The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Abstract
The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature through an example. It then offers methodological insights on the standard approach to modeling incomplete contracts; in particular it discusses a tension between two assumptions made in the literature, namely rationality and the existence of transaction costs. Last, it argues that, contrary to what is commonly argued, the complete contract methodology need not be unable to account for standard institutions such as authority and ownership; and it concludes with a discussion of the research agenda.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-6637 · Cited by 16,594
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
O'Brien, D. P., & Williamson, O. E. (1976) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2230812 · Cited by 13,381
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
(1986) · The Antitrust Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0003603x8603100308 · Cited by 10,730
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1996) · Firms, Organizations and Contracts · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198774358.003.0005 · Cited by 9,565
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Gamst, F. C. (1991) · Anthropology of Work Review · doi:10.1525/awr.1991.12.3.19 · Cited by 7,932
(1938) · Virtual Defense Library (Ministerio de Defensa) · Cited by 7,145
Williamson, O. E. (1975) · Cited by 6,810
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
(1994) · Cited by 5,513
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261729 · Cited by 5,364
Moffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Economics, Organization and Management.
Bhattacharya, S., Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2328903 · Cited by 4,644
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262063 · Cited by 3,046
Self-citationAggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation
Ireland, N. (1994) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(94)90034-5 · Cited by 2,554
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555382 · Cited by 2,511
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0 · Cited by 2,504
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
Macaulay, S. (1963) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2090458 · Cited by 2,468
An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297860 · Cited by 2,128
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912698 · Cited by 1,876
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261826 · Cited by 1,873
The Firm as an Incentive System
Holmstrom, B. R., & Milgrom, P. (1994) · American Economic Review · Cited by 1,772
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261893 · Cited by 1,719
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555325 · Cited by 1,509
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118350 · Cited by 1,438
One-share-one-vote and the market for corporate control
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90044-x · Cited by 1,342
Hart, O., & Holmström, B. (1987) · Advances in Economic Theory · doi:10.1017/ccol0521340446.003 · Cited by 1,330
A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
Simon, H. A. (1951) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906815 · Cited by 1,314
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118360 · Cited by 1,201
Self-citationNash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Maskin, E. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00076 · Cited by 1,180
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1991) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3906 · Cited by 1,060
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00080 · Cited by 960
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118358 · Cited by 953
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. (1993) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w4480 · Cited by 921
Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4 · Cited by 912
A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
Dewatripont, M., & Tirole, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118355 · Cited by 835
Self-citationUnforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00079 · Cited by 775
Self-citationImplicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
MacLeod, W. B., & Malcomson, J. M. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912562 · Cited by 766
Contracts as a barrier to entry
Aghion, P., & Bolton, P. G. M. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 729
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90045-1 · Cited by 670
The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts
Bull, C. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884685 · Cited by 649
Seniority and maturity of debt contracts
Diamond, D. W. (1993) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(93)90011-y · Cited by 642
Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design
Milgrom, P. R. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261523 · Cited by 633
Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity
Bernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1997) · American Economic Review · Cited by 608
Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., & Rey, P. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951613 · Cited by 572
An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm
Hart, O. (1989) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1122818 · Cited by 498
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
Che, Y.-K., & Hausch, D. B. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.125 · Cited by 495
Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1994) · American Economic Review · Cited by 475
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
Maskin, E. S., & Jean Tirole, Z. (1992) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951674 · Cited by 475
Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts.
MacLeod, W. B., & Malcomson, J. M. (1993) · Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) · Cited by 460
Subgame Perfect Implementation
Moore, J., & Repullo, R. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911364 · Cited by 460
Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem
Noldeke, G., & Schmidt, K. M. (1995) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555911 · Cited by 451
Aggregation and revelation of preferences
Laffont, J. (1979) · Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) · Cited by 433
Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment
Edlin, A., & Reichelstein, S. (1995) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5007 · Cited by 400
Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing.
Shin, H. S., Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1995) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2235142 · Cited by 390
Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
Segal, I. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00078 · Cited by 377
Vertical Integration and Communication
Arrow, K. J. (1975) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003220 · Cited by 351
The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach
Schmidt, K. M. (1996) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023354 · Cited by 350
Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form
(1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037009 · Cited by 296
Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
Chung, T.-Y. (1991) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297950 · Cited by 290
Incomplete Contracts and Signalling
Spier, K. E. (1992) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555872 · Cited by 272
An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm
Hart, O. (2009) · The Economic Nature of the Firm · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817410.027 · Cited by 268
Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing.
