The Evolution of Conventions
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Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
Citations
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“Such theoretical models suggest that risk-dominant conventions are more likely to occur even if they are inefficient (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993).”
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“CentER's hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. members of the population (e. g. Binmore and Samuelson (1994), Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993)), an increasing number of papers deals with local interaction structures (e. g. Anderlini and Ianni (1996), Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1994a,b), Boyer…”
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“It can be shown that, if information srm is Ž .sufficiently incomplete in particular, if srm F 1r2 , then the process Žconverges with probability one to a coordination equilibrium Young, 1993, .”
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“Tractability is gained by considering the limit as the noise level in agents’ decisions vanishes (see Foster and Young (1990); Kandori et al. (1993); Young (1993, 1998); Ellison (2000)), or as the population size grows large (see Binmore et al. (1995); Binmore and Samuelson (1997)), or both; see…”
BackgroundReinforcement Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas
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“interact with all other actors in the population, without assuming any social structure (e.g. Kandori, Mailath & Rob, 1993; Young, 1993).”
BackgroundMulti-player games on the cycle
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Salience and focusing in pure coordination games
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“In spite of these and similar discouraging remarks from early commentators, pure coordination games have attracted increasing attention from game theorists and experimental researchers in recent years (e.g. Anderlini 1995; Bacharach 1993; Bacharach and Bemasconi in press; Bicchieri 1993; Colman 1995: 33-40; Colman and…”
ResultEndogenous networks, social games, and evolution
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“Young (1993), and many other papers that followed.”
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Self-citationStochastic stability for roommate markets
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“This approach has first been used for equilibrium selection in non-cooperative game theory (see [11,20]) and has been adapted to network formation (and marriage markets in particular) by Jackson and Watts [10].”
MethodInfluentialWhy Does Research in Finance Have so Little Impact?
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“…in the world (e.g. developing countries) as these are considerably more difficult to publish in the ‘top’ journals thereby establishing a convention (Young, 1993) through the positive feedback effects of journal acceptance.26 The conventions of ‘top’ ranking journals have consequences for faculty…”
Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia
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Waves in consumption with interdependence among consumers
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“…is the peer of every other.6 To remove from the very strong standardization results of the technology choice literature, it is important to recognize heterogeneity among agents, even if only peer 3 See for example, Banerjee (1993); Bernheim (1994); Corneo and Jeanne (forthcoming); Young (1993).”
BackgroundCooperation Through Imitation and Exclusion In Networks
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“Result 1 If I + Z = 2 , all realizations converge to a graph where the largest component consists of a core of cooperators with cliques of defectors lying on the periphery.”
InfluentialAn evolutionary model of energy transitions with interactive innovation-selection dynamics
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Emergence of conventions through social learning: Heterogeneous learners in complex networks
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Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations
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“We consider a population of sizeN 2 and describe its evolution by a homogeneous Markov chain fX(t; ;N) : t = 0; 1; : : : g with 2This way of computing the support of the limit distribution was introduced by Freidlin and Wentzell [9]; its use in evolutionary game theory is due to Kandori et al. [18] and Young [25].”
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“Since the risk dominance prediction is in uenced by 10For example, see van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) and Young (1993).”
BackgroundChapman, A. C., Rogers, A., Jennings, N. R., & Leslie, D. S. (2011) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888911000178 · Cited by 55
“It is frequently used in applications of local greedy algorithms (e.g. Matthews & Durrant-Whyte, 2006), and in implementations of fictitious play (e.g. Leslie & Collins, 2006) and some variants of adaptive play (e.g. Young, 1993).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMouzas, S., & Ford, D. (2009) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2008.09.003 · Cited by 66
“We use the term ‘constitution’ to encapsulate a higher-order of multiple conventions that are customary, expected and often self-enforcing within particular business networks (Buchanan, 1975, 1978, 1988; Lewis, 1967; Young, 1993).”
