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Race effects on eBay

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Ayres, Ian, Banaji, Mahzarin, Jolls, Christine · 2015 · The RAND Journal of Economics
Cited by 121

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We investigate the impact of seller race in a field experiment involving baseball card auctions on eBay. Photographs showed the cards held by either a dark‐skinned/African‐American hand or a light‐skinned/Caucasian hand. Cards held by African‐American sellers sold for approximately 20% ($0.90) less than cards held by Caucasian sellers. Our evidence of race differentials is important because the online environment is well controlled (with the absence of confounding tester effects) and because the results show that race effects can persist in a thick real‐world market such as eBay.

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 34

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Ayres, I., Banaji, M., & Jolls, C.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2015-10
Volume
46
Issue
4
Pages
891-917
ISSN
  • 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
  • 1756-2171
OpenAlex
W3125198792
Cited by
121
References
13
FWCI
25.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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