The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments
Open accessAbstract
A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which artificial "seed" players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation did not spread beyond direct neighbors in the network. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those conducted in physical labs.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
Watts, D. J., & Strogatz, S. H. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/30918 · Cited by 43,060
Self-citationNonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences
Guitton, H., & Siegel, S. (1958) · Revue économique · doi:10.2307/3498751 · Cited by 35,245
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The Structure and Function of Complex Networks
Newman, M. E. J. (2003) · SIAM Review · doi:10.1137/s003614450342480 · Cited by 18,719
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Strogatz, S. H. (2001) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35065725 · Cited by 8,302
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90039-6 · Cited by 4,144
Conducting behavioral research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Mason, W., & Suri, S. (2012) · Behavior Research Methods · doi:10.3758/s13428-011-0124-6 · Cited by 3,172
Self-citationRevisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges.
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278 · Cited by 2,798
The spread of behavior in an online social network experiment
Centola, D. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1185231 · Cited by 2,692
Small worlds: the dynamics of networks between order and randomness
(2000) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.37-5722 · Cited by 2,360
Experimental Study of Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market
Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S., & Watts, D. J. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1121066 · Cited by 2,231
Self-citationSmall Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks between Order and Randomness
Watts, D. J. (1999) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691188331 · Cited by 2,105
Self-citation(2008) · Cited by 1,657
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
Camerer, C. F., Hogarth, R. M., Budescu, D. V., & Eckel, C. (1999) · Elicitation of Preferences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1406-8_2 · Cited by 1,545
The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market∗Preprint
Zeckhauser, R. J. (2016) · Cited by 1,529
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
COPING WITH TRAGEDIES OF THE COMMONS
Ostrom, E. (1999) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.493 · Cited by 1,390
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415424a · Cited by 1,371
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
(2020) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5 · Cited by 1,105
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
Isaac, R. M., & Walker, J. M. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882648 · Cited by 1,085
Identity and Search in Social Networks
Watts, D. J., Dodds, P. S., & Newman, M. E. J. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1070120 · Cited by 1,052
Self-citation2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1123633 · Cited by 997
Quality management on Amazon Mechanical Turk
Ipeirotis, P. G., Provost, F., & Wang, J. (2010) · Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation · doi:10.1145/1837885.1837906 · Cited by 973
von Ahn, L. (2006) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2006.196 · Cited by 955
Costly Signaling and Cooperation
GINTIS, H., SMITH, E. A., & BOWLES, S. (2001) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 · Cited by 862
Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks
Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0913149107 · Cited by 767
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1979) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226937 · Cited by 742
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1177418 · Cited by 715
The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2004) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001 · Cited by 707
Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks between Order and Randomness
Watts, D. J., & Bak, P. (2000) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.1333299 · Cited by 599
Self-citationFinancial incentives and the "performance of crowds"
Mason, W., & Watts, D. J. (2009) · Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation · doi:10.1145/1600150.1600175 · Cited by 520
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Antal, T. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0215 · Cited by 512
The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation
Egas, M., & Riedl, A. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2007.1558 · Cited by 453
Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
Nowak, M. A., Bonhoeffer, S., & May, R. M. (1994) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.91.11.4877 · Cited by 441
An Experimental Study of the Coloring Problem on Human Subject Networks
Kearns, M., Suri, S., & Montfort, N. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1127207 · Cited by 269
Self-citationCoordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence
Cassar, A. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.008 · Cited by 220
Behavioral experiments on biased voting in networks
Kearns, M. J., Judd, S. J., Tan, J., & Wortman, J. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0808147106 · Cited by 157
Glance, N., & Huberman, B. A. (1993) · Journal of Mathematical Sociology · doi:10.1080/0022250x.1993.9990112 · Cited by 140
Indirect Punishment and Generosity Toward Strangers
Ule, A., Schram, A. J. H. C., Riedl, A. M., & Cason, T. N. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1178883 · Cited by 134
17. The Evolution of Cooperation
Axelrod, R. (2009) · Stanford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781503627116-024 · Cited by 96
Cited by
Prolific.ac—A subject pool for online experiments
Palan, S., & Schitter, C. (2018) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbef.2017.12.004 · Cited by 3,450
Data collection in a flat world: the strengths and weaknesses of Mechanical Turk samples
Goodman, J. K., Cryder, C. E., & Cheema, A. (2013) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.1753 · Cited by 2,242
Evaluating amazon’s mechanical turk as a tool for experimental behavioral research
Crump, M. J. C., McDonnell, J. V., & Gureckis, T. M. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057410 · Cited by 1,617
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334
Abusive Language Detection in Online User Content
Nobata, C., Tetreault, J., Thomas, A., Mehdad, Y., & Chang, Y. (2016) · Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/2872427.2883062 · Cited by 1,122
Metadata
- Authors
- Suri, S., & Watts, D. J.
- Venue
- ACM SIGecom Exchanges
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 3-8
- ISSN
- 1551-9031 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2106114848
- Cited by
- 318
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 80.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.