The Evolution of Conventions
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Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
Citations
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Cited by
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“reducible and aperiodic Markov chain. We use a characterization introduced by [7], which has been extensively used for showing stochastic stability arguments for several learning dynamics, see, e.g., [18,28]. In particular, for finite Markov chains an invariant distribution can be expressed as the ratio of sums of prod…”
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“Given a house allocation problem we want to define a perturbed Markov process as in Young (1998).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
Dawid, H., & MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.004 · Cited by 26
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BackgroundInfluentialAn experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game
Nagel, R., & Vriend, N. J. (2002) · Physica-Verlag eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-57646-1_3 · Cited by 26
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“Our experimental findings gave 18See Young (1993b).”
BackgroundLearning to respect property by refashioning theft into trade
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“Young (1993, 1996) details the game-theoretic emergence of such conventions (by his definition, convergence to a single equilibrium when many exist) among boundedly-rational agents for a broad class of games.”
How should people be rewarded for their work?
Frey, B. S. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107337190.008 · Cited by 24
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Yazıcıoğlu, Y., Egerstedt, M., & Shamma, J. S. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems · doi:10.1109/tcns.2016.2518083 · Cited by 29
“Stochastic stability was introduced in game theory to explain how some equilibria may arise much more frequently than the others in the long run as the strategic decision makers update their actions in a stochastic setting with noise [28], [30], [31].”
Conditions for the Emergence of Shared Norms in Populations with Incompatible Preferences
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BackgroundInfluentialEpistemological Perspectives on Simulation
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'Collective Innovation’ in a Model of Network Formation with Preferential Meeting
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“Asynch play, more than simple repetition of a game in normal form, can potentially transfor kelberg espite rium slow arning r, this ts that s than arning to the yers rs, or found but in ervals. y which e fast ween rnot). nopoly s, with poly game into what is essentially a repeated sequential game,…”
BackgroundUnconditional and Conditional Takeover Offers: Experimental Evidence
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Convergence in Player-Specific Graphical Resource Allocation Games
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Stochastic stability in assignment problems
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INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT QUEST
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“…this pioneer approach other authors have gone on to exploit game theory, but using a rather different technique – Evolutionary Games, for example, in Young (1993), which tries to show the paths of the process of convergence to a specific “equilibrium” on conventions, where only one of the Nash…”
Helbing, D., & Johansson, A. (2010) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.81.016112 · Cited by 26
“In such a way, one can study problems ranging from the spontaneous magnetization in spin glasses [22, 23] up to the emergence of behavioral conventions [7, 24, 25].”
BackgroundUsing focal point learning to improve human–machine tacit coordination
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“First, they do not give any consideration to social conventions and cultural factors [19,35,36].”
BackgroundInfluence of Opinion Dynamics on the Evolution of Games
Gargiulo, F., & Ramasco, J. J. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0048916 · Cited by 26
Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment
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“Our setup, with uncountable state space and no mutations does not allow us to apply the well-known ergodicity theorems directly, in contrast to what is typically the case in the literature (cf. e.g. Kandori et al 1993, Young, 1993 and Vega-Redondo, 1997).”
ResultA game theoretical model of deforestation in human–environment relationships
Rodrigues, A. M. M., Koeppl, H., Ohtsuki, H., & Satake, A. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.005 · Cited by 24
“In fact, Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) have shown that under the population dynamics in which players try to maximize one's individual payoff, risk-dominant equilibrium is most likely to be chosen. σ 00 σ 00 σ 11 σ 11 Fig.”
Qi, H., Wang, Y., Liu, T. H., & Cheng, D. (2016) · Journal of Systems Science and Complexity · doi:10.1007/s11424-016-4192-7 · Cited by 23
Hayek Enriched by Complexity Enriched by Hayek
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“In similar models, though, Young (1993b) and Gallo (2014) employ a common assumption from economics about individual preferences over goods.”
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“A strategy profile Stochastic stability for the mistakes model can be characterized along the lines introduced in KMR or Young (1993), with a useful “radius-coradius” sufficient condition developed by Ellison (2000).”
The origins of social institutions
Urpelainen, J. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Politics · doi:10.1177/0951629811400473 · Cited by 27
“Institutions evolve when these adaptive processes converge, either through biological selection of ‘fit’ behavioral rules or cultural selection through ‘imitation’ of successful behavioral rules (Alchian, 1950; Hayek, 1960; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Young, 1993).”
