The Evolution of Conventions
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Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
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Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
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“Our work is related to the literature on learning in coordination games (see e.g. Crawford and Haller (1990), Crawford (1991, 1995), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), or Young (1993)) and in particular to the literature of learning on networks (see e.g. )).”
BackgroundMistakes in Cooperation: The Stochastic Stability of Edgeworth's Recontracting
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Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria
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“Technically, the analysis borrows from the pioneering work of Foster . and Young 1990 which was further developed and applied by Kandori . . . et al. 1993 , Young 1993a, b , Fudenberg and Harris 1992 , Noldeke and”
BackgroundMethodReinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games
Bendor, J. B., Dilip Mookherjee, B., & Debraj Ray, B. (2001) · The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · doi:10.2202/1534-5963.1008 · Cited by 34
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Grüne‐Yanoff, T. (2011) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-011-9273-3 · Cited by 37
Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments
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“Our analysis rests on stochastic techniques from evolutionary game theory (Foster and Young 1990; Fudenberg and Harris 1992; Kandori et al. 1993; Young 1993; Fudenberg and Imhof 2006), which in turn are inspired by the general study of random perturbations of dynamical systems (Freidlin and…”
MethodCartwright, A., & Cartwright, E. J. (2019) · Games · doi:10.3390/g10020026 · Cited by 35
“Our approach is similar to that of Young (1993) [34,36] and consistent with beliefs being biased by event frequencies [37].”
BackgroundResultHow Norms Emerge from Conventions (and Change)
Przepiorka, W., Székely, Á., Andrighetto, G., Diekmann, A., & Tummolini, L. (2022) · Socius Sociological Research for a Dynamic World · doi:10.1177/23780231221124556 · Cited by 39
“…literature has explored how conventions, defined as behavioral regularities that serve as arbitrary solutions to coordination problems (Lewis 1969; Sugden 1986), can emerge tacitly as unintended consequences of repeated social interactions (Centola and Baronchelli 2015; Sugden 1986; Young 1993).”
BackgroundConformism and cooperation in a local interaction model
Mengel, F. (2008) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-008-0131-7 · Cited by 33
“P Result (Young 1993) State s ∗ is stochastically stable if it has minimal stochastic potential, i.e. if s ∗ ∈ arg min s Ω ψ ( s ) .”
Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Weidenholzer, S. (2007) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007 · Cited by 33
“To illustrate this, consider the following 3× 3 example, taken from Young (1993).”
BackgroundInfluentialIs it a norm to favour your own group?
Harris, D., Herrmann, B., Kontoleon, A., & Newton, J. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 · Cited by 38
“The literature on adaptive dynamics and conventions (see Young, 1993) considers norms to be equilibria that are anticipated precisely because they have been played in the past, and hence a norm that is routinely violated will not remain a norm for long.”
BackgroundAn approach to complex agent-based negotiations via effectively modeling unknown opponents
Chen, S., & Weiß, G. (2014) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2014.10.048 · Cited by 33
“The purpose of this analysis technique is to identify pure Nash equilibria where none of the agents has an incentive to change its current strategy or, in case no such equilibrium exists, to find the best reply cycle (Young, 1993).”
MethodOn the Co-existence of Conventions
Anwar, A. W. (2002) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2872 · Cited by 33
“Following Young (1993), such a set will be called a recurrent communication class.”
BackgroundInfluentialA Social Interactions Perspective on Trust and its Determinants
Singh, T. B. (2011) · Journal of Trust Research · doi:10.1080/21515581.2012.708496 · Cited by 33
“As emphasised by Young (1996), it is when individual”
Engel, C. (2008) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137408001094 · Cited by 62
“Although it is related, the topic of this paper does not collapse with the work on custom (e.g. Young, 1993) and on informal institutions more generally (e.g. North, 1990).”
