The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Looking for Myself: Current Multisensory Input Alters Self-Face Recognition
Open accessAbstract
How do I know the person I see in the mirror is really me? Is it because I know the person simply looks like me, or is it because the mirror reflection moves when I move, and I see it being touched when I feel touch myself? Studies of face-recognition suggest that visual recognition of stored visual features inform self-face recognition. In contrast, body-recognition studies conclude that multisensory integration is the main cue to selfhood. The present study investigates for the first time the specific contribution of current multisensory input for self-face recognition. Participants were stroked on their face while they were looking at a morphed face being touched in synchrony or asynchrony. Before and after the visuo-tactile stimulation participants performed a self-recognition task. The results show that multisensory signals have a significant effect on self-face recognition. Synchronous tactile stimulation while watching another person's face being similarly touched produced a bias in recognizing one's own face, in the direction of the other person included in the representation of one's own face. Multisensory integration can update cognitive representations of one's body, such as the sense of ownership. The present study extends this converging evidence by showing that the correlation of synchronous multisensory signals also updates the representation of one's face. The face is a key feature of our identity, but at the same time is a source of rich multisensory experiences used to maintain or update self-representations.
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In the citing paper
“The first relevant finding to support our argument is that experimentally induced modulations of body ownership enhance perceived physical similarity between self and other.”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [26]
In the citing paper
“In a more objective quantification of a comparable effect, participants accepted morphed photos of faces with a higher percentage of the other as depicting themselves after experiencing an enfacement illusion, suggesting that the participants' stored representations of their own faces were altered to incorporate aspects of the other person [26,35,36].”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [26]
In the citing paper
“For example, after the rubber hand illusion, participants rated the rubber hand as more physically similar to their own [26].”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [26]
In the citing paper
“produces a measurable bias in self-face recognition, whereby participants perceive the other's face as looking more like their own [26,35,36].”
From Changing bodies changes minds: Owning another body affects social cognition (2015) · cites this paper as [26]
In the citing paper
“Tsakiris [32] showed that synchronous, but not asynchronous, visuo-tactile stimulation between the participant’s own face and a morphed face, containing a blending of the facial features of the participant (50%) with the features of someone else’s face (50%), produced a measurable bias in self-face recognition.”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“Using unfamiliar faces rules out the possibility that the bias in self-face recognition towards the other’s face could be accounted simply by face familiarity and affiliation with the other [32], while obtaining a baseline self-recognition prior to stimulation allows us to quantify the exact change in self-face recognition as a result of multisensory stimulation (cf. [33]).”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“These findings are compatible with the behavioral results of Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33], but importantly, they show, for the first time, that IMS between one’s own face and a completely unknown face can affect the mental representation of one’s own face.”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“Tsakiris [32] used a self-other morphed face during visuo-tactile stimulation, rather than an unfamiliar other;”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“This issue was investigated by Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33], who failed to find significant differences between self-recognition changes for the “self to other” and “other to self” directions [32] and between the judgments given under different instruction conditions (e.g., to evaluate the amount of “self” or to evaluate the amount of “other” contained in the morphs) [33].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“Experiment 1 was designed to control for potential confounds reported in previous studies, such as the use of a familiar face [32], [33] and the lack of a pre-test baseline self-recognition performance [33].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“This asymmetric effect for the two directions of morphing could also be observed in Experiment 1, but was not found in previous studies where the other’s face was a familiar one [32], [33].”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“Is it possible that synchronous IMS disrupts face recognition performance in general? This seems unlikely, given that Tsakiris [32] showed the behavioral effect to be specific to the face seen during visuo-tactile stimulation, and not to other familiar faces that were not seen during stimulation.”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“The percentage of change reported in Experiment 1 is comparable to that reported in similar studies that used a familiar “other” face (1.8% in [32], and 4.4% in [33]).”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
In the citing paper
“Previous studies failed to find significant differences between self-recognition changes for the “self to other” and “other to self” directions in a video morphing from one face to the other [32], a task identical to the one used in our Experiment 4, and between the judgments of morphed images under different instruction conditions (either to evaluate the amount of “self” or to evaluate the amount”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [32]
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Citations
Cites
The distributed human neural system for face perception
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01482-0 · Cited by 4,891
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410
Understanding face recognition
Bruce, V., & Young, A. (1986) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1986.tb02199.x · Cited by 4,067
Parts and Wholes in Face Recognition
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A · doi:10.1080/14640749308401045 · Cited by 2,179
A cortical area selective for visual processing of the human body
Downing, P. E., Jiang, Y., Shuman, M., & Kanwisher, N. (2001) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1063414 · Cited by 2,043
The fusiform face area: a cortical region specialized for the perception of faces
Kanwisher, N., & Yovel, G. (2006) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2006.1934 · Cited by 1,718
That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb
Ehrsson, H. H., Spence, C., & Passingham, R. E. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1097011 · Cited by 1,348
The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.80 · Cited by 1,328
What is embodiment? A psychometric approach
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.004 · Cited by 956
If I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping
Petkova, V. I., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2008) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003832 · Cited by 953
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The Sense of Embodiment in Virtual Reality
Kilteni, K., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2012) · PRESENCE Virtual and Augmented Reality · doi:10.1162/pres_a_00124 · Cited by 1,901
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vogeley, K. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000660 · Cited by 1,510
Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness.
Blanke, O. (2012) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3292 · Cited by 1,147
My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership.
Tsakiris, M. (2010) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.034 · Cited by 1,069
Pan, X., & Hamilton, A. F. D. C. (2018) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/bjop.12290 · Cited by 801
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsakiris, M.
- Venue
- PLoS ONE
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2008-12-24
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- e4040
- ISSN
- 1932-6203 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC2603324
- OpenAlex
- W2155205708
- Cited by
- 330
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 29 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 16
- FWCI
- 11.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS ONE (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council (RES‐061‐25‐0233)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Multisensory perception and integration
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Tactile and Sensory Interactions
- Keywords
- self-face recognition, multisensory integration, visuo-tactile stimulation, representation of the body, self-representation, face identity, specular reflection, morphed faces
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Awareness, Body Image, Face, Female, Humans, Image Processing, Computer-Assisted, Male, Mental Processes, Pattern Recognition, Visual, Photic Stimulation, Physical Stimulation, Self Concept, Sensation, Visual Perception, Recognition, Psychology, Young Adult
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