The Evolution of Conventions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
Citations
Cites
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 11,815
Convention: A Philosophical Study.
Llewelyn, J. E., & Lewis, D. K. (1970) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2218418 · Cited by 3,121
Random perturbations of dynamical systems
(1997) · Translations of Mathematical Monographs · doi:10.1090/mmono/161/03 · Cited by 2,584
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in GamesPreprint
Harsanyi, J. C., & Selten, R. (1988) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2,104
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
Evolutionary Games in Economics
Friedman, D. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938222 · Cited by 1,939
Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment
Kirman, A. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118498 · Cited by 983
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics∗
Foster, D., & Young, P. (1990) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-j · Cited by 948
An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining
Young, H. P. (1993) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1993.1009 · Cited by 374
Self-citationEvolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated GamesPreprint
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. S. (1990) · American Economic Review · Cited by 368
Cited by
Items 701–800 of 1,001
The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale
Kandori, M. (2003) · Japanese Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-5876.00244 · Cited by 21
“We argue that the long run stochastic stability (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob [15] and Young [24]) is a natural concept to address stability of equilibrium in this model.”
BackgroundMethodEvolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games
Clemens, C., & Riechmann, T. (2006) · Computational Economics · doi:10.1007/s10614-006-9044-4 · Cited by 21
“Evolutionary, replicator-like dynamics including noise are described in two pioneering papers on Nash-refinements by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) , who introduce the notion of stochastic stability.”
BackgroundBuskens, V., & Snijders, C. C. P. (2015) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-015-0144-4 · Cited by 23
“[33,34]), again, often related to theoretical arguments aimed at developing a theory of the evolution of conventions [20,37].”
BackgroundFocal points in coordinated divergence
Heath, C., Ho, B., & Berger, J. A. (2006) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.04.004 · Cited by 23
“Proponents of social convention include Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), and Young (1993), who oVer models of how social conventions evolve.”
BackgroundStochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents
Sandholm, W. H. (2012) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.05.018 · Cited by 21
“2 Others, including Binmore and Samuelson [4], Young [29, Section 4.5], and Bena¨ım and Weibull [3], focus on large population limits, studying the behavior of the stationary distribution as the population size approaches infinity.”
BackgroundInfluentialRelational Contract Theory: Confirmations and Contradictions
Mouzas, S., & Blois, K. J. (2008) · Cited by 21
Les unités pastorales du Sahel sénégalais, outils de gestion de l’élevage et des espaces pastoraux
Wane, A., Ancey, V., & Grosdidier, B. (2006) · Développement durable et territoires · doi:10.4000/developpementdurable.3292 · Cited by 21
Why shops close again: An evolutionary perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours
Kosfeld, M. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00092-7 · Cited by 21
Bergin, J. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199280290.003.0020 · Cited by 21
Deterministic evolutionary dynamics: A unifying approach
Joosten, R. A. M. G. (1996) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01193636 · Cited by 20
“Examples are Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993) , Kandori et al. (1993), and Binmore and Samuelson (1993).”
BackgroundApproaches to economic equilibrium
Flåm, S. D. (1996) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/0165-1889(96)00912-8 · Cited by 22
Statistical Inference in Evolutionary Dynamics
Sawa, R., & Wu, J. (2021) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.008 · Cited by 21
Toward the minimum vertex cover of complex networks using distributed potential games
Chen, J., & Li, X. (2022) · Science China Information Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11432-021-3291-3 · Cited by 20
“MBR [24,40].”
Bounded rationality: static versus dynamic approaches
Basov, S. (2004) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-004-0484-6 · Cited by 20
“…dynamic approach originated in the work of Arrow and Hurwicz (1960) and is represented, for example, by the papers of Foster and Young (1990), Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Kandori, Mailath, Rob (1993), Young (1993), Friedman and Yellin (1997), Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1999), and Friedman (2000).”
Survival at the center—The stability of minimum differentiation
Hehenkamp, B., & Wambach, A. (2010) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2010.09.018 · Cited by 20
“Both evolutionary stability (in the sense of Scha¤er, 1989) and stochastic stability (following Kandori et al., 1993, and Young, 1993) are analysed.”
BackgroundGeneral equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2009) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-009-0466-9 · Cited by 20
“The limit invariant distribution (as the rate of experimentation tends to zero) μ∗ = limε→0 μ(ε) exists and is an invariant distribution of the unperturbed process P0 = P (see, e.g. Kandori et al. 1993; Young 1993 or Ellison 2000).”