BackgroundEvolution with Changing Mutation Rates
Robles, J. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2382 · Cited by 24
Oechssler, J. (1999) · Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory · doi:10.1023/a:1009646410168 · Cited by 24
“More closely related, however, are several recent contributions to learning and equilibrium selection, in particular, Young (1993) and Kandori et al. (1993). 4 Both papers show that play converges for some classes of games to certain long-run states, which are in general Nash equilibria of the game.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialMultiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection
Parkes, D. C., & Huberman, B. A. (2001) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2000.0799 · Cited by 28
“The usual emphasis in game theory is on model-based learning, for example Fictitious Play [20], and other models of myopic best-response dynamics [57, 33], where agents play a best-response to a model that they learn of their opponents.”
Stigma and Social ControlPreprint
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Evolutionary stability of ambiguity in context signaling games
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“…example, in 2 × 2 games with multiple equilibria, it has been shown that the risk-dominant equilibrium (i) is the only stochastically stable strategy Young 1993, (ii) has generally the largest basin of attraction under replicator dynamics (Zhang and Hofbauer 2015), and (iii) is most likely…”
BackgroundPerpetuating Advantage: Mechanisms of Structural Injustice
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Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame
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“In Section 12 we show that the property of having the uniform FIP is stronger than that of being weakly acyclic (see [21] and [15]).”
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“The results of study are supported by the evident from literature that entrepreneurship education plays an important role in enhancing intentions towards establishment of one’s own venture (Long 2011; Souitaris, Zerbinati, & Al-Laham, 2007; Young, 1993).”
ResultKim, N., Kim, D., Lee, J., Niyato, D. T., & Choi, J. K. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3045277 · Cited by 24
“This implies that there exists a best-response improvement path to the unique NE in the PM subgame regardless of the initial strategies of the players [58].”
BackgroundProspect Dynamic and Loss Dominance
Sawa, R., & Wu, J. (2016) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.006 · Cited by 22
Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications
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Robustness of stochastic stability in game theoretic learning
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“Stochastic Stability The following is adapted from the presentations in [14] and [23].”
BackgroundMethodSocial Norms and the Paradox of Elections? Turnout
de Matos, J. A., & Barros, P. P. (2004) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-004-2251-4 · Cited by 32
“For a (different) model of “norms” where the dynamics are detailed, see Young (1993).”
BackgroundThe Price of Stochastic Anarchy
Chung, C., Ligett, K., Pruhs, K. R., & Roth, A. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_27 · Cited by 23
“Definition 2.3 (Young [24]).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSocial and individual learning of helping in humans and other species
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Crawford, V. P. (2016) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.30.4.131 · Cited by 25
A characterization of stochastically stable networks
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“The main result of Jackson and Watts (2002) that is closely related to the technics developed in Young (1993) is that the set of stochastically stable networks is the set {g | r(g) ≤ r(g′) for all g′}.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialThe evolution of social norms: With managerial implications
Kolstad, I. (2006) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.028 · Cited by 25
Evolution of Conventional Meaning and Conversational Principles
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Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents
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“In the models of KMR (1993) and Young (1993) each mutative step is taken with probability.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialLEARNING,NETWORKFORMATION AND COORDINATION*Preprint
Goyal, S., Vega‐Redondo, F., & Vega-Redondo, F. (2000) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 23
Network Formation and Social CoordinationPreprint
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Evolutionary modeling in economics: recent history and immediate prospectsPreprint
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From niches to norms: the promise of social tipping interventions to scale climate action
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“EvolutionaryGameTheorycanbehelpful, asitisinherentlydesignedtostudytheevolutionofcooperation,empha-sizingoff-equilibriumbehavior 86 .”
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“Before proceeding, we introduce the concepts of regular perturbation and stochastically stable states from [31], [34] for Markov chains in Definitions 4 and 5.”
BackgroundMethodAcyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
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“The properties are also conducive to the convergence of more sophisticated scenarios (Young, 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995; Friedman and Mezzetti, 2001).”
BackgroundPotential games in volatile environments
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“It has been shown by Blume (1993, 1997) and Young (1998) that the logit dynamics concentrates on the set of potential maximizers as the noise level goes to zero.”
