The Evolution of Conventions
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Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
Citations
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Cited by
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Evolution, interaction, and Nash equilibria
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Electoral Institutions and the Evolution of Partisan Conventions, 1880-1940
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Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games
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Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
Staudigl, M. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.003 · Cited by 43
“…the well-known relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability as first observed by Kandori et al. (1993) (see their Section 9) and Young (1993), but proved with entirely different methods.18 However, if relative population sizes differ, then this one-to-one relationship breaks…”
BackgroundInfluentialCoalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
Sawa, R. (2014) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005 · Cited by 43
“Newton (2011) modifies the stochastic stability approach of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) by introducing vanishingly small probabilities of coalitional deviations, and uses this approach to examine the robustness of Nash equilibrium.”
BackgroundMethodOrders of limits for stationary distributions, stochastic dominance, and stochastic stability
Sandholm, W. H. (2010) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te554 · Cited by 43
Cognitive Reflection, Decision Biases, and Response Times
Alós‐Ferrer, C., Garagnani, M., & Hügelschäfer, S. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01402 · Cited by 56
A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
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“…states by SS. Definition 2.2 SS := {g ∈ G : π0(g) > 0} All stochastically stable matchings belong to recurrent classes of the unperturbed process (Young, 1993) and from any matching there exists a finite sequence of transitions under the unperturbed process that culminates in a stable…”
BackgroundInfluentialCoordination and Cooperation in Local, Random and Small World Networks: Experimental EvidencePreprint
Cassar, A. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1288174 · Cited by 43
On dynamics in selfish network creation
Kawald, B., & Lenzner, P. (2013) · ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA) · doi:10.1145/2486159.2486185 · Cited by 42
“The above mentioned classes of finite strategic games are related as follows: poly-FIPG ⊂ FIPG ⊂ BR-WAG ⊂ WAG.”
BackgroundInfluentialRecontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
Newton, J. (2011) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.007 · Cited by 42
“The dynamic proposed is essentially adaptive play as in [13] with some work going into defining what constitutes a best response for a group of players.”
BackgroundA Structural Econometric Analysis of Network Formation Games
Sheng, S. (2014) · Cited by 40
Online Learning of Feasible Strategies in Unknown Environments
Paternain, S., & Ribeiro, A. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2016.2627401 · Cited by 47
“[26], [38], [39]) the bounds on the regret in continuous time are tighter than in its discrete counterpart for online gradient descent.”
BackgroundNeary, P. R. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.003 · Cited by 51
“Both KMR and Young (1993) show that the risk dominant action will emerge under perturbed best response based dynamics.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialTercieux, O. (2005) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.001 · Cited by 42
“Indeed, many recent papers (see Morris et al. [17] and Kajii and Morris [10]) for the incomplete information approach, and Young [26], Maruta [13] and Ellison [6] for the stochastic evolutionary dynamics approach, and Oyama [20] for the perfect foresight approach) underlined the strong properties…”
BackgroundAdaptive Group Coordination and Role Differentiation
Roberts, M. E., & Goldstone, R. L. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022377 · Cited by 42
Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game
Johnson, P., Levine, D. K., & Pesendorfer, W. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2823 · Cited by 44
“polynomials in e . Consequently we can apply Theorem 4 from Young [1993] and conclude that lim e e”
Myatt, D. P., & Wallace, C. (2008) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02206.x · Cited by 45
“When rational players lack common knowledge of the payoffs, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) showed that the risk-dominant strategy profile of a 2 � 2 game is almost always played. Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993)”
Lillbacka, R. (2006) · Acta Sociologica · doi:10.1177/0001699306064774 · Cited by 65
“However, suboptimal and counterproductive behaviour may also be learned in a similar (partly self-sustaining) manner (Russell et al., 1976; Akers et al., 1979; Sugden, 1989; Macy, 1991b; Van Huyck et al., 1991: 897, 900, 904; Young, 1993: 58; Kapur, 1995).”
BackgroundOn the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox
Alós‐Ferrer, C., Kirchsteiger, G., & Walzl, M. (2009) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02297.x · Cited by 45
“[22] and Young [36].”