BackgroundMethodQoE-Aware Intelligent Vertical Handoff Scheme Over Heterogeneous Wireless Access Networks
Chen, J., Wang, Y., Li, Y., & Wang, E. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2853730 · Cited by 56
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“Models of the ‘evolution of conventions’ (Young (1993)) have linked dynamic behaviour in such coordination games to the structure of the underlying network.”
BackgroundEvolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
Nax, H. H., & Pradelski, B. (2014) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-014-0459-1 · Cited by 58
Evolutionary Game Theory and Population Dynamics
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MethodComplexity, organization, and Stuart Kauffman's The Origins of Order
Westhoff, F., Yarbrough, B. V., & Yarbrough, R. M. (1996) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00049-6 · Cited by 53
“…( 1990); Young and Foster (1991); Binmore and Samuelson (1992); Ellison (1992); Nachbar (1992); Papadimitriou (1992); Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993). ooo1 0010 e$E 0110 oooo 0100 0101 0011 1000 1100 1001 m 1101 0111 1010 1110 1011 1111 cF7 STATE CYCLE A STATE CYCLE B STATE CYCLE C Fig.”
Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling
Offerman, T., & Schotter, A. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.004 · Cited by 52
Bargaining power in communication networks
Calvó‐Armengol, A. (2001) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00049-4 · Cited by 52
“For instance, Young (1993) recovers (and generalizes) the Nash solution as the unique stable outcome of an evolutionary version of the Nash demand game.”
Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
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Games on NetworksPreprint
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“Young [25] presented a bargaining game for bilateral bargaining with the goal to maximize payoffs of stakeholders as much as possible.”
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Cache Policies for Linear Utility Maximization
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A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution
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“Now, we propose an algorithm by using the best response dynamic structure in [34] to attain the feasible strategy profiles which we refer to it as the iterative resource allocation (IRA) or Algorithm 2.”
MethodConstrained interactions and social coordination
Staudigl, M., & Weidenholzer, S. (2014) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.001 · Cited by 50
“We consider a model of noisy best response learning in discrete time à la Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). Each period t = 0, 1, 2, .”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCoalitional stochastic stability
Newton, J. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.014 · Cited by 50
“Young (1993) applies these ideas to the evolution of social norms in a discrete time dynamic process which he calls adaptive play.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialDynamics and convergence of hyper-networked evolutionary games with time delay in strategies☆
Zhang, J., Lou, J., Qiu, J., & Lu, J. (2021) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2021.02.033 · Cited by 48
Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play
Naidu, S., Hwang, S., & Bowles, S. (2010) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.005 · Cited by 69
Evolution and the Social Contract
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Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games
Banerjee, A., & Weibull, J. W. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0756 · Cited by 50
“3By contrast, Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993), and Kandori and Rob (1995) show that certain stochastic dynamics, that can be interpreted as processes of social evolution, select the risk-dominant equilibrium in 2 × 2 coordination games. a message that does not belong to the group of messages…”
BackgroundDissonance Minimization as a Microfoundation of Social Influence in Models of Opinion Formation
Groeber, P., Lorenz, J., & Schweitzer, F. (2014) · Journal of Mathematical Sociology · doi:10.1080/0022250x.2012.724486 · Cited by 53
“7In the context of games with a finite number of strategies, alternative dynamics that also include the probability of randommistakes by the agents are provided by Young (1993).”
BackgroundEndogenous dynamics of institutional change
DellaPosta, D., Nee, V. G., & Opper, S. (2016) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463116633147 · Cited by 61
“Our model builds upon previous work on the evolution of social norms, diffusion of institutional innovations (Nee and Opper, 2012), and choices with network externalities (Axelrod, 1984, 1986; Nee and Lian, 1994; DiMaggio and Garip, 2011; Schelling, 1973; Young, 1993, 2011).”
BackgroundMethodOn Endogenously Staggered Prices
Bhaskar, V. (2002) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00199 · Cited by 49
Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with applications to duopoly
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Dynamic focal points in N-person coordination games
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Beyond replicator dynamics: Innovation–selection dynamics and optimal diversity
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“Notable exceptions are Foster and Young (1990), Canning (1992), Young (1993), and Kandori et al. (1993), who propose models of adaptive learning in the context of repeated 2x2 games.”
