Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game-theoretic modeling of its various aspects: regime persistence and breakdown, ruling-coalition formation and leadership change, protests and repression, formal institutions and elections, and censorship and media control. We review this research agenda, focusing on the foundational assumptions and political intuition behind key models. Our survey reveals a field populated by disparate models of particular mechanisms that nonetheless share two major analytical themes: asymmetries of information and commitment problems. We propose that future models move toward a genuinely comparative study of authoritarian institutions.
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Cites
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Cited by
How much should we trust the dictator’s GDP growth estimates?
Martínez, L. R. (2022) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/720458 · Cited by 228
“…which they interpret as evidence of data manipulation.3 The econometric model I develop 1 Theoretical papers on this topic include Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009), Edmond (2013), Gehlbach and Sonin (2014), Lorentzen (2014), Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik (2016), and Guriev and Treisman (2020).”
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Antiauthoritarian Movement*
Cantoni, D., Yang, D. Y., Yuchtman, N., & Zhang, Y. J. (2019) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjz002 · Cited by 209
A theory of informational autocracy
Guriev, S., & Treisman, D. (2020) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104158 · Cited by 205
Resilience to Online Censorship
Roberts, M. E. (2020) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032837 · Cited by 131
Metadata
- Authors
- Gehlbach, S., Sonin, K., & Svolik, M. W.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2016-05-11
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 565-584
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W1882610359
- Cited by
- 227
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 11.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Gehlbach, S., Sonin, K., & Svolik, M. W. (2016). Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics. Annual Review of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-042114-014927
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