The Evolution of Conventions
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Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
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Strategic Uncertainty and the Genetic Algorithm Adaptation
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“If all Nash equilibria are strict, then the definition of weak acyclicity under best replies coincides with the definition of weak acyclicity by Young (1993).”
BackgroundInfluentialWhat noise matters? Experimental evidence for stochastic deviations in social norms
Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., & Nax, H. H. (2020) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2020.101626 · Cited by 12
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“They find numerous applications in modeling social and economic behaviors like the emergence of social norms and conventions or the adoption of new technologies [21], [32], [33], [34], [35].”
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“Again, note that the cheapest way to leave an absorbing set is by only 12 While the original cost trees in the sense of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) are defined over all absorbing sets, reduced cost trees are only defined over a subset of absorbing sets compromising one set for each class…”
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“…(to be specified below), one for each player, the vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) of conditional experimentation probabilities (to be specified below), and the vector κ = (κ1, . . . , κn) of conditional learning probabilities (in case of 2 or more alternative best replies, again to be specified below).”
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“In Theorem 1 of Young (1993b) it is shown—for populations solely consisting of L1 individuals—that if at least one individual in each population samples at most half of the record of play, then (from any initial state) the process converges almost surely to a convention.”
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Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
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The Evolution of Organizational Conventions and Gains from DiversityPreprint
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Institutional resilience: how the formal legal system sustains informal cooperation
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“As with the standard methodology for convergence analysis of payoff-based learning dynamics to NE of potential games (e.g., Young 1993), the fundamental concept underlying the convergence analysis in Zhu and Martínez (2013) is the stochastic stability of the Markov chain {z(t)} (see Definition 5 in…”
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Paarporn, K., Alizadeh, M., & Marden, J. R. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2020.3002499 · Cited by 11
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Inequality in minimum-effort coordination
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Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games
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“After that, in Section 4 we give a qualitative overview of the main results, placing them in the context of the 1This outcome is similar to what could be expected based on stochastic stability (Young, 1993), but is obtained in a completely different framework.”
Informed-user Algorithms that Converge to Nash Equilibrium in Traffic Games
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Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a Public Good game
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Fairness and self-interest: An assessment
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Stochastic stability in the Scarf economy
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“…that the risk dominant equilibrium, and not necessarily the payoff dominant one, will be the one to be played (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993).5 In what follows, we therefore assume that the equilibrium that is selected is the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium.”
The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph
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“We invite the reader who is interested in a formal exposition of perturbed Markov chain theory to consult Young (1993) and Ellison (2000), while in the following we simply make use of the resistance function r : M × M → R+ ∪ {∞}, where r(m, m′) indicates the minimum number of mistakes required to…”
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“The limit invariant distribution (as the rate of experimentation tends to zero)μ∗ = limε→0 μ (ε) exists and is an invariant distribution of the unperturbed process (Kandori et al. 1993; Young 1993; Ellison 2000).”
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Self-citationEquilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play
Hansen, P. S., & Kaarbøe, O. M. (2002) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-001-0243-x · Cited by 10
“5 Based upon arguments in Freidlin and Wentzell [6], Young [16] has shown that this limit exists.”
BackgroundBeyond rationality: Rigor without mortis in game theory
Colman, A. M. (2003) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0350005x · Cited by 12
Meritocratic Matching Stabilizes Public Goods ProvisionPreprint
Nax, H. H., Murphy, R. O., & Helbing, D. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2404280 · Cited by 10
On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design ParadoxPreprint
Alós‐Ferrer, C., Kirchsteiger, G., & Walzl, M. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.993675 · Cited by 10
Long-run cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma: A hierarchic evolutionary approach
Vega‐Redondo, F. (1996) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/0303-2647(96)81239-1 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.