The DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions
Open accessAbstract
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ("defectors"), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called "cooperators" or "second-order free-riders"), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ("moralists"), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ("immoralists"). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the "second-order free-rider problem". Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ("who laughs last laughs best effect"). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an "unholy collaboration". Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of "moral behavior" by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Hardin, G. (1968) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.162.3859.1243 · Cited by 25,167
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Hardin, G. (2009) · Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research · doi:10.1080/19390450903037302 · Cited by 6,367
Nielsen, R. P., & Axelrod, R. (1985) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257983 · Cited by 6,321
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475 · cited 1×
“goods dilemmas [2–8], and it is effective indeed [9–11].”
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Coevolutionary games—A mini review
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2010) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.10.003 · Cited by 1,971
Self-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice
Szabó, G., & Tőke, C. (1998) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.58.69 · Cited by 1,659
Self-citationSocial diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games
Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., & Pacheco, J. M. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06940 · Cited by 1,442
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H.-J. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415424a · Cited by 1,371
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359
Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games
Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1070582 · Cited by 1,114
(2006) · Cited by 1,041
The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., & Rockenbach, B. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1123633 · Cited by 997
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02978 · Cited by 865
(2001) · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 · Cited by 803
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation
(2003) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3232.001.0001 · Cited by 743
When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1110600 · Cited by 732
Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1141588 · Cited by 725
The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2004) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2003.07.001 · Cited by 707
Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games
Szabó, G., & Hauert, C. (2002) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.89.118101 · Cited by 660
Self-citationSigmund, K., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2001) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.161155698 · Cited by 644
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change
Milinski, M., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Reed, F. A., & Marotzke, J. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0709546105 · Cited by 610
Sigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570
Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2006) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020140 · Cited by 556 · cited 1×
“Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate the emergence of punishment within the framework of a coevolutionary model [54–56], where both, individual strategies and punishment levels are simultaneously spread.”
Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Antal, T. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0215 · Cited by 512
The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions
Helbing, D., & Yu, W. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0811503106 · Cited by 484
Self-citationAltruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation
Fowler, J. H. (2005) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0500938102 · Cited by 473
Driving forces behind informal sanctions
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x · Cited by 451
Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
Nowak, M. A., Bonhoeffer, S., & May, R. M. (1994) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.91.11.4877 · Cited by 441
Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games
Brandt, H., Hauert, C., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2003.2336 · Cited by 419
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0912515107 · Cited by 412
Critical Coarsening without Surface Tension: The Universality Class of the Voter Model
Dornic, I., Chaté, H., Chave, J., & Hinrichsen, H. (2001) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.87.045701 · Cited by 375
Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game
Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature01986 · Cited by 362
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation
Wilson, D. S. (2004) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.06.001 · Cited by 337
NOWAK, M. A., BONHOEFFER, S., & MAY, R. M. (1994) · International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos · doi:10.1142/s0218127494000046 · Cited by 307
Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games
Traulsen, A., Hauert, C., De Silva, H., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0808450106 · Cited by 271
The Dynamics and Dilemmas of Collective Action
Heckathorn, D. D. (1996) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2096334 · Cited by 254
Spatial dynamics of ecological public goods
Wakano, J. Y., Nowak, M. A., & Hauert, C. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0812644106 · Cited by 226
Fehr, E. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/432449a · Cited by 219
Punishing and abstaining for public goods
Brandt, H., Hauert, C., & Sigmund, K. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0507229103 · Cited by 204
False friends are worse than bitter enemies
Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T., & Ohmura, Y. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.001 · Cited by 193
Rock-scissors-paper game on regular small-world networks
Szabó, G., Szolnoki, A., & Izsák, R. (2004) · Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General · doi:10.1088/0305-4470/37/7/006 · Cited by 175
Self-citationDirect reciprocity with costly punishment: Generous tit-for-tat prevails
Rand, D. G., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.015 · Cited by 165
Defector-accelerated cooperativeness and punishment in public goods games with mutations
Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Szabó, G. (2010) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.81.057104 · Cited by 148
Self-citationThe coevolution of altruism and punishment: Role of the selfish punisher
Nakamaru, M., & Iwasa, Y. (2005) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.011 · Cited by 144
Colman, A. M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/440744b · Cited by 104
Selection of dynamical rules in spatial Prisoner's Dilemma games
Szabó, G., Szolnoki, A., & Vukov, J. (2009) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007 · Cited by 99
Self-citationNakamaru, M., & Iwasa, Y. (2005) · Evolutionary ecology research · Cited by 95
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment
Boyd, R. T., Gintis, H. M., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2005) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4771.003.0012 · Cited by 94
Selfishness as second-order altruism
Eldakar, O. T., & Wilson, D. S. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0712173105 · Cited by 92
Population Structure Induces a Symmetry Breaking Favoring the Emergence of Cooperation
Pacheco, J. M., Pinheiro, F. L., & Santos, F. C. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000596 · Cited by 68
Second-order free-riding problem solved?
Fowler, J. H. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04201 · Cited by 65
Calculating Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations
Nathanson, C., Tarnita, C. E., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615 · Cited by 44
Sekiguchi, T., & Nakamaru, M. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.025 · Cited by 32
麻由子, 中. (2005) · Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB) · Cited by 27
Nakamaru, M., & Iwasa, Y. (2006) · Tokyo Tech Research Repository (Tokyo Institute of Technology) · Cited by 24
Cited by
Networks beyond pairwise interactions: Structure and dynamics
Battiston, F., Cencetti, G., Iacopini, I., Latora, V., Lucas, M., Patania, A., Young, J.-G., & Petri, G. (2020) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2020.05.004 · Cited by 1,602
Statistical physics of human cooperation
Perc, M., Jordan, J. J., Rand, D. G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., & Szolnoki, A. (2017) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2017.05.004 · Cited by 1,590
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review
Perc, M., Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Szolnoki, A., Floría, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2013) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2012.0997 · Cited by 1,340
Self-citationReward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2010) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/92/38003 · Cited by 689
Self-citationFairness Expectations and Altruistic Sharing in 15-Month-Old Human Infants
Schmidt, M. F. H., & Sommerville, J. A. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223 · Cited by 579
Metadata
- Authors
- Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Szabó, G.
- Venue
- PLoS Computational Biology
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2010-04-29
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- e1000758
- ISSN
- 1553-734X (ISSN-L)
- 1553-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2104702102
- Cited by
- 389
- References
- 61
- FWCI
- 110.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.