Cited by 514Misinformation and Its ImpactsSpam and Phishing DetectionIslamic Finance and Communication

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 55 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 37 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media

Open access
Roozenbeek, Jon, van der Linden, Sander, Goldberg, Beth, Rathje, Steve, Lewandowsky, Stephan·2022·Science Advances

Abstract

Online misinformation continues to have adverse consequences for society. Inoculation theory has been put forward as a way to reduce susceptibility to misinformation by informing people about how they might be misinformed, but its scalability has been elusive both at a theoretical level and a practical level. We developed five short videos that inoculate people against manipulation techniques commonly used in misinformation: emotionally manipulative language, incoherence, false dichotomies, scapegoating, and ad hominem attacks. In seven preregistered studies, i.e., six randomized controlled studies ( n = 6464) and an ecologically valid field study on YouTube ( n = 22,632), we find that these videos improve manipulation technique recognition, boost confidence in spotting these techniques, increase people’s ability to discern trustworthy from untrustworthy content, and improve the quality of their sharing decisions. These effects are robust across the political spectrum and a wide variety of covariates. We show that psychological inoculation campaigns on social media are effective at improving misinformation resilience at scale.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Five short inoculation videos targeting manipulation techniques improved recognition, confidence, trustworthiness discernment, and sharing decisions in six randomized studies (n = 6464) and a YouTube field study (n = 22,632). Effects were robust across the political spectrum and covariates, though the YouTube field effect narrowly missed the preregistered smallest effect size of interest.

Key findings

  • In studies 1–5, 16 of 20 preregistered outcome measures were supported; technique-recognition effect sizes ranged from Cohen’s d = 0.28 for scapegoating to d = 0.68 for false dichotomies. Nonsignificant effects were confidence and sharing for incoherence (study 2) and trustworthiness and sharing for scapegoating (study 4).
  • Study 6 replicated the emotional-language video: technique recognition P < 0.001, d = 0.67; trustworthiness P < 0.001, d = 0.44; sharing P < 0.001, d = 0.34. Outcome-measure response order did not significantly interact with condition (all P > 0.351).
  • In the YouTube field study (study 7), all six headlines combined showed significantly higher correct identification in treatment vs. control (P < 0.001, Cohen’s h = 0.09); emotional language P = 0.009, h = 0.05; false dichotomies P < 0.001, h = 0.13. The overall effect narrowly failed the preregistered SESOI of h = 0.10.
  • Moderation analyses found no consistently significant two-way interactions between experimental condition and covariates including gender, age, education, political ideology, news checking, social media use, populism, bullshit receptivity, conspiracy belief, analytical thinking, numeracy, personality, actively open-minded thinking, and misinformation susceptibility.

Methods

  • Seven preregistered studies: five randomized controlled studies testing five videos (total n = 5416, U.S. national quota samples), a replication of the emotional-language study (study 6, n = 1068), and an ecologically valid YouTube field study (study 7, n = 22,632).
  • In studies 1–6, participants were randomly assigned to watch a 1.5-min inoculation video or a neutral control video, then rated 10 synthetic social media posts (manipulative or neutral) on technique recognition, confidence, trustworthiness, and willingness to share; main outcomes used discernment scores (manipulative vs. neutral difference).
  • Study 7 ran two videos as YouTube ads; a random 30% of viewers were shown one test question within 24 hours, and a matched control group answered the same question without seeing an inoculation video. Analyses included independent-samples t tests, Bayesian analyses, moderation regressions, and two-proportion z tests.

