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Cited by 101

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Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments

Keefer, Philip, Stasavage, David·2002·International Organization

Abstract

In this article, we argue that the effectiveness of central bank independence and exchange-rate pegs in solving credibility problems is contingent on two factors: political institutions and information asymmetries. However, the impact of these two factors differs. We argue that the presence of one institution—multiple political veto players—should be crucial for the effectiveness of central bank independence, but should have no impact on the efficacy of exchange-rate pegs. In contrast, exchange-rate pegs should have a greater anti-inflationary impact when it is difficult for the public to distinguish between inflation generated by policy choice and inflation resulting from exogenous shocks to the economy. Such information asymmetries between the public and the government, however, do not increase the efficacy of central bank independence. Empirical tests using newly developed data on political institutions provide strong support for our hypotheses.

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Research works printed but not linked: 31

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Metadata

Authors
Keefer, P., & Stasavage, D.
Venue
International Organization
Published
2002
Volume
56
Issue
4
Pages
751-774
ISSN
  • 0020-8183
  • 1531-5088
Cited by
101
References
2
Language
en

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/002081802760403766
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Keefer, P., & Stasavage, D. (2002). Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403766

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