Nachman, D. C., Allen, F., & Gale, D. M. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329356 · Cited by 252
Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
Hermalin, B. E., & Katz, M. L. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938287 · Cited by 243
Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency
(1990) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036997 · Cited by 200
Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, and Future
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1988) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/135430 · Cited by 173
Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00081 · Cited by 167
Self-citation(1993) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037059 · Cited by 166
Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
Anderlini, L., & Felli, L. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118357 · Cited by 162
(1993) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/ccol0521416663 · Cited by 154
Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements
Demski, J. S., & Sappington, D. E. M. (1991) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2601019 · Cited by 146
Is 'Bounded Rationality' an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?
Hart, O. (1990) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft · Cited by 98
Chavas, J., & Hildenbrand, W. (1984) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1058011 · Cited by 76
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
Green, G., & Laffont (1992) · Annales d Économie et de Statistique · doi:10.2307/20075860 · Cited by 38
Renegotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts
Green, J. R., & Laffont, J. (1988) · Annals of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.7907/8x4wv-7kr95 · Cited by 29
Incentives in Organizations: An Overview of Some of the Evidence and Theory
MacLeod, W. B. (2001) · Cited by 14
Research works printed but not linked: 31
- Aghion P., 1987, American Economic Review, 77, 388
- Aghion P., 1990, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6, 381
- 10.1016/0014-2921(94)00050-A · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00050-a
- Alchian A., 1972, American Economic Review, 62, 777
- Anton J., 1994, American Economic Review, 84, 190
- Coase R., 1937, Readings in Price Theory
- 10.1086/250049 · doi:10.1086/250049
- Dye R. A., 1985, International Economic Review, 26, 233, 10.2307/2526538 · doi:10.2307/2526538
- A. E dlin , and B. H ermalin (1997 ): "Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems ," Mimeo, UC Berkeley. · doi:10.3386/w6086
- Edlin A., 1996, American Economic Review, 86, 478
- Green J., 1994, Annales d' Economie et de Statistique, 36, 81, 10.2307/20075970 · doi:10.2307/20075970
- Hart O., 1990, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, 596
- Hart O., 1993, University of Toronto Law Journal, 43, 299, 10.2307/825709 · doi:10.2307/825709
- Hart O., 1987, Advances in Economic Theory, 5th World Congress of the Econometric Society
- Hermalin B., 1993, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9, 230
- Holmstrom B., 1982, Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, 66, 169
- Holmstrom B., 1994, American Economic Review, 84, 972
- Holmstrom B., 1991, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 201, 10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · DOI · Paper page
- Kreps D., 1992, Economic Analysis of Markets and Games
- 10.1111/1467-9442.00077 · doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00077
- 10.1111/1467-937X.00077 · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00077
- 10.1111/1467-937X.00075 · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00075
- Noldeke G., 1996, Firms, Markets and Contracts, 1
- G. N oldeke , and K. S chmidt (1997 ): "Sequential Investments and Options to Own ," Mimeo, University of Bonn and Munich. · doi:10.2307/2556087
- C. P acheco -P ires (1994 ): "An Axiomatic Model of Awareness and Knowledge ," Ch. 1 in "Three Essays in Economic Theory," Ph.D. Thesis, MIT.
- Riordan M., 1990, The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties
- Schwartz A., 1992, Contract Economics, 6, 76
- I. S egal (1995 ): "Essays on Commitment, Renegotiation, and Incompleteness of Contracts ," Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University.
- Tirole J., 1992, Contract Economics, 109
- Walras L., 1898, Oeuvres Economiques Completes d' Auguste et Leon Walras. Tome IX: Etudes d' Economie Sociale
- Weber M., 1968, Economy and Society
Cited by
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262063 · Cited by 3,046
Self-citationThe role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts
Cong, L. W., & He, Z. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz007 · Cited by 1,089
Authority and Communication in Organizations
Dessein, W. (2002) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00227 · Cited by 964
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.2.368 · Cited by 917
Metadata
- Authors
- Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 1999-07
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 741-781
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2138595148
- Cited by
- 1,193
- References
- 84
- FWCI
- 103.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 5906 d)
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.