Cited by 2,219Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesComplex Systems and Time Series AnalysisDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market

Salganik, Matthew J., Dodds, Peter Sheridan, Watts, Duncan J.·2006·Science

Abstract

Hit songs, books, and movies are many times more successful than average, suggesting that “the best” alternatives are qualitatively different from “the rest”; yet experts routinely fail to predict which products will succeed. We investigated this paradox experimentally, by creating an artificial “music market” in which 14,341 participants downloaded previously unknown songs either with or without knowledge of previous participants' choices. Increasing the strength of social influence increased both inequality and unpredictability of success. Success was also only partly determined by quality: The best songs rarely did poorly, and the worst rarely did well, but any other result was possible.

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Crossref · 10.1126/science.1121066

Cites

20 of 20 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Rosen's economics of superstars shows that when cost of serving additional consumers approaches zero, cultural markets concentrate rewards on a small number of winners regardless of marginal quality differences.

    “Rosen's economics of superstars [21] shows formally that when the cost of serving additional consumers approaches zero, cultural markets concentrate rewards on a small number of winners regardless of marginal quality differences”

    From AI as a Democratizing Force in Indie Game Development (2026) · cites this paper as [21]

  • The market-structure literature predicts superstar concentration under near-zero marginal cost, against which the long-tail alternative is directly testable with the outcome data of Table 13, and choice-abundant markets whose winners are selected by social dynamics rather than quality gradients.

    “The market-structure literature of §2.4 predicts what follows: superstar concentration under near-zero marginal cost [21], against which the long-tail alternative [22] is directly testable with the outcome data of Table 13, and choice-abundant markets whose winners are selected by social dynamics rather than quality gradients [23].”

    From AI as a Democratizing Force in Indie Game Development (2026) · cites this paper as [21]

  • Inequality in heterogeneous populations has two distinct aspects: dispersion of outcomes and predictability of outcomes.

    “When considering inequality in heterogeneous populations, there are two distinct aspects to take into account-the dispersion of outcomes and the predictability of outcomes (Lynn, Podolny, & Tao, 2009;Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006).”

    From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006

  • In the case of an inherent quality or virtue, more predictable outcomes imply more equality and fairness.

    “In the case of an inherent quality or virtue, more predictable outcomes imply more equality and fairness (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983;Jasso, 1983;Salganik et al., 2006).”
  • Social success and quality of content are only partly correlated.

    “However, social success and quality of content are only partly correlated (Salganik et al., 2006).”

    From Social Drivers and Algorithmic Mechanisms on Digital Media. (2024) · cites this paper as Salganik et al., 2006

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

1 of the 21 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. R. E. Caves Creative Industries (Harvard Univ. Press Cambridge MA 2000).
  2. S. Rosen, Am. Econ. Rev.71, 845 (1981).
  3. M. Adler, Am. Econ. Rev.75, 208 (1985).
  4. L. R. Anderson, C. A. Holt, Am. Econ. Rev.87, 847 (1997).

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Authors
Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S., & Watts, D. J.
Affiliations
Santa Fe Institute (US)
Corresponding author
  • Salganik, Matthew J.
  • Dodds, Peter Sheridan
  • Watts, Duncan J.
Venue
Science
Published
2006-02-10
Volume
311
Issue
5762
Pages
854-856
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W2147453867
Cited by
2,219
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 117 · 2025: 89 · 2024: 98 · 2023: 127 · 2022: 109 · 2021: 244 · 2020: 106 · 2019: 130 · 2018: 129 · 2017: 144 · 2016: 128 · 2015: 126 · 2014: 141 · 2013: 92 · 2012: 125
FWCI
162.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
cultural market, social influence, music download, product success, consumer choice
MeSH terms
Consumer Behavior, Culture, Forecasting, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Music, Research Design, Social Behavior, Sociology, Internet

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