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Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
Abstract
Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people's initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that structural nonequilibrium “level-k” or “cognitive hierarchy” models often out-predict equilibrium. Even when learning is possible and converges to equilibrium, such models allow better predictions of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper surveys recent theory and evidence on strategic thinking and illustrates the applications of level-k models in economics. (JEL C70, D03, D82, D83)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, V. P., Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Iriberri, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2013-03-01
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-62
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1993429270
- Cited by
- 505
- References
- 100
- FWCI
- 62.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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