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Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments
Abstract
In this article, we argue that the effectiveness of central bank independence and exchange-rate pegs in solving credibility problems is contingent on two factors: political institutions and information asymmetries. However, the impact of these two factors differs. We argue that the presence of one institution—multiple political veto players—should be crucial for the effectiveness of central bank independence, but should have no impact on the efficacy of exchange-rate pegs. In contrast, exchange-rate pegs should have a greater anti-inflationary impact when it is difficult for the public to distinguish between inflation generated by policy choice and inflation resulting from exogenous shocks to the economy. Such information asymmetries between the public and the government, however, do not increase the efficacy of central bank independence. Empirical tests using newly developed data on political institutions provide strong support for our hypotheses.
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“In addition, unlike political constraints, the checks variable is explicitly incremented when a party in the government has an economic policy orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the party of the executive.”
From The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy (2003) · cites this paper as Keefer (2002)
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Cited by
KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000777 · Cited by 636
Self-citationPolitical System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes
Broz, J. L. (2002) · International Organization · doi:10.1162/002081802760403801 · Cited by 301
The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy
Oatley, T. (2011) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s002081831100004x · Cited by 275
The Politics of Central Bank Independence
<!>de Haan, J., & Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2887931 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Keefer, P., & Stasavage, D.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 751-774
- ISSN
- 0020-8183
- 1531-5088
- Cited by
- 101
- References
- 2
- Language
- en
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