InfluentialApproximate Best-Response Dynamics in Random Interference Games
Bistritz, I., & Leshem, A. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2017.2749139 · Cited by 20
“In some scenarios, this condition can be considered sufficient since it has been shown that randomized BR dynamics converge almost surely in weakly acyclic games [13] despite the fact that a weakly acyclic game may contain cycles of BR moves.”
BackgroundStrategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists
Alger, I., & Weibull, J. W. (2017) · Games · doi:10.3390/g8030038 · Cited by 41
“For related models of social norms, see Young (1993), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Sethi and Somanathan (1996), Bicchieri (1997), Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull (1999), Huck, Kübler, and Weibull (2012), 3This is certainly not the only way morality can be modeled.”
Eradicating Women-Hurting Customs: What Role for Social Engineering?
Platteau, J., Camilotti, G., & Auriol, E. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829591.003.0015 · Cited by 25
On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
Fabrikant, A., Jaggard, A. D., & Schapira, M. (2010) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_12 · Cited by 20
Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
Zhang, B. (2016) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.003 · Cited by 20
Potential Norms Detection in Social Agent Societies
Mahmoud, M. A., Mustapha, A., Ahmad, M. S., Ahmad, A., Yusoff, M. Z. M., & Hamid, N. H. A. (2013) · Advances in intelligent systems and computing · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-00551-5_51 · Cited by 20
Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01564146 · Cited by 21
Volume of Trade and Dynamic Network Formation in Two-Sided Economies
Pongou, R., & Serrano, R. (2013) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.01.003 · Cited by 21
An Intelligent Agent for Bilateral Negotiation with Unknown Opponents in Continuous-Time Domains
Chen, S., & Weiß, G. (2014) · ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems · doi:10.1145/2629577 · Cited by 20
“…of using EGT is to search for pure Nash equilibria, in which no agent has an incentive to deviate from its current strategy, or best reply cycle [Young 1993], where there exist a set of pro.les (i.e., the combination of strategies chosen by players) for which a path of deviations exists that…”
BackgroundEquilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games
Zhang, B., & Hofbauer, J. (2014) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-014-0437-7 · Cited by 22
Melioration learning in games with constant and frequency-dependent pay-offs
Brenner, T., & Witt, U. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00034-3 · Cited by 29
“Other adaptive learning models, similar in some respects to melioration learning, have also been studied in recent years (Ellison, 1993; Young, 1993; Samuelson, 1994; Sanchirico, 1996; Dawid, 1997, and Offerman and Sonnemans, 1998).Yet, a systematic investigation of the melioration learning hypothesis in a game-theore…”
MethodThe emergence of local norms in networks
Burke, M. A., Fournier, G. M., & Prasad, K. (2006) · Complexity · doi:10.1002/cplx.20129 · Cited by 20
“[1], and Ellison [26], allows us to refine predictions consider-”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHong, J., Hwang, M., Chen, W., Lee, C.-C., Lin, P., & Chen, Y. (2013) · Computers & Education · doi:10.1016/j.compedu.2013.07.027 · Cited by 22
“This law was based on the reinforcement learning model, where players’ behavior is path-dependent and as such knowledge could be absorbed in different play, depending on the initial conditions with which the learning process started (Kandori, Mailath, & Rob, 1993; Young, 1993).”
MethodComplementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
Earle, J. S., & Peter, K. S. (2009) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.91.4.832 · Cited by 21
Selfishness Level of Strategic Games
Apt, K. R., & Schäfer, G. (2014) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.4164 · Cited by 20
Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models
Levine, D. K., & Modica, S. (2016) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te1978 · Cited by 20
Voigt, S. (1999) · Constitutional Political Economy · doi:10.1023/a:1017225113536 · Cited by 24
Observational learning, group selection, and societal evolution
Witt, U. (2008) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137407000823 · Cited by 20
“A typical example of a ‘rule of conduct’ within a group of interacting agents is the ‘convention’ resulting as equilibrium point in a coordination game (see, e.g., Boyer and Orléan, 1993; Young, 1993) or the non-cooperative solution in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game.”
van Damme, E. E. C., Weibull, J. W., & Weibull, J. W. (1995) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3440825 · Cited by 22
Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox
Hehenkamp, B. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0902 · Cited by 20
Economics & Corporate CulturePreprint
Hermalin, B. E. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.162549 · Cited by 32
A sensor coverage game with improved efficiency guarantees
Ramaswamy, V., & Marden, J. R. (2016) · Proceedings of the ... American Control Conference/Proceedings of the American Control Conference · doi:10.1109/acc.2016.7526676 · Cited by 23
“A sufficient condition for this to happen is that the game is weakly acyclic [10], [11].”
