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What Psychological States are Not
Abstract
AS FAR as anyone knows, different organisms are often in psychological states of exactly the same type at one time or another, and a given organism is often in psychological states of exactly the same type at different times. Whenever either is the case, we shall say of the psychological states of the organism(s) in question that they are type identical. One thing that currently fashionable theories in the philosophy of mind often try to do is characterize the conditions for type identity of psychological states. For example, some varieties of philosophical behaviorism claim that two organisms are in typeidentical psychological states if and only if certain of their behaviors or behavioral dispositions are type identical. Analogously, some (though not all) varieties of physicalism claim that organisms are in type-identical psychological states if and only if certain of their physical states are type identical. In so far as they are construed as theories about the conditions for type identity of psychological states, it seems increasingly unlikely that either behaviorism or physicalism is true. Since
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Block, N. J., & Fodor, J. A.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1972-04
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 159
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2028599038
- Cited by
- 552
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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