InfluentialStochastic imitation in finite games
Josephson, J., & Matros, A. (2004) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.01.004 · Cited by 42
On the Relationship between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability
Maruta, T. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0556 · Cited by 42
Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
Galesloot, B., & Goyal, S. (1997) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00810-0 · Cited by 42
Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games
Blume, A. (1998) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0598 · Cited by 41
Proving convergence of log-linear learning in potential games
Tatarenko, T. (2014) · Proceedings of the ... American Control Conference/Proceedings of the American Control Conference · doi:10.1109/acc.2014.6858606 · Cited by 41
“Learning algorithms can be set for cooperative control in engineering and economic systems to solve such problems as consensus finding, sensor deployment, coverage optimization, vehicletarget assignment, analysis of conventions, etc [1], [8], [9], [15], [16].”
BackgroundAre conventions solutions to uncertainty? contrasting visions of social coordination
Latsis, J., de Larquier, G., & Besis, F. (2010) · Journal of Post Keynesian Economics · doi:10.2753/pke0160-3477320402 · Cited by 57
Dynamic pricing in discrete time stochastic day-to-day route choice models
Rambha, T., & Boyles, S. D. (2016) · Transportation Research Part B Methodological · doi:10.1016/j.trb.2016.01.008 · Cited by 42
Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game
Belloc, M., Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., & D’Alessandro, S. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-50556-8 · Cited by 43
Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities
Ferrer, R. (2009) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.04.008 · Cited by 41
Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400987111 · Cited by 41
“We show that both models generate similar beliefs and that both have a weighted universal consistency property.”
BackgroundImitation, local interactions, and efficiency
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Weidenholzer, S. (2006) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.006 · Cited by 41
“Following the seminal papers by Blume (1993), Kandori et al. (1993), and Young (1993) the literature of learning in games has studied equilibrium selection in games when agents follow some basic behavioral rule, which is then perturbed with a mutation probability.”
BackgroundMohlin, E. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.009 · Cited by 45
Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
Sáez‐Martí, M., & Weibull, J. W. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2528 · Cited by 41
“Nor have we shown what happens if clever agents invade some or all populations in the recurrent play of an arbitrary normal-form game, as in the set-up of Young [ 9 ].”
BackgroundResultA Game Theoretic Analysis of Merging-Giveway Interaction: A Joint Estimation Model
Hideyuki, K. I. T. A., & Fukuyama, K. (2002) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/9780585474601-025 · Cited by 41
The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game
Hofbauer, J. (1999) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1023/a:1018979708014 · Cited by 41
“[16] and Young [32].”
Self-organized evolution in a socioeconomic environment
Arenas, À., Díaz-Guilera, A., Vicente, C. J. P., & Vega-Redondo, F. (2000) · Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics · doi:10.1103/physreve.61.3466 · Cited by 43
Awards: A View from Psychological EconomicsPreprint
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Supplementary material for: “From Evolutionary to Strategic Stability”
Demichelis, S., & Ritzberger, K. (2003) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00078-4 · Cited by 41
Contract research today: Where do we stand?
Mouzas, S., & Blois, K. J. (2013) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2013.07.025 · Cited by 40
Energy-Efficient Resource Allocation for Energy Harvesting-Based Device-to-Device Communication
Dai, H., Huang, Y., Xu, Y., Li, C., Wang, B., & Yang, L. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · doi:10.1109/tvt.2018.2881545 · Cited by 40
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“The canonical models of this sort were formulated by Young (1993) and by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993).”
MethodInformations et conventions. Le cadre du modèle général
Gomez, P. (2006) · Revue française de gestion · doi:10.3166/rfg.160.217-240 · Cited by 68
Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
Newton, J., & Angus, S. D. (2015) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.003 · Cited by 39
“There exists a large literature in cooperative game theory on the behavior of coalitions.8 Concepts include ‘strong equilibrium’ (Aumann, 1959), coalition 5van Damme and Weibull (2002) give conditions on error probabilities under which the results of Young are recovered.”