Limitations

  • The paper states: the field study could not assess how long inoculation effects remain significant beyond the 24-hour window; videos and samples were tailored to U.S. audiences, so transfer to other cultural and linguistic settings is unknown; cross-protection against non-inoculated techniques was not investigated; manipulative and neutral stimuli were not exact mirrors; YouTube participants each saw only a single test item; and the YouTube study assessed susceptibility, not behavior such as sharing or watch time.
  • Evident from the text: laboratory sharing outcomes were self-reported willingness to share rather than observed sharing behavior, and the YouTube field effect was small (h = 0.09) and missed the preregistered SESOI overall.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1126/sciadv.abo6254

Cites

55 of 57 references verified1 citation errors · 1 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 of 37 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 21
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 38
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1
54 of 54
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Nonpolitical and fictitious humorous examples avoid any appearance of partisan bias and prevent triggering defensive motivated cognition.

    “All examples are nonpolitical and fictitious, in addition to being humorous, to avoid any appearance of partisan bias and prevent triggering defensive motivated cognition.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The manipulative stimuli clearly make use of a specific manipulation technique, and the neutral counterparts do not.

    “The manipulative stimuli were not always necessarily false in the sense that they made verifiably untrue claims; rather, they were designed to clearly make use of a specific manipulation technique.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    YouTube users in the treatment and control groups are comparable except for exposure to the inoculation video.

    “a control group (a group of YouTube users matched to the treatment group in terms of demographics, who were not shown an inoculation video but did answer one of the test questions)”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The single-item test question embedded within YouTube is a valid measure of manipulation technique recognition.

    “a random 30% of this group was shown one single-item test question embedded within the YouTube environment, which consisted of a headline containing a particular manipulation technique”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The headlines used in study 7 contain a particular manipulation technique.

    “which consisted of a headline containing a particular manipulation technique (the headlines were adapted from the stimuli used in studies 1 and 3)”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The control video (a SciShow video about freezer burn) was of similar length and aesthetic to the inoculation videos and its content was unrelated to online misinformation.

    “the control group watched a video of similar length and aesthetic, but with content unrelated to online misinformation (specifically: a SciShow video about freezer burn, found here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=fPEtOaGTZ0s&t=8s).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    For studies 2 to 5 (incoherence, false dichotomies, scapegoating, and ad hominem), the manipulation techniques can be clearly defined and embedded in the stimuli.

    “For studies 2 to 5 (incoherence, false dichotomies, scapegoating, and ad hominem), stimuli design was straightforward, as these techniques can be clearly defined and embedded in the stimuli.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The single test question embedded within YouTube in study 7 validly measures participants' ability to identify manipulation techniques.

    “Participants were shown a single sentence containing a manipulation technique (either emotional language or a false dichotomy; the stimuli themselves were taken from studies 1 and 3, with minor adaptations due to length limitations; see the “Stimuli” section below) and were asked to indicate what technique is used (four response options: one correct and three incorrect).”
8 of 8

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. M. Mosleh C. Martel D. Eckles D. G. Rand in CHI ‘21: Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Yokohama Japan 8 to 13 May 2021) pp. 1–13.
  2. D. Walton Ad Hominem Arguments (The University of Alabama Press 1998).

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Metadata

Authors
Roozenbeek, J., van der Linden, S., Goldberg, B., Rathje, S., & Lewandowsky, S.
Affiliations
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
  • Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK.
  • Google (United States) (US)
  • The University of Western Australia (AU)
Corresponding author
Roozenbeek, Jon
Venue
Science Advances
Published
2022-08-26
Volume
8
Issue
34
Pages
eabo6254-eabo6254
ISSN
2375-2548 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4293105742
Cited by
472
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 125 · 2025: 127 · 2024: 135 · 2023: 71 · 2022: 13
FWCI
124.83
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Science Advances (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Explore Bristol Research (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • UWA Profiles and Research Repository (UWA) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • Apollo (cc-by)
Funders
Economic and Social Research Council (ES/V011960/1)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Spam and Phishing Detection
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Islamic Finance and Communication
Keywords
psychological inoculation, misinformation, social media, manipulation techniques, emotional manipulation, false dichotomy, scapegoating, ad hominem, incoherence, manipulation detection, trustworthiness judgments, YouTube, political polarization, misinformation resilience

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