economic Review, 26, 233, 10.2307/2526538 · doi:10.2307/2526538
  9. A. E dlin , and B. H ermalin (1997 ): "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems ," Mimeo, UC Berkeley. · doi:10.3386/w6086
  10. Edlin A., 1996, American Economic Review, 86, 478
  11. Green J., 1994, Annales d' Economie et de Statistique, 36, 81, 10.2307/20075970 · doi:10.2307/20075970
  12. Hart O., 1990, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, 596
  13. Hart O., 1993, University of Toronto Law Journal, 43, 299, 10.2307/825709 · doi:10.2307/825709
  14. Hart O., 1987, Advances in Economic Theory, 5th World Congress of the Econometric Society
  15. Hermalin B., 1993, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9, 230
  16. Holmstrom B., 1982, Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, 66, 169
  17. Holmstrom B., 1994, American Economic Review, 84, 972
  18. Holmstrom B., 1991, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 201, 10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · DOI · Paper page
  19. Kreps D., 1992, Economic Analysis of Markets and Games
  20. 10.1111/1467-9442.00077 · doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00077
  21. 10.1111/1467-937X.00077 · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00077
  22. 10.1111/1467-937X.00075 · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00075
  23. Noldeke G., 1996, Firms, Markets and Contracts, 1
  24. G. N oldeke , and K. S chmidt (1997 ): "Sequential Investments and Options to Own ," Mimeo, University of Bonn and Munich. · doi:10.2307/2556087
  25. C. P acheco -P ires (1994 ): "An Axiomatic Model of Awareness and Knowledge ," Ch. 1 in "Three Essays in Economic Theory," Ph.D. Thesis, MIT.
  26. Riordan M., 1990, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties
  27. Schwartz A., 1992, Contract Economics, 6, 76
  28. I. S egal (1995 ): "Essays on Commitment, Renegotiation, and Incompleteness of Contracts ," Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University.
  29. Tirole J., 1992, Contract Economics, 109
  30. Walras L., 1898, Oeuvres Economiques Completes d' Auguste et Leon Walras. Tome IX: Etudes d' Economie Sociale
  31. Weber M., 1968, Economy and Society

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Tirole, J.
Venue
Econometrica
Published
1999-07
Volume
67
Issue
4
Pages
741-781
ISSN
  • 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0262
OpenAlex
W2138595148
Cited by
1,193
References
84
FWCI
103.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 5906 d)

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.