Cited by 151Climate Change Communication and PerceptionMisinformation and Its ImpactsClimate Change Policy and Economics

The ‘Alice in Wonderland’ mechanics of the rejection of (climate) science: simulating coherence by conspiracism

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Lewandowsky, Stephan, Cook, John, Lloyd, Elisabeth·2018·Synthese

Abstract

Science strives for coherence. For example, the findings from climate science form a highly coherent body of knowledge that is supported by many independent lines of evidence: greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from human economic activities are causing the global climate to warm and unless GHG emissions are drastically reduced in the near future, the risks from climate change will continue to grow and major adverse consequences will become unavoidable. People who oppose this scientific body of knowledge because the implications of cutting GHG emissions—such as regulation or increased taxation—threaten their worldview or livelihood cannot provide an alternative view that is coherent by the standards of conventional scientific thinking. Instead, we suggest that people who reject the fact that the Earth’s climate is changing due to greenhouse gas emissions (or any other body of well-established scientific knowledge) oppose whatever inconvenient finding they are confronting in piece-meal fashion, rather than systematically, and without considering the implications of this rejection to the rest of the relevant scientific theory and findings. Hence, claims that the globe “is cooling” can coexist with claims that the “observed warming is natural” and that “the human influence does not matter because warming is good for us.” Coherence between these mutually contradictory opinions can only be achieved at a highly abstract level, namely that “something must be wrong” with the scientific evidence in order to justify a political position against climate change mitigation. This high-level coherence accompanied by contradictory subordinate propositions is a known attribute of conspiracist ideation, and conspiracism may be implicated when people reject well-established scientific propositions.

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  • The five manipulation techniques used in the videos are consistently identified as epistemologically dubious: emotionally manipulative rhetoric, incoherent or mutually exclusive arguments, false dichotomies or dilemmas, scapegoating individuals or groups, and ad hominem attacks.

    “These five techniques were taken from the broader literature on argumentation and manipulation strategies and are consistently identified as epistemologically dubious: (i) using emotionally manipulative rhetoric to evoke outrage, anger, or other strong emotions (18, 22), (ii) the use of incoherent or mutually exclusive arguments (23), (iii) presenting false dichotomies or dilemmas (24), (iv) scape”

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Foster, G., & Abraham, J. (2015). Lack of evidence for a slowdown in global temperature. US CLIVAR, 13(3), 6-9.
  2. Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  3. Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of doubt. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

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Authors
Lewandowsky, S., Cook, J., & Lloyd, E.
Affiliations
  • The University of Western Australia (AU)
  • The University of Queensland (AU)
  • Indiana University Bloomington (US)
Corresponding author
Lewandowsky, Stephan
Venue
Synthese
Published
2016-09-19
Volume
195
Issue
1
Pages
175-196
ISSN
  • 0039-7857 (ISSN-L)
  • 1573-0964
OpenAlex
W2522054027
Cited by
151
References
107
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 2
FWCI
47.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Synthese (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • UWA Profiles and Research Repository (UWA) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Explore Bristol Research (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Royal Society (Wolfson Research Merit Award)
  • Australian Research Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Climate Change Communication and Perception
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
Keywords
climate change denial, conspiracy beliefs, conspiracist ideation, coherence, greenhouse gas emissions, climate change mitigation, climate change skepticism

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