BackgroundMethodSocial identity and social free-riding
Bernard, M. M., Hett, F., & Mechtel, M. (2016) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.001 · Cited by 47
Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry
Hwang, S.-H., Lim, W., Neary, P. R., & Newton, J. (2018) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.002 · Cited by 39
“Unintentional Intentional Uniform Kalai-Smorodinsky Young (1998a) Nash bargaining Naidu et al. (2010)”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialWomen's career choices, social norms and child care policies
Barigozzi, F., Cremer, H., & Roeder, K. (2018) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.10.004 · Cited by 55
An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection
Ania, A. B., Tröger, T., & Wambach, A. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00002-7 · Cited by 39
“For any two states s, s′ ∈ Ωδ the resistance r(s, s′) is the minimum number of experiments in any finite sequence of transitions that brings the process from s to s′ (cf. Young, 1993).”
BackgroundIndividual learning and social rationality
Young, H. P. (1998) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00143-8 · Cited by 39
Self-citationWitt, U. (2008) · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2033-1 · Cited by 39
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“To improve the efficiency of the fictitious play process, Young [23] proposed an optimized version and proved its validity.”
MethodA decentralized approach for convention emergence in multi-agent systems
Mihaylov, M., Tuyls, K., & Nowé, A. (2013) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-013-9240-2 · Cited by 36
“Young [44] studies stochastically stable equilibria in coordination games where agents can occasionally explore, or make mistakes.”
BackgroundEvolutionary dynamics of N-person Hawk-Dove games
Chen, W., Gracia-Lázaro, C., Li, Z., Wang, L., & Moreno, Y. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-04284-6 · Cited by 39
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“Clutton-Brock, T. H. and Parker, G. A. 1995.”
BackgroundCooperation and Effective Computability
Anderlini, L., & Sabourian, H. (1995) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171773 · Cited by 39
Stochastic stability in best shot network games
Boncinelli, L., & Pin, P. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001 · Cited by 38
“We introduce perturbations by means of a regular perturbed Markov chain (Young, 1993, see also Ellison, 2000), that is triple (X,T, (T ) ∈(0,̄)) where (X,T ) is the unperturbed Markov chain and: 1.”
MethodAn evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
Myatt, D. P., & Wallace, C. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.005 · Cited by 38
Coordination via genetic learning
Arifovic, J., & Eaton, C. (1995) · Computational Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01298459 · Cited by 38
Learning, Matching, and Aggregation
Hopkins, E. (1999) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0647 · Cited by 37
“Zeeman (1981) faced a similar problem in modeling mixed-strategy evolutionary dynamics.”
BackgroundInfluentialCoordination in Large Numbers: An Agent-Based Model of International Negotiations
Earnest, D. C. (2008) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00505.x · Cited by 44
Probe and Adjust in Information Transfer Games
Huttegger, S. M., Skyrms, B., & Zollman, K. (2013) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9467-y · Cited by 35
“Suppose that (a, 0) and (b, 0) are two states with a 6¼ b. (By a result in Young (1993) it is enough to consider the resistances between recurrent states of the unperturbed process.)”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSemi-tensor product approach to networked evolutionary games
Cheng, D., Qi, H., He, F., Xu, T., & Dong, H. (2014) · Control Theory and Technology · doi:10.1007/s11768-014-0038-9 · Cited by 37
“Myopic best response adjustment rule (MBRA) [44]: assume then we choose When the strategies with best payoff are not unique, say the set of best strategies is we may use the following 2 options: i) First MBRA (MBRA-1): Choose one corresponding to a priority.”
MethodA Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity
Kets, W., & Sandroni, A. (2020) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdaa037 · Cited by 42
Yongacoglu, B., Arslan, G., & Yüksel, S. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2021.3121228 · Cited by 40
“A considerably different approach is taken in [27], which presents optimal adaptive play (OAP), a joint action learner based on adaptive play [28] rather than on Q-learning.”