BackgroundTrust as a determinant of social welfare in the digital economy
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“Recent research elaborated income and trust level of individuals as the significant determinants of social welfare (1993).”
Predicting and preventing coordination problems in cooperative Q-learning systems
Fulda, N., & Ventura, D. A. (2007) · International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence · Cited by 47
Bubbles and crashes: Gradient dynamics in financial markets
Friedman, D., & Abraham, R. (2008) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2008.10.006 · Cited by 47
Reinforcement Learning Algorithms for Adaptive Cyber Defense against Heartbleed
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Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks
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“Games in the coordination class have been widely used as models for conventions [24, 25, 31], but they have typically received little attention as models of cooperation, although interesting exceptions to this trend are [32–35].”
MethodAn experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
Lim, W., & Neary, P. R. (2016) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.010 · Cited by 48
“For agents who follow the mBR learning rule there are three ‘standard’ models of deviations that appear in the literature: (i) payoff-independent deviations (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993) are precisely that - equally likely no matter what the current circumstances; (ii) payoff(1)Fudenberg and Levine (1…”
Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games
Agastya, M. K. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2574 · Cited by 48
Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
Schipper, B. C. (2009) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2009.06.003 · Cited by 48
The Emergence of Firms in a Population of AgentsPreprint
Axtell, R. L. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 83
Evolutionary agent-based economics
Alkemade, F. (2004) · Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), the national research institute for mathematics and computer science in the Netherlands · doi:10.6100/ir581264 · Cited by 73
Dai, H., Huang, Y., & Yang, L. (2015) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2015.2416988 · Cited by 47
“Proof: To study the asymptotical optimality of simultaneous Max-logit learning, we deduce the following two Theorems by introducing the theory of resistance trees for regular perturbed Markov decision process [35].”
MethodNetwork structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis
Rosenkranz, S., & Weitzel, U. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.003 · Cited by 47
“We study subjects’ strategic investment decisions in four basic network structures.”
Integrating Reinforcement Learning with Multi-Agent Techniques for Adaptive Service Composition
Wang, H., Chen, X., Wu, Q., Yu, Q., Hu, X., Zheng, Z., & Bouguettaya, A. (2017) · ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems · doi:10.1145/3058592 · Cited by 50
“To improve the efficiency of the fictitious play process, Young [23] proposed an optimized version and proved its validity.”
MethodTorre, A. (2006) · Entrepreneurship and Regional Development · doi:10.1080/08985620500467557 · Cited by 47
“In particular there are the works dedicated to commons, following Schelling’s founding work, and the analyses concerning the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod 1984), in their spatial form (Nowak and May 1992) or their conventional form (Young 1993).”
BackgroundDivide et Impera. Optimnal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels and Organized CrimePreprint
Spagnolo, G. (2004) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 47
Application of Automated Guided Vehicles in Smart Automated Warehouse Systems: A Survey
Zhang, Z., Chen, J., & Guo, Q. (2022) · Computer Modeling in Engineering & Sciences · doi:10.32604/cmes.2022.021451 · Cited by 81
Overcoming the Limitations of Utility Design for Multiagent Systems
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Energy Efficient Spectrum Sharing Strategy Selection for Cognitive MIMO Interference Channels
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“In this subsection, we study the feasibility of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the our proposed game with Co.1 and (or) Co.2.”
MethodSecurity Against Impersonation Attacks in Distributed Systems
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An Agent-Based Model of Centralized Institutions, Social Network Technology, and Revolution
Makowsky, M. D., & Rubin, J. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080380 · Cited by 57
“For more on the mechanisms underlying rapid changes in publicly displayed preferences, see [6,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26].”
BackgroundNoisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bhaskar, V. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2423 · Cited by 46
Quan, J., Liu, W., Chu, Y., & Wang, X. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-16140-8 · Cited by 45
Industry Self‐Regulation: A Game‐Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance
Ashby, S., Chuah, S., & Hoffmann, R. F. (2004) · International Journal of the Economics of Business · doi:10.1080/1357151032000172255 · Cited by 50
“A number of authors have provided accounts of the evolution of institutions in games (see, for instance, Lewis, 1969; Sugden, 1986; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993).”
BackgroundConverting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation
Leeson, P. T., Coyne, C. J., & Boettke, P. J. (2006) · The Review of Austrian Economics · doi:10.1007/s11138-006-7345-4 · Cited by 46
“On the evolution of equilibria in coordination scenarios played repeatedly, given a population, see Crawford (1991), Kandori, et al. (1993), Young (1993) and Ellison (1993).”
BackgroundConvergent Learning Algorithms for Unknown Reward Games
Chapman, A. C., Leslie, D. S., Rogers, A., & Jennings, N. R. (2013) · SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization · doi:10.1137/120893501 · Cited by 44
“However for Q –learning variants we have seen that it is important to play all (joint) actions infinitely often. Therefore we consider a perturbation, which we call uniform sampling, applied to the adaptive play process. We begin by considering the simpler case of games with known rewards, before extending the analysi…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialDiekmann, A., & Przepiorka, W. (2015) · Social Forces · doi:10.1093/sf/sov107 · Cited by 54
“Examples are vehicles driving on the right-hand side of the road (Young 1993), or the emergence of cultural badges (Centola and Baronchelli 2015).”
BackgroundFrom Peer Pressure to Biased Norms
Michaeli, M., & Spiro, D. (2017) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20150151 · Cited by 46
“These games are particularly useful for studying social norms as, when there are many players, a common interpretation is that the point of coordination constitutes a social norm or convention (e.g., Schelling 1960, Lewis 1969, Granovetter 1978, Young 1993).”
BackgroundBurke, M. A., & Young, H. P. (2011) · Handbook of social economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53187-2.00008-5 · Cited by 95
Self-citationHeterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
Fudenberg, D., & Takahashi, S. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014 · Cited by 45
“…histories seem natural in a number of other learning models in addition to SFP, for example in models where agents have a short memory and play a best response to their most recent observation, or to a subsample of the last few outcomes, as in Young (1993); we hope to explore this in future work.”
Social Approval, Values, and AFDC: A Reexamination of the Illegitimacy Debate
Nechyba, T. J. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/321020 · Cited by 47
Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
Sandholm, W. H. (1998) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00163-3 · Cited by 45
“We consider the evolution of play under Bernoulli selection: in each round, each player independently with some fixed probability θ ∈ (0, 1] receives the learning draw.”
BackgroundAre evolutionary games another way of thinking about game theory?
Schmidt, C. (2004) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-004-0213-0 · Cited by 44
“Third step, the biologists’ inventions are, in their turn, captured by the economists to renew and to enlarge their understanding of some basic ideas in game theory (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991; Boyland, 1992; Young, 1993).”
BackgroundWhen Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
Myatt, D. P., & Wallace, C. (2008) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00482.x · Cited by 50
“One possibility, following Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), would be to allow players to “mutate” against the flow of play by choosing a non-best-reply with some small probability.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialNo-regret dynamics and fictitious play
Viossat, Y., & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Y. (2013) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003 · Cited by 44
“It is well known that discrete fictitious play does not lead to no regret [27, 51].”
Asymmetric Game: A Silver Bullet to Weighted Vertex Cover of Networks
Tang, C., Li, A., & Li, X. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tcyb.2017.2754919 · Cited by 44
Simple property of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics: Beyond weak selection
Zhou, L., Wu, B., de Vasconcelos, V. V. L., & Wang, L. (2018) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.98.062124 · Cited by 44
Binary Games with State Dependent Stochastic Choice
Maruta, T. (2002) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2808 · Cited by 44
Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
Goyal, S., & Janssen, M. C. W. (1996) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf00133159 · Cited by 44
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
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