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A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167097853
- Cited by
- 1,629
- References
- 57
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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