Cited by 269Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceNeural dynamics and brain functionEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Qualia: The Geometry of Integrated Information

Open access
Balduzzi, David, Tononi, Giulio·2009·PLoS Computational Biology

Abstract

According to the integrated information theory, the quantity of consciousness is the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements, and the quality of experience is specified by the informational relationships it generates. This paper outlines a framework for characterizing the informational relationships generated by such systems. Qualia space (Q) is a space having an axis for each possible state (activity pattern) of a complex. Within Q, each submechanism specifies a point corresponding to a repertoire of system states. Arrows between repertoires in Q define informational relationships. Together, these arrows specify a quale -- a shape that completely and univocally characterizes the quality of a conscious experience. Phi -- the height of this shape -- is the quantity of consciousness associated with the experience. Entanglement measures how irreducible informational relationships are to their component relationships, specifying concepts and modes. Several corollaries follow from these premises. The quale is determined by both the mechanism and state of the system. Thus, two different systems having identical activity patterns may generate different qualia. Conversely, the same quale may be generated by two systems that differ in both activity and connectivity. Both active and inactive elements specify a quale, but elements that are inactivated do not. Also, the activation of an element affects experience by changing the shape of the quale. The subdivision of experience into modalities and submodalities corresponds to subshapes in Q. In principle, different aspects of experience may be classified as different shapes in Q, and the similarity between experiences reduces to similarities between shapes. Finally, specific qualities, such as the "redness" of red, while generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it, but require considering the entire quale. Ultimately, the present framework may offer a principled way for translating qualitative properties of experience into mathematics.

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Crossref · 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462

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  • IIT offers an explanation for why intelligence and consciousness may tend to co-evolve in biological organisms: selective pressure for intelligence, acting on resource-limited substrates such as brains, typically leads to an increase in integration among the parts of a system.

    “We showed previously that IIT offers an explanation for why intelligence and consciousness may tend to co-evolve in biological organisms: selective pressure for intelligence, acting on resource-limited substrates such as brains, typically leads to an increase in integration among the parts of a system [94,95].”

    From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [95]

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  • IIT appears to be identifying consciousness with a specific measure of information.

    “In either case, IIT appears to be identifying consciousness with a specific measure of information.”

    From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [5]

    The Introduction says IIT identifies the quantity of consciousness with the amount of integrated information and describes Φ as a measure of it. But it says the quality of consciousness is specified by informational relationships, not by that single measure, so the claim is too broad if it refers to consciousness as a whole. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (Φ).

    “IIT defines a property of a system called integrated information (Φ) and postulates that this is an exact measure of the quantity of consciousness of any system.”
  • IIT implies a form of panpsychism.

    “Tononi’s response is not surprising given that IIT implies a form of panpsychism [1–8].”

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Authors
Balduzzi, D., & Tononi, G.
Affiliations
University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
Corresponding author
Tononi, Giulio
Venue
PLoS Computational Biology
Published
2009-08-14
Volume
5
Issue
8
Pages
e1000462
ISSN
  • 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
  • 1553-7358
OpenAlex
W2120745192
Cited by
269
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 13 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 12
FWCI
17.77
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PLoS Computational Biology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • James S. McDonnell Foundation
  • National Institutes of Health (DP1OD000579)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
qualia, integrated information theory, consciousness, entanglement, quality of experience
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, Consciousness, Information Theory, Models, Theoretical, Databases, Factual, Computational Biology

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