BackgroundInfluentialOn the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices
Bosch‐Domènech, A., & Vriend, N. J. (2013) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.07.014 · Cited by 22
Bergin, J., & Bernhardt, D. (2009) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.008 · Cited by 22
“The concept has been utilized extensively in economics since its use by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993).”
MethodInformation theory and behavior
Foley, D. K. (2020) · The European Physical Journal Special Topics · doi:10.1140/epjst/e2020-900133-x · Cited by 22
Inefficiencies in a model of spatial networks formation with positive externalities
Φ, N. C., Roux, P., & Yıldızoğlu, M. (2008) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2007.04.004 · Cited by 21
Volij, O. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0893 · Cited by 22
“…been successfully applied by Kandori et al. (1993) in the analysis of symmetric 2 × 2 games, by Young (1993a) for weakly acyclic n person games, by Young (1993b) in the analysis of bargaining, by VegaRedondo (1997) in the analysis of competition among firms, and recently by Ben-Shoham et al.…”
BackgroundMethodOn the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
Fabrikant, A., Jaggard, A. D., & Schapira, M. (2013) · Theory of Computing Systems · doi:10.1007/s00224-013-9457-0 · Cited by 22
“Games for which this property holds are called “weakly acyclic games” [11, 18].”
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Building a synthetic basis for kin selection and evolutionary game theory using population genetics
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Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
Kuzmics, C. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.001 · Cited by 22
“One might think that random mutations in evolutiona models, as in Kandori et al. (1993) or Young (1993), serve the same purpo perturbations in the rational formulation, and lead to virtually all individuals playing t E-mail addresses: c-kuzmics@kellogg.northwestern.edu, c.a.kuzmics.99@cantab.net.”
BackgroundReal Patterns and the Ontological Foundations of Microeconomics
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Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
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“[19], where the degree of transience was used in order to refine the solution concept of Nash equilibrium suitable for non-cooperative games.”
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On coset weighted potential game
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“Nash equilibrium, there are many learning algorithms which lead a coset weighted potential game to a pure Nash equilibrium. For instance, it is easily proved that the Myopic Best Response Adjustment [21], Fictitious Play [17], etc, will all guarantee the convergence of a coset weighted potential game to one of pure Na…”
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Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict
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“3We build on the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) s concept of risk dominance and Young (1993).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialWatercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture
Newton, J., Wait, A., & Angus, S. D. (2019) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.004 · Cited by 19
Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
Hwang, S., & Newton, J. (2016) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0988-x · Cited by 21
“States in SS are known as stochastically stable states (Young 1993).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHeterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models
Neary, P. R., & Newton, J. (2017) · Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design · doi:10.22574/jmid.2017.12.005 · Cited by 21
“That is, the global maximizers of Potential(·) are the stochastically stable (Young, 1993) states of the process.”
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Cui, Z., & Weidenholzer, S. (2021) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2021.105187 · Cited by 25
Behavior in Strategic Settings: Evidence from a Million Rock-Paper-Scissors Games
Batzilis, D., Jaffe, S., Levitt, S. D., List, J. A., & Picel, J. (2019) · Games · doi:10.3390/g10020018 · Cited by 35
“Young [12] also studies how conventions evolve as players respond to information about how their opponents have behaved in the past, while Mookherjee and Sopher [13,14] examine the effect of information on opponents’ history on strategic choices.”
BackgroundQuan, J., Zheng, J., Wang, X., & Yang, X. (2019) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.121866 · Cited by 21
Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Assortative Interactions
Iyer, S., & Killingback, T. (2020) · Games · doi:10.3390/g11040041 · Cited by 21
“Games in this class have been widely used as models for conventions [28,29,86], but they have typically received little attention as models of cooperation, although interesting exceptions to this trend are [56,70,87,88].”
MethodPure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games
Amiet, B., Collevecchio, A., Scarsini, M., & Zhong, Z. (2021) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2020.1102 · Cited by 22
Collusion with intertemporal price dispersion
de Roos, N., & Smirnov, V. (2020) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12309 · Cited by 20
Governance Structures, Insider Status, and Boundary Maintenance
Yarbrough, B. V., & Yarbrough, R. M. (1999) · Journal of Bioeconomics · doi:10.1023/a:1010058113016 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.