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On the Reconciliation of Probability Assessments
Abstract
This paper investigates the question of how to reconcile incoherent probability assessments, i.e., assessments that are inconsistent with the laws of probability. A general model for the analysis of probability assessments is introduced, and two approaches to the reconciliation problem are developed. In the internal approach, one estimates the subject's true probabilities on the basis of his assessments. In the external approach, an external observer updates his own coherent probabilities in the light of the assessments made by the subject. The two approaches are illustrated and discussed. Least-squares procedures for reconciliation are developed within the internal approach. (Author)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lindley, D. V., Tversky, A., & Brown, R. V.
- Venue
- Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General)
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979
- Volume
- 142
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 146
- ISSN
- 0035-9238 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1509045286
- Cited by
- 340
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 12.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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