The Evolution of Conventions
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Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
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“To analyze how conventions evolve in a population many models have been presented that apply the theory of evolutionary games (e.g. Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993).”
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ON THE ORIGIN OF CONVENTION: EVIDENCE FROM COORDINATION GAMES*
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“This algorithm has been first applied in an economic context by KMR and Young [7] and has been further developed and improved by Ellison [1].”
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Gurven, M., Zanolini, A., & Schniter, E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.005 · Cited by 95
“The Public nature of norms (Young, 1993) requires that specific norms should be explicitly or implicitly recognizable by village members.”
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“It turned out soon that risk-dominance plays an important role in two di¤erent models of equilibrium selection: robustness to incomplete information (Carlsson and Damme (1993) and Kajii and Morris (1997)) and evolutionary learning (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993)).”
BackgroundMethodSampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
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“…extensively using evolutionary models.17 The risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in the models of Ellison (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and Young (1993); the pay-off-dominant equilibrium is favoured in Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), Ely (2002), and in studies of cheap talk, for…”
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“In the framework of the evolution of conventions [86], a repeated game is played by one-time players who learn from past plays and are subject to noise and mistakes.”
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“…developed by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) ( rst applied in an economic context by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Nöldeke and Samuelson, 1993; and Young, 1993) to identify the set of stochastically stable states, i.e. states that are in the support of the limit invariant distribution as the…”
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“Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) studied stochastic evolutionary game dynamics by introducing mutations to best response dynamics, and found that a risk-dominant strategy is chosen most of the time.”
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Spatial evolution of automata in the prisoners’ dilemma
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Collective patterns of social diffusion are shaped by individual inertia and trend-seeking
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“Proof A little calculation shows that the interval ( δ, δ∗ ) is never empty (d − a) (c − d) > 0 ⇔ b − a − c + d b − a > b − c b − d ⇔ δ∗ > δ.”
Evolution, coordination, and banking panics
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MethodBandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice
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Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
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“The evolutionary algorithm (Young, 1993 and Kandori et al., 1993) has been introduced as an equilibrium selection mechanism into many rational expectation models with multiple equilibria and have greatly contributed to the understanding of these models.”
Convergence to Equilibrium in Local Interaction Games
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The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process
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BackgroundMigration and the evolution of conventions
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“JEL classification:C72; C73 Keywords:Evolution; Equilibrium selection; Migration”
BackgroundSocial Learning in Recurring Games
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“…to list here, but such examples include: Nash (1950) and Aumann and Maschler (1967), as well as more recent work by Fudenberg and Kreps (1988), Jordan (1991), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993), Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Kalai and Lehrer (1993) (see Marimon (1995) for an overview).”
BackgroundCournot versus Walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory
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Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players
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Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? The Ordinary versus the Extraordinary
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Conformism and self-selection in social networks
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Can stable social groups be maintained by homophilous imitation alone?
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“JEL classification:C0; C7; D7 Keywords:Social norms; Mathematical model; Cooperation; Group formation; Group dynamics; Homophily”
BackgroundPayoff based dynamics for multi-player weakly acyclic games
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MethodSelf-citationRisk dominance selects the leader: An experimental analysis
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“…intrinsic game theoretic interest, we wanted to evaluate different learning rules in this game because some recent research (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993) has shown that Table 1 Payoffs of the game Matrix 1: Matrix 2: Choice of B Choice of B 0 1 0 1 Choice 0 29, 29 594, 365 Choice 0 123, 78…”
Gilboa, I., & Schmeidler, D. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0056 · Cited by 73
“Yet another example of the same principle may be found in evolutionary models in game theory such as are given by Foster and Young (1990), Kandoriet al., (1993), and Young (1993).”
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“This paper takes the best-response with mutations model of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) as choice function.”
Generalized Efficiency Bounds in Distributed Resource Allocation
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A Review of Norms and Normative Multiagent Systems
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“Young [27] defined conventions as “a pattern of behavior that is customary, expected, and self-enforcing.”
BackgroundGeneralized online transfer learning for climate control in residential buildings
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Green Investment and Coordination Failure: An Investors' Perspective
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“Evolutionary game theorists have extended it to more players and iterated it (Skyrms (2007); Binmore and Samuelson (1999); Moreira et al (2012); Young (1993)).”
BackgroundBargaining With Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?
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History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social NormsPreprint
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Game-theoretic modeling of collective decision making during epidemics
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Towards a Snowdrift Game Optimization to Vertex Cover of Networks
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“Therefore, when a population state reaches a convention, it should be steady and be “locked in” [35], [39].”
BackgroundCooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach
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“not matter which of the behavioral options people agree upon. In that case, one also speaks of behavioral conventions, and one-population models are often sucient to describe the underlying dynamics [61,89]. Examples of conventions are the preference of pedestrians to walk on one side [61,90{93] (for example, the righ…”
Computational and Game-Theoretic Approaches for Modeling Bounded Rationality
Waltman, L. (2007) · EUR Research Repository (Erasmus University Rotterdam) · Cited by 62
Learning to compete, coordinate, and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning
Crandall, J. W., & Goodrich, M. A. (2010) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/s10994-010-5192-9 · Cited by 73
“AP—Adaptive Play ( Young 1993 ) Uses 100 of the previous 200 actions to create the opponent model”
BackgroundAlmost global convergence to p -dominant equilibrium
Sandholm, W. H. (2001) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s001820100067 · Cited by 61
Culture-dependent strategies in coordination games
Jackson, M. O., & Xing, Y. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400826111 · Cited by 61
Noisy Directional Learning and the Logit Equilibrium
Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (2004) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00378.x · Cited by 81
In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting
García, J., & van Veelen, M. (2015) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.007 · Cited by 77
“It is comparisons between transitions like the latter ones that are central to the concepts of stochastically stable states (Young, 1993), or long-run equilibria (Kandori et al., 1993).”
BackgroundDevavrat Shah, B., & Shin, J. (2010) · ACM SIGMETRICS International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS) · doi:10.1145/1811039.1811052 · Cited by 61
“Various results about the long-term behavior of this mechanism has been obtained by Friedlin [15], Kandori, Mailath and Rob [12] and Young [22].”
Parisi, F., & Fon, V. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374155.001.0001 · Cited by 62
Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players
Sethi, R. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0753 · Cited by 61
A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets
Nöldeke, G., & Samuelson, L. (1997) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.2239 · Cited by 60
“The payo® to the buyer from each unit purchased at price p from a seller who is of type q 2 f`; hg and who has sent signal x 2 X is given by: vq(x) ¡ p; where vq(x) denotes the value of a unit purchased from a q-quality seller who has sent signal x.”
BackgroundHomo Socialis : An Analytical Core for Sociological Theory
Gintis, H., & Helbing, D. (2015) · Review of Behavioral Economics · doi:10.1561/105.00000016 · Cited by 61
Stochastic stability in networks with decay
Feri, F. (2006) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.006 · Cited by 60
An analysis of one-dimensional schelling segregation
Brandt, C., Immorlica, N., Kamath, G., & Kleinberg, R. (2012) · ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) · doi:10.1145/2213977.2214048 · Cited by 60
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
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