BackgroundQuan, J., Chu, Y., Liu, W., Wang, X., & Yang, X. (2018) · Chinese Physics B · doi:10.1088/1674-1056/27/6/060203 · Cited by 21
Distributed Learning in Noisy-Potential Games for Resource Allocation in D2D Networks
Ali, M. S., Coucheney, P., & Coupechoux, M. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · doi:10.1109/tmc.2019.2936345 · Cited by 19
“We now define a minimum resistance tree and the stochastically stable states of a PMC [31].”
BackgroundInfluentialCompromise and coordination: An experimental study
He, S., & Wu, J. (2019) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.003 · Cited by 19
Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
Jackson, M. O., Barraquer, T. R., & Tan, X. (2011) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.007 · Cited by 21
“Approaches such as stochastic stability (e.g., L R Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993)), or other sorts of dynamic/evolutionary or reasoning arguments (e.g., Harsanyi and Selten (1988)), can lead to a prediction of (U,L) even with perturbations of the payoffs, but these rely on very…”
BackgroundModal choice and optimal congestion
David, Q., & Foucart, R. (2014) · Regional Science and Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.04.005 · Cited by 18
“But also because if commuters take their commuting decisions based on the history of what have been the past equilibrium (as in Young (1993, 1996)), it may take several periods of socially too high taxation before the optimal equilibrium is reached.”
BackgroundRule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection
Juang, W.-T. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0894 · Cited by 19
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Ania, A. B. (2004) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.02.005 · Cited by 19
Learning and Statistical Discrimination
Blume, L. E. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805774670257 · Cited by 19
Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation
Khan, A. (2014) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-013-0399-1 · Cited by 19
“…results on Markov process indicate that the perturbed process To determine the long-run outcome, we use the notion of stochastic stability (see Young (1993, 1998) and Kandori et al. (1993)), which selects the states that receive a positive weight in the limiting invariant distribution, The…”
A classification of weakly acyclic games
Apt, K. R., & Simon, S. (2014) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-014-9436-1 · Cited by 19
“Milchtaich proved that such games belong to a larger class of games (essentially introduced in [16]), called weakly acyclic games, in which one only stipulates that from any initial joint strategy some finite improvement path exists.”
BackgroundAdaptive play with spatial sampling
Durieu, J., & Solal, P. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00012-5 · Cited by 19
Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity
Leaver, C., & Makris, M. (2006) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00279.x · Cited by 19
Clever agents in adaptive learning
Matros, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00068-1 · Cited by 19
“Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce ‘‘cleverness’’ of players.”
BackgroundContagion and State Dependent Mutations
Lee, I. H., Szeidl, Á., & Valentinyi, Á. (2003) · Advances in Theoretical Economics · doi:10.2202/1534-5963.1063 · Cited by 19
The price of selfishness in network coding
Marden, J. R., & Effros, M. (2009) · International Symposium on Network Coding (NetCod) · doi:10.1109/netcod.2009.5191388 · Cited by 19
Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results
Banerjee, A., Weibull, J. W., & Binmore, K. (1996) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-25168-1_4 · Cited by 18
Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games
Jacobsen, H. J., Jensen, M. H., & Sloth, B. (2001) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2000.0795 · Cited by 19
Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional LearningPreprint
Anderson, S. P., Goeree, J. K., & Holt, C. A. (1999) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 19
Homo Socialis: An Analytical Core for Sociological TheoryPreprint
Gintis, H., & Helbing, D. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2362262 · Cited by 52
“There are several plausible models of the evolution and transformation of conventions (Kandori et al., 1993, Young, 1993, 1998) based on the notion of a Markov process.”
Witt, U. (2018) · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2033 · Cited by 19
Tang, Y. Q., Li, L., & Lu, J. (2021) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2021.126710 · Cited by 18
Gonzalez-Cabrera, I. D. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03925-2 · Cited by 18
“Evolutionary approaches to game theory also suggest that the risk dominant equilibrium strategy is more likely to occur than the payoff dominant equilibrium (Kandori et al., 1993; Nax & Newton, 2019; Sawa & Wu, 2018; Young, 1993).”
