Cited by 113Memory Processes and InfluencesPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceFace Recognition and Perception

Watching my mind unfold versus yours: an fMRI study using a novel camera technology to examine neural differences in self-projection of self versus other perspectives

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St. Jacques, Peggy L., Conway, Martin A., Lowder, Matthew W., Cabeza, Roberto·2011·Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

Self-projection, the capacity to re-experience the personal past and to mentally infer another person's perspective, has been linked to medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). In particular, ventral mPFC is associated with inferences about one's own self, whereas dorsal mPFC is associated with inferences about another individual. In the present fMRI study, we examined self-projection using a novel camera technology, which employs a sensor and timer to automatically take hundreds of photographs when worn, in order to create dynamic visuospatial cues taken from a first-person perspective. This allowed us to ask participants to self-project into the personal past or into the life of another person. We predicted that self-projection to the personal past would elicit greater activity in ventral mPFC, whereas self-projection of another perspective would rely on dorsal mPFC. There were three main findings supporting this prediction. First, we found that self-projection to the personal past recruited greater ventral mPFC, whereas observing another person's perspective recruited dorsal mPFC. Second, activity in ventral versus dorsal mPFC was sensitive to parametric modulation on each trial by the ability to relive the personal past or to understand another's perspective, respectively. Third, task-related functional connectivity analysis revealed that ventral mPFC contributed to the medial temporal lobe network linked to memory processes, whereas dorsal mPFC contributed to the fronto-parietal network linked to controlled processes. In sum, these results suggest that ventral-dorsal subregions of the anterior midline are functionally dissociable and may differentially contribute to self-projection of self versus other.

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  • Encoding of episodic memory requires the natural co-perception of one's body and the extrapersonal world, which is perceived from the first-person perspective.

    “Therefore, these studies suggest that encoding of EM requires the natural co-perception of one’s body and the extrapersonal world, which is perceived from the first-person perspective.”
  • Subsequent hits were associated with posterior cingulate cortex and rostral medial PFC, which are core midline regions of the default network that support self-referential processes and successful encoding of self-relevant information.

    “Compared with subsequent false alarms, we found that subsequent hits were associated with posterior cingulate cortex and rostral medial PFC, which are core midline regions of the default network (74) that support self-referential processes (82, 83) and successful encoding of self-relevant information (84–86).”

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Authors
St. Jacques, P. L., Conway, M. A., Lowder, M. W., & Cabeza, R.
Affiliations
  • 1Duke University
  • University of Leeds (GB)
  • Duke University (US)
Venue
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Published
2011-06-01
Volume
23
Issue
6
Pages
1275-1284
ISSN
  • 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-8898
OpenAlex
W2110926076
Cited by
113
References
58
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 9
FWCI
6.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • City Research Online (City University London) (acceptedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
National Institute on Aging (AG23770, R01AG023770, R56AG023770)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
Keywords
self-projection, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, personal history, functional connectivity, medial temporal lobe, frontoparietal network
MeSH terms
Adult, Female, Humans, Image Processing, Computer-Assisted, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Memory, Photic Stimulation, Photography, Projection, Prospective Studies, Psychomotor Performance, Psychophysiology, Self Concept, Space Perception, Prefrontal Cortex, Young Adult

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