The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures
Abstract
In recent years, most states have constructed elaborate accountability systems using school-level test scores. However, because the median elementary school contains only 69 children per grade level, such measures are quite imprecise. We evaluate the implications for school accountability systems. For instance, rewards or sanctions for schools with scores at either extreme primarily affect small schools and provide weak incentives to large ones. Nevertheless, we conclude that accountability systems may be worthwhile. Even in states with aggressive financial incentives, the marginal reward to schools for raising student performance is a small fraction of the potential labor market value for students.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
Coleman, J. S. (1968) · Equity & Excellence in Education · doi:10.1080/0020486680060504 · Cited by 5,308
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Cooper, T. (1976) · Military Medicine · doi:10.1093/milmed/141.8.521 · Cited by 3,993
Belief in the law of small numbers.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0031322 · Cited by 3,246
Education Policy Analysis Archives
(2015) · Education Policy Analysis Archives · doi:10.14507/epaa · Cited by 2,228
Trade Liberalization, Exit, and Productivity Improvements: Evidence from Chilean Plants
Pavcnik, N. (2002) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00205 · Cited by 1,777
The Black-White Test Score Gap
(2011) · Rowman & Littlefield Publishers eBooks · doi:10.5771/9780815746119 · Cited by 1,715
Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education
Black, S. E. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556070 · Cited by 1,694
The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage Differences
Neal, D. A., & Johnson, W. R. (1996) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262045 · Cited by 1,340
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B. J., & Liebman, J. B. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555702 · Cited by 1,308
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
Hall, B., & Liebman, J. (1997) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6213 · Cited by 1,291
The psychology of judgment and decision making
(1994) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-2965 · Cited by 1,253
The Growing Importance of Cognitive Skills in Wage Determination
Murnane, R. J., Willett, J. B., & Levy, F. (1995) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109863 · Cited by 1,160
Incentive contracts and performance measurement
Baker, G. P. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261831 · Cited by 1,085
Gibbons, R. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.4.115 · Cited by 1,022
Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating
Jacob, B. A., & Levitt, S. D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360698441 · Cited by 878
Economic Considerations and Class Size
Krueger, A. B. (2003) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00098 · Cited by 723
Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Baker, G. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069615 · Cited by 466
Evaluating the Effect of Teachers’ Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement
Lavy, V. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/342810 · Cited by 448
Changes in College Skills and the Rise in the College Wage Premium
Grogger, J., & Eide, E. (1995) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/146120 · Cited by 430
Plant- and Firm-Level Evidence on "New" Trade Theories
Tybout, J. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8418 · Cited by 365
Rothstein, J. M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.4.1333 · Cited by 277
The Central Role of Noise in Evaluating Interventions That Use Test Scores to Rank Schools
Chay, K. Y., Mcewan, P. J., & Urquiola, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825529 · Cited by 277
What Do Test Scores in Texas Tell Us?
Klein et al, S. P., Hamilton, L., McCaffrey, D. F., & Stecher, B. (2000) · Education Policy Analysis Archives · doi:10.14507/epaa.v8n49.2000 · Cited by 250
Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of Educators' Productivity
Koretz, D. M. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069616 · Cited by 235
Volatility in School Test Scores: Implications for Test-Based Accountability Systems
Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. (2002) · Brookings Papers on Education Policy · doi:10.1353/pep.2002.0010 · Cited by 196
Self-citationIncentives and Careers in Organizations
Gibbons, R. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5705 · Cited by 195
Plant- and Firm-Level Evidence onPreprint
Tybout, J. R. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 167
The Validity of Gains in Scores on the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS)
Koretz, D. M., & Barron, S. (1998) · Cited by 125
Perceived Effects of the Kentucky Instructional Results Information System (KIRIS).
Koretz, D. M., Barron, S., Mitchell, K., & Stecher, B. M. (1996) · Cited by 122
Improving School Accountability Measures
Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8156 · Cited by 120
Self-citationEXPLORING RAPID ACHIEVEMENT GAINS IN NORTH CAROLINA AND TEXAS
Grissmer, D. W., & Flanagan, A. (1998) · Cited by 120
Quadrennial Milepost Accountability Testing in Kentucky
Stecher, B. M., & Barron, S. (2002) · Cited by 41
Lavy, V. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.329820 · Cited by 31
Cited by
Teachers and Student Achievement in the Chicago Public High Schools
Aaronson, D., Barrow, L., & Sander, W. (2007) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/508733 · Cited by 1,291
Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India
Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/659655 · Cited by 823
Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency
Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510533 · Cited by 752
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Grouped Patterns of Heterogeneity in Panel Data
Bonhomme, S., & Manresa, E. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11319 · Cited by 451
Metadata
- Authors
- Kane, T. J., & Staiger, D. O.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2002-11-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 91-114
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035443751
- Cited by
- 503
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 35.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.