BackgroundThe evolution of Walrasian behavior in oligopolies
Schenk–Hoppé, K. R. (2000) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00010-5 · Cited by 37
The coexistence of conventions
Sugden, R. (1995) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(95)00034-8 · Cited by 37
Evolutionary choice of markets
Gerber, A., & Bettzüge, M. O. (2005) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-005-0063-5 · Cited by 38
An evolutionary game-theoretic approach to congestion control
Menasché, D. S., Figueiredo, D. R., & Silva, E. D. S. E. (2005) · Performance Evaluation · doi:10.1016/j.peva.2005.07.028 · Cited by 39
“In this case, the state of the Markov chain is usually given by a vector representing the number of players making a given choice [Kandori et al., 1993, Young, 1993].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialGame Theory: Models, Numerical Methods and Applications
Bauso, D. (2014) · Foundations and Trends® in Systems and Control · doi:10.1561/2600000003 · Cited by 38
Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions
Golman, R., & Page, S. E. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.005 · Cited by 39
“Each offers the agent a reward that is assuredly positive and increases with the number of others taking the same action.”
BackgroundShared intentions: The evolution of collaboration
Newton, J. (2017) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.001 · Cited by 41
“If the number of SI types in a group is at least n, then under a coalitional better response dynamic with uniform mistakes (see, for example Newton and Angus, 2015), provision of the good is uniquely stochastically stable in the sense of (Young, 1993).”
BackgroundConventions under Heterogeneous Behavioural Rules
Newton, J. (2020) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdaa063 · Cited by 35
“4.2.2 Best response with uniform deviations A player i follows best response with uniform deviations (Young, 1993a; Kandori et al., 1993) if ϒi(x) = 1 if xi > 00 if xi ≤ 0 ,(4.3) so that, for small ε , player i will rarely change his strategy unless his payoff weakly increases as a consequence.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe Cloud: Understanding the Security, Privacy and Trust Challenges
Robinson, N., Valeri, L., Cave, J. A. K., Thompson-Starkey, T. G., Graux, H., Creese, S., & Hopkins, P. (2011) · RAND Corporation eBooks · doi:10.7249/tr933 · Cited by 36
Learning by (limited) forward looking players
Mengel, F. (2014) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.08.001 · Cited by 36
Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria
Oyama, D., & Tercieux, O. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2009.03.001 · Cited by 36
“Consider the following symmetric 3 × 3 game due to Young (1993): 0 1 2 0 6, 6 0, 5 0, 0 1 5, 0 7, 7 5, 5 2 0, 0 5, 5 8, 8 This game does not have any (p, p)-dominant equilibrium for p 3/5, but (2, 2) is an iterated strict (2/5, 2/5)-dominant equilibrium with a sequence S1 = {1, 2} × {1, 2} and S2 = {(2, 2)}.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialNegotiation on Data Allocation in Multi-Agent Environments
Azoulay-Schwartz, R., & Kraus, S. (2002) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1023/a:1014838726454 · Cited by 36
Young, H. P. (2008) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2338-1 · Cited by 37
Self-citationNetwork ExperimentsPreprint
Kosfeld, M. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.413871 · Cited by 43
Vagueness and Imprecise Imitation in Signalling Games
Franke, M., & Correia, J. P. (2017) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axx002 · Cited by 36
“…can 1 Much previous work has investigated the interplay of adaptive dynamics, including imitation-based update protocols, on the one hand, and noise or mutation, on the other hand (e.g. Foster and Young 1990; Fudenberg and Harris 1992; Kandori et al. 1993; Young 1993; Fudenberg and Imhof 2006).”
BackgroundAvoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals
Foley, M., Smead, R., Forber, P., & Riedl, C. (2021) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008847 · Cited by 40
“Since these correlated equilibria identify patterns of behavior that are “customary, expected, and self-enforcing” [13], they are identified as paradigm examples of conventions in game theory [14, 15].”
Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games
Veller, C., & Hayward, L. K. (2016) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.005 · Cited by 34
“of multiple ‘roles’ (‘Player 1’, ‘Player 2’, etc.). In the evolutionary approach, the simplest way to incorporate multiple roles is to model evolution as occurring in multiple interacting populations [3, 5, 12, 25{29].1 Suppose that we have an underlying game with roles i= 1;:::;I, each role associated 1In Section 5,…”
BackgroundInformation and learning in oligopoly: An experiment
Bigoni, M., & Fort, M. (2013) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.006 · Cited by 40
“We shall follow the demonstration provided by Peyton Young [18] (Appendix), that we report here for sake of completeness.”
CHAPTER 11 Imitation and Learning
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Schlag, K. H. (2009) · The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0012 · Cited by 35
Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
Agastya, M. K. (1997) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2971721 · Cited by 34
Why Can’t We Be Friends? - Entitlements and the Costs of Conflict
Kimbrough, E. O., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2012) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343314524428 · Cited by 41
Risky speech: behavioral game theory and pragmatics
Sally, D. (2002) · Journal of Pragmatics · doi:10.1016/s0378-2166(02)00170-4 · Cited by 40
An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
Oechssler, J. (1997) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0550 · Cited by 35
The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement
Huck, S., & Kosfeld, M. (2007) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02011.x · Cited by 49
On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions
Cary, M., Das, A., Edelman, B., Giotis, I., Heimerl, K., Karlin, A. R., Mathieu, C., & Schwarz, M. H. (2008) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w13788 · Cited by 35
Scheinkman, J. A. (2008) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2422-1 · Cited by 39
Chapter 20 Economic Activity on Fixed Networks
Wilhite, A. W. (2006) · Handbook of computational economics · doi:10.1016/s1574-0021(05)02020-4 · Cited by 34
Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria
Myerson, R. B., & Weibull, J. W. (2015) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta11048 · Cited by 34
“Some of these have been shown to converge to minimal curb sets, see Young (1993, 1998), Hurkens (1995) and Sanchirico (1996).”
BackgroundAdaptive and Dynamic Service Composition via Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning
Wang, H., Wu, Q., Chen, X., Yu, Q., Zheng, Z., & Bouguettaya, A. (2014) · IEEE International Conference on Web Services (ICWS) · doi:10.1109/icws.2014.70 · Cited by 34
“To improve the efficiency of fictitious play process, [18] proposed a modified method and proved its validity.”
MethodUtility-Based Resource Allocation for Multi-Channel Decentralized Networks
Sheng, M., Xu, C., Wang, X., Zhang, Y., Han, W., & Li, J. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Communications · doi:10.1109/tcomm.2014.2357028 · Cited by 34
Content-peering dynamics of autonomous caches in a content-centric network
Pacifici, V., & Dán, G. (2013) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) · doi:10.1109/infcom.2013.6566898 · Cited by 40
“…could potentially lead to increased costs for the peering ISPs, as shown by the following simple example in which as a consequence of coordination every ISP evicts and fetches the same items repeatedly over transit connections, thereby increasing their traffic costs compared to no content-peering.”
BackgroundConvergence to equilibrium in local interaction games
Andrea Montanari, A., & Saberi, A. (2009) · ACM SIGecom Exchanges · doi:10.1145/1598780.1598791 · Cited by 34
Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit
Sandholm, W. H., & Staudigl, M. (2016) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te1905 · Cited by 34
“If agents sometimes choose suboptimal strategies, then over longer time spans, transitions between equilibria are inevitable, with some occurring more readily than others.”
Game dynamics as the meaning of a game
Papadimitriou, C. H., & Piliouras, G. (2019) · ACM SIGecom Exchanges · doi:10.1145/3331041.3331048 · Cited by 67
“Peyton Young in his influential 1993 paper “The evolution of social conventions” [Young 1993] introduces a randomized game dynamics which, even though in detail quite different from our noisy MWU, can be shown to converge to the MCCs of the game in the special case in which the MCCs are singletons ,…”
BackgroundCritical mass effect in evolutionary games triggered by zealots
Cardillo, A., & Masuda, N. (2020) · Physical Review Research · doi:10.1103/physrevresearch.2.023305 · Cited by 40
The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games
Bó, P. D., Fréchette, G. R., & Kim, J. (2021) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.010 · Cited by 34
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.