The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO Preferences and Acquisitions
Abstract
This paper explores the impact of target CEOs’ retirement preferences on takeovers. Using retirement age as a proxy for CEOs’ private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEOs’ preferences affect merger activity. The likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher when target CEOs are close to age 65. Takeover premiums and target announcement returns are similar for retirement‐age and younger CEOs, implying that retirement‐age CEOs increase firm sales without sacrificing premiums. Better corporate governance is associated with more acquisitions of firms led by young CEOs, and with a smaller increase in deals at retirement age.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552775 · Cited by 3,894
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x · Cited by 3,669
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 · Cited by 3,075
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction☆
MALMENDIER, U., & TATE, G. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 · Cited by 2,754
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Stock market driven acquisitions
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00211-3 · Cited by 2,065
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261826 · Cited by 1,873
The determinants of board structure☆
LINCK, J., NETTER, J., & YANG, T. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.004 · Cited by 1,802
MALMENDIER, U., TATE, G., & YAN, J. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01685.x · Cited by 1,724
Executive incentives and the horizon problem
Dechow, P. M., & Sloan, R. G. (1991) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(91)90058-s · Cited by 1,548
The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity
Mitchell, M. L., & Mulherin, J. H. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00860-h · Cited by 1,511
Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification
DENIS, D. J., DENIS, D. K., & SARIN, A. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03811.x · Cited by 1,304
Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills
Brickley, J. A., Coles, J. L., & Terry, R. L. (1994) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90038-8 · Cited by 1,156
Market Valuation and Merger Waves
Rhodes‐Kropf, M., & VISWANATHAN, S. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00713.x · Cited by 985
CORE, J. E., GUAY, W. R., & RUSTICUS, T. O. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00851.x · Cited by 956
Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers
Shivdasani, A. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90009-5 · Cited by 906
Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover
Murphy, K. J., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90014-7 · Cited by 896
How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior In a World of Incomplete Markets
Rust, J., & Phelan, C. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171940 · Cited by 888
Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures
Comment, R., & Schwert, G. W. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00823-j · Cited by 751
Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover
MARTIN, K. J., & MCCONNELL, J. J. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02679.x · Cited by 655
Corporate takeovers: causes and consequences
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-2781 · Cited by 647
Pensions, the Option Value of Work, and Retirement
Stock, J. H., & Wise, D. A. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938304 · Cited by 594
Wealth Accumulation and the Propensity to Plan
Ameriks, J., Caplin, A., & Leahy, J. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360698487 · Cited by 556
Pensions, The Option Value of Work, and Retirement
Stock, J., & Wise, D. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2686 · Cited by 555
Termination fees in mergers and acquisitions
Officer, M. S. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00119-3 · Cited by 547
Passing the Baton: Managing the Process of CEO Succession
Vancil, R. F. (1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 545
Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth
DeAngelo, H., & Rice, E. M. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90016-8 · Cited by 475
Investigating the economic role of mergers
Andrade, G., & Stafford, E. (2002) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(02)00023-8 · Cited by 469
Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation
Fee, C. E., Hadlock, C. J., & Pierce, J. R. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs131 · Cited by 422
What's In It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired
Hartzell, J. C., Ofek, E., & Yermack, D. (2004) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhg034 · Cited by 421
CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions
Weisbach, M. S. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00793-z · Cited by 418
Ambrose, B. W., & Megginson, W. L. (1992) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331141 · Cited by 391
Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance
Walkling, R. A., & Long, M. S. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003669 · Cited by 325
Learning and the disappearing association between governance and returns
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.004 · Cited by 311
The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth
Song, M. H., & Walkling, R. A. (1993) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2331159 · Cited by 308
Managers' voting rights and corporate control
Mikkelson, W. H., & Partch, M. M. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90084-6 · Cited by 262
Labor Force Dynamics of Older Men
Blau, D. M. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951478 · Cited by 239
The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers
STULZ, R. M., WALKLING, R. A., & SONG, M. H. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05107.x · Cited by 208
Let's make a deal! How shareholder control impacts merger payoffs
Moeller, T. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.11.001 · Cited by 201
Issues in the economics of aging
Kesteloot, P. K. (1991) · Health Policy · doi:10.1016/0168-8510(91)90077-b · Cited by 199
Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers
Knoeber, C. R. (1986) · American Economic Review · Cited by 196
Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO Careers and Management Styles
Schoar, A., & Zuo, L. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17590 · Cited by 182
Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from "Mergers of Equals"
Wulf, J. (2004) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/20.1.60 · Cited by 171
How managerial wealth affects the tender offer process
Cotter, J. F., & Zenner, M. (1994) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)90018-3 · Cited by 166
Managerial incentives, capital reallocation, and the business cycle
Eisfeldt, A. L., & Rampini, A. A. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.007 · Cited by 164
Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs
Cai, J., & Vijh, A. M. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01260.x · Cited by 149
Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice
Wise, D. A. (1985) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226903279.001.0001 · Cited by 148
Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare
Harris, E. G. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555472 · Cited by 124
Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within FirmsPreprint
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Puri, M. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1571527 · Cited by 123
Advances in the Economics of Aging
Frey, D. Ε., & Wise, D. A. (1997) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061062 · Cited by 114
Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations
Fich, E. M., Cai, J., & Tran, A. L. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.010 · Cited by 100
Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2013) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.11.008 · Cited by 79
How Do Acquirers Retain Successful Target CEOs? The Role of Governance
Wulf, J. M., & Singh, H. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1414 · Cited by 70
On the Importance of Golden Parachutes
Fich, E. M., Tran, A. L., & Walkling, R. A. (2013) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s002210901300063x · Cited by 61
Markup Pricing RevisitedPreprint
Betton, S., Eckbo, B. E., & Thorburn, K. S. (2008) · doi:10.67929/ecgi-fin-199-2008 · Cited by 60
Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations
Heitzman, S. M. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.06.004 · Cited by 51
Efficient Windows and Labor Force Reduction
Lumsdaine, R. L., Stock, J. H., & Wise, D. A. (1990) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(90)90027-f · Cited by 38
Cited by
Does policy uncertainty affect mergers and acquisitions?
Bonaime, A., Gulen, H., & Ion, M. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.007 · Cited by 1,007
Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts
Gormley, T. A., & Matsa, D. A. (2016) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.08.002 · Cited by 507
Corporate governance and firm performance: The sequel
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2019) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.04.006 · Cited by 352
Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions
Renneboog, L., & Vansteenkiste, C. (2019) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.07.010 · Cited by 344
Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions
Ghaly, M., Dang, V. A., & Stathopoulos, K. (2020) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101634 · Cited by 253
Metadata
- Authors
- JENTER, D., & LEWELLEN, K.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-11-12
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2813-2852
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2523934821
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 76.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.