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The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.
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Citations
Cited by
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
Pryor, J. (2000) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00277 · Cited by 1,127
Contemporary debates in epistemology
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0232 · Cited by 969
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
Williamson, T. (1996) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2998423 · Cited by 589
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
Alston, W. P. (1988) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214077 · Cited by 578
Justification and the Truth-Connection
Littlejohn, C. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139060097 · Cited by 530
Metaepistemology and Skepticism
Fumerton, R. (1990) · Doubting · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-1942-6_5 · Cited by 523
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions
Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2012) · Collected Papers, Volume 2 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0008 · Cited by 520
Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know
Lackey, J. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x · Cited by 388
Buchak, L. (2014) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0182-y · Cited by 380
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility
Douven, I. (2006) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-010 · Cited by 357
Coherence as constraint satisfaction
Thagard, P. (1998) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1016/s0364-0213(99)80033-0 · Cited by 352
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Berker, S. (2013) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2087645 · Cited by 336
Highlights of Recent Epistemology
Pryor, J. (2001) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/52.1.95 · Cited by 335
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
Nelkin, D. K. (2000) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-109-3-373 · Cited by 327
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Worsnip, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12246 · Cited by 317
How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism
WEINBERG, J. M. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00157.x · Cited by 292
The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good
Zagzebski, L. (2003) · Metaphilosophy · doi:10.1111/1467-9973.00257 · Cited by 288
Alston, W. P. (1988) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00869630 · Cited by 276
Bernecker, S. (2008) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-8220-7 · Cited by 267
Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology
Goldman, A. I. (1993) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.2307/1522948 · Cited by 170
(2013) · Philosopher's Imprint · Cited by 80
Unconscious perceptual justification*
Berger, J., Nanay, B., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2018) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1432413 · Cited by 53
Lackey, J. (2006) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00035.x · Cited by 46
Metadata
- Authors
- Moser, P. K., & Bonjour, L.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1987-06
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 670
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2151075651
- Cited by
- 1,206
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 244.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.