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Cited by 152Digital Platforms and EconomicsDigital Economy and Work TransformationDiverse Legal and Medical Studies

THE COEVOLUTION OF PLATFORM DOMINANCE AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES: EFFECTS ON COMPLEMENTOR PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES

Open access
Rietveld, Joost, Ploog, Joe N, Nieborg, David B·2020·Academy of Management Discoveries
DOI 10.5465/amd.2019.0064
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Abstract

Multisided platforms such as Apple’s App Store and Valve’s Steam become increasingly dominant when more end users and complement producers join their ecosystems. Despite their importance to a platform’s overall success, however, we know little about complement producers and how they are affected by a platform’s dominance trajectory: How does a platform’s increasingly dominant market position affect performance outcomes for complementors? We explore this question by conducting a multiple case study on four market leading platform ecosystems over several years. We discover that, as a platform becomes increasingly dominant, the platform sponsor’s governance strategies shift from being largely supportive of the wider complement population to becoming more selective and geared toward end users. These changes are associated with shifts in complementor performance outcomes. Although the value created at the overall ecosystem level increases as a platform gains dominance, average demand for individual complements decreases and becomes progressively concentrated. Furthermore, we find that prices for complements decline, whereas the costs complementors incur increase. These findings are particularly salient in the context of digital platform ecosystems, where platform sponsors can seamlessly alter their technological infrastructures and implement changes to extend and solidify their dominant positions.

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  • Interoperability enables complementors to address a larger market comprising many platforms without finding themselves at the mercy of any single platform's sudden policy changes.

    “interoperability enables complementors to address a larger market comprising many platforms without finding themselves at the mercy of any single platform's sudden policy changes (Rietveld et al., 2020;Thomas et al., 2025).”

    From Make Social Media Social Again: How Platform Interoperability Can Fix Social Media and Future‐Proof Democracy (2025) · cites this paper as Rietveld et al., 2020

    The Demand Side Factors section says a platform with many users offers complementors a larger potential customer pool. The Conclusion and Cross Platform Variation sections describe governance changes that can compromise complementors’ value capture. The paper does not establish that interoperability lets complementors reach users across multiple platforms or protects them from any one platform’s policy changes. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Eisenmann, T. R., Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. W. 2006. Strategies for two sided markets. Harvard Business Review, 84: 92-103.
  2. Morgan Kaufmann.

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Related

Authors
Rietveld, J., Ploog, J. N., & Nieborg, D. B.
Affiliations
  • University College London (GB)
  • University of Toronto Scarborough (CA)
ORCID
Venue
Academy of Management Discoveries
Publisher
Academy of Management
Published
2020-06-09
ISSN
2168-1007 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.5465/amd.2019.0064
OpenAlex
W3029702787
Cited by
151
References
73
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 26 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 3
FWCI
26.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Academy of Management Discoveries (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Digital Economy and Work Transformation
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Diverse Legal and Medical Studies
Keywords
platform dominance, platform governance, complementors, multi-sided platforms, platform ecosystems, digital platform ecosystems

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