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Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
Abstract
A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoffstructure is determined by a rairdom draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game.For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise forces the players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion.When the uncertainty is one-dimensional, the result may be obtained by repeated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game."1'his pxper is a combinat.ion,and a subatantial generalization, of Carlxson (19R9) and Carlason and Van Damme (1989).Some basic ideas on global games and their telation to risk dominance originate from a note, written by Cadseon in 1985.The suthora thank R.einhard Selten, Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Jdrgen Weibull and various seminar audiences Cor helpful comments.The conatructive criticiam of several referees considerably improved the paper's quality.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Carlsson, H., & van Damme, E.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-09
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 989
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2107031016
- Cited by
- 1,535
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 5.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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