BackgroundAcceptable Discourse: Social Norms of Beliefs and Opinions
Golman, R. (2022) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104588 · Cited by 26
What do you want to know? Information acquisition and learning in experimental Cournot games
Bigoni, M. (2009) · Research in Economics · doi:10.1016/j.rie.2009.12.001 · Cited by 18
Geographic variations in a model of physician treatment choice with social interactions
Burke, M. A., Fournier, G. M., & Prasad, K. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.11.004 · Cited by 18
Rationality, Imitation, and Rational Imitation in Spatial Public Goods Games
Govaert, A., Ramazi, P., & Cao, M. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems · doi:10.1109/tcns.2021.3065655 · Cited by 22
Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games
Hwang, S., Katsoulakis, M. A., & Rey-Bellet, L. (2013) · Theoretical Economics · doi:10.3982/te829 · Cited by 18
“2corresponding author. email: hwang@math.umass.edu 3email: markos@math.umass.edu 4email: luc@math.umass.edu”
Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies
Robles, J. (1997) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2274 · Cited by 16
State-contingent rent reduction and tenancy contract choice
Arimoto, Y. (2004) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.12.017 · Cited by 18
Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games
Staudigl, M. (2012) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-012-0331-0 · Cited by 18
Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games
Kojima, F. (2005) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.006 · Cited by 18
“Consider the following 3 × 3 game by Young [31].”
BackgroundDistributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (II) : Reaching the set of global optima
Zhu, M., & Martı́nez, S. (2009) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2009.5399544 · Cited by 18
“1 ([27]): Let {P t } be a regular perturbation of {P0 t }, and for each ' > 0, let μ(') be the unique stationary distribution of {P t }.”
BackgroundMethodThe Dynamics of Neighborhood Watch and Norm EnforcementPreprint
Huck, S., & Kosfeld, M. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.574964 · Cited by 18
Equilibrium Wage Arrears: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Institutional Lock-InPreprint
Earle, J. S., & Sabirianova, K. Z. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.251999 · Cited by 23
“…punishment on nonconformity or preference for similarity may account for the existence of clusters of customs and conventions (Akerlof, 1980; or Young, 1993), explaining phenomena as varied as rules of the road (Young, 1996) and social norms in the welfare state (Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull,…”
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: coordination and equilibrium selection
Raducha, T., & Miguel, M. S. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-38589-6 · Cited by 17
Social Conflict and the Evolution of Unequal Conventions
Hwang, S., Naidu, S., & Bowles, S. (2024) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1093/jeea/jvae004 · Cited by 30
Building Norms-Adaptable Agents from Potential Norms Detection Technique (PNDT)
Mahmoud, M. A., Ahmad, M. S., Ahmad, A., Mustapha, A., Yusoff, M. Z. M., & Hamid, N. H. A. (2013) · International Journal of Intelligent Information Technologies · doi:10.4018/jiit.2013070103 · Cited by 17
“Young (1993) defined conventions as “a pattern of behaviour that is customary, expected, and self-enforcing.”
BackgroundImitation, local interaction, and coordination
Chen, H., Chow, Y., & Wu, L.-C. (2012) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-012-0353-7 · Cited by 17
“This method is introduced in Appendix B. Similar approaches have been employed in previous works, such as in Young (1993) and Ellison (2000).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialBluffing and betting behavior in a simplified poker game
Seale, D. A., & Phelan, S. E. (2009) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.658 · Cited by 22
The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation
Sasaki, T. (2013) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7 · Cited by 17
“A strand of literature uses stochastic evolution models [14, 33, 64], in which typically, a risk-dominant equilibrium [23] that has the larger basin of attraction is selected through random fluctuation in the long run.”
Coordination Games on Directed Graphs
Apt, K. R., Simon, S., & Wojtczak, D. (2016) · Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.4204/eptcs.215.6 · Cited by 17
“The notions of a game having the FIP or being weakly acyclic, see [16, 13], are then defined by referring to improvement paths instead of c-improvement paths.”
BackgroundFictitious play in coordination games
Sela, A., & Herreiner, D. K. (1999) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s001820050012 · Cited by 15
Network Formation: Neighborhood Structures, Establishment Costs, and Distributed Learning
Chasparis, G. C., & Shamma, J. S. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tsmcb.2012.2236553 · Cited by 17
“where 1) xi(t) ∈ Δ(|Ai|) is the strategy of agent i at stage t; 2) 1 is a vector of appropriate dimension, with each element equal to 1; and 3) λ ≥ 0 is a parameter used to model possible perturbations in the decision-making process, which are also called mutations [33], [35].”
BackgroundThe evolution of free trade networks
Zhang, J., Cui, Z., & Lei, Z. K. (2013) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2013.09.004 · Cited by 17
“To capture the long-run effect of these uncertainties, we use stochastic stability (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993) to explore which FTA networks are observable for most of the time when stochastic mutations cease.”
MethodDynamic systems of social interactions
Horst, U. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.007 · Cited by 17
“There is a large literature (Foster and Young 1990, Kirman 1992, Young 1993) on stochastic stability in evolutionary models that uses stationary distribution to describe the long run behavior in economic models.”
BackgroundInfluentialVoting with your pocketbook — a stochastic model of consumer boycotts
Diermeier, D. A., & Mieghem, J. A. V. (2008) · Mathematical and Computer Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.043 · Cited by 17
Huck, S., & Sarin, R. (2004) · The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · doi:10.2202/1534-5971.1109 · Cited by 17
A Theoretical Analysis of Cooperative Behavior in Multi-agent Q-learning
Waltman, L., & Kaymak, U. (2007) · IEEE Symposium on Adaptive Dynamic Programming and Reinforcement Learning · doi:10.1109/adprl.2007.368173 · Cited by 17
“These techniques are discussed in, for example, [23]–[25].”
On the geography of conventions
Blume, A., & Temzelides, T. (2003) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0350-3 · Cited by 17
“and Young (1993) who, in turn, used techniques in Freidlin and Wentzell (1984).”
MethodSatisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games
Pazgal, A. I. (1997) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01813884 · Cited by 17
Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games
Pazgal, A. I. (1998) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s001820050045 · Cited by 17
Network Formation in Symmetric 2x2 GamesPreprint
Berninghaus, S. K., & Vogt, B. (2004) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 17
Serifsoy, B., & Tyrell, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.928610 · Cited by 19
“Also the evolutionary stochastic adjustment dynamics literature, typified for example by Young (1993), provides independent theoretical justification for the selection of risk-dominant equilibria.”
Learning to Resolve Social Dilemmas: A Survey
Fatima, S. S., Jennings, N. R., & Wooldridge, M. (2024) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.1.15167 · Cited by 30
Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents
Basov, S. (2003) · Topics in Theoretical Economics · doi:10.2202/1534-598x.1093 · Cited by 16
Decentralized dynamics to optimal and stable states in the assignment game
Nax, H. H., Pradelski, B., & Young, H. P. (2013) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2013.6760238 · Cited by 16
“The existing strand of this literature is based on noisy bestresponse dynamics and the theory of large deviations [26, 27, 28].”
BackgroundSelf-citationSample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Sandholm, W. H., & Staudigl, M. (2018) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2017.0908 · Cited by 16
“3See Freidlin and Wentzell [19, lemma 6.3.1] or Young [45, theorem 4].”
InfluentialSocial learning and the shadow of the past
Heller, Y., & Mohlin, E. (2017) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.003 · Cited by 15
Asymmetries in punishment propensity may drive the civilizing process
Strimling, P., de Barra, M., & Eriksson, K. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0278-z · Cited by 16
Monitoring norms: a multi-disciplinary perspective
Dastani, M. M., Torroni, P., & Yorke‐Smith, N. (2018) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888918000267 · Cited by 23
“The focus in this case is on the emergence and dynamics of conventions , as solutions to recurring coordination problems (Lewis, 1969; Young, 1993), or norms in relation with beliefs, expectations, group knowledge and common knowledge (Bicchieri, 2006).”
BackgroundStability and stabilization of evolutionary games with time delays via matrix method
Gao, X., Wang, J., & Yang, D. (2019) · Asian Journal of Control · doi:10.1002/asjc.2153 · Cited by 16
Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
Nöldeke, G., & Peña, J. (2020) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.003 · Cited by 16
“…and Wallace (2008a) and Myatt and Wallace (2008b) who use stochastic stability arguments akin to the ones developed in Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) to select among the pure strategy equilibria in repeated threshold games played by myopic players and study the composition affects…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.