Comparative Learning Dynamics*
Bergin, J., & Bernhardt, D. (2004) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00132.x · Cited by 33
Self-organized criticality in evolutionary systems with local interaction
Arenas, À., Díaz-Guilera, A., Vicente, C. J. P., & Vega‐Redondo, F. (2002) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/s0165-1889(01)00025-2 · Cited by 32
“†Corresponding author – mail address: Facultad de Económicas, Universidad de Alicante, 03071 Alicante, Spain; Ph.: 34-96590-3616; Fax: 34-96590-3685; e-mail: vega@merlin.fae.ua.es.”
Agent-based dynamics in disaggregated growth models
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“This means, we can not 1 It is worth mentioning that there have been many literatures in which some authors try to connect the principle of spontaneous order and the method of evolutionary game, e.g., see Schotter (1981), Sugden (1989) and Young (1993) (1996).”
Social influence and spread dynamics in social networks
Zheng, X., Zhong, Y., Zeng, D. D., & Wang, F. (2012) · Frontiers of Computer Science · doi:10.1007/s11704-012-1176-1 · Cited by 40
“Recently, some extensions of the Bass model have been applied in several domains such as pricing and advertising [63,75].”
MethodThe evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
Bilancini, E., & Boncinelli, L. (2019) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-019-01174-y · Cited by 33
“Some models consider random pairwise encounters (Kandori et al., 1993; Kandori and Rob, 1995; Young, 1993).”
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Trust, risk, and the social contract
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Co-ordinating fiscal authorities in the euro-zone: a key role for the ECB
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Hoffmann, T., Ye, M., Zino, L., Cao, M., Rauws, W. S., & Bolderdijk, J. W. (2024) · Journal of Environmental Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2023.102221 · Cited by 37
“The randomness parameter ε i allows for including some level of bounded rationality in the behaviour update process, capturing the fact that individuals can occasionally be irrational, or show behaviour that deviates from their convictions (cf. Peyton Young, 1993).”
Competitive Diffusion in Social Networks: Quality or Seeding?
Fazeli, A., Ajorlou, A., & Jadbabaie, A. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems · doi:10.1109/tcns.2016.2553364 · Cited by 32
Mixing Times in Evolutionary Game Dynamics
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Leading a Best-Response Teammate in an Ad Hoc Team
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“Young [17, 18] explored a related concept called “adaptive play”, which similarly models a dynamic process whereby agents, each employing bounded-memory best-response algorithms based upon a random sample of past plays of the game, may gradually move towards an equilibrium (the specific choice of equilibrium by a popu…”
BackgroundIterative voting and acyclic games
Meir, R., Polukarov, M., Rosenschein, J. S., & Jennings, N. R. (2017) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2017.08.002 · Cited by 31
“Any game G induces a directed graph whose vertices are all action profiles (states) A , and edges are all local improvement steps [44, 16].”
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Wallace, C., & Young, H. P. (2014) · Handbook of game theory and economic applications · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53766-9.00006-9 · Cited by 31
Self-citationStochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games
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“The normal-form game G is weakly acyclic if from any given strategy profile there exists a better reply path to a Nash equilibrium (Young, [45, 1993]).”
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“In the pioneering work of [53] and [24], convergence to the risk-dominant equilibrium is shown when agents apply adaptive-play and best-reply dynamics, respectively, while at the same time agents’ decisions are subject to small randomized perturbations (or mutations ), which are uniformly…”
BackgroundInfluentialModels as products of interdisciplinary exchange: Evidence from evolutionary game theory
Grüne‐Yanoff, T. (2011) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.12.004 · Cited by 40
“In his wake, various authors proposed evolutionary explanations based on EGT (although they did not necessarily follow Sugden’s approach): from the evolution of conventions (Young, 1993) and norms (Binmore & Samuelson, 1994) to the ‘indirect evolutionary approach’, the aim of which was to account for the development o…”
BackgroundSocial coordination with locally observable types
Bilancini, E., & Boncinelli, L. (2017) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-017-1047-y · Cited by 31
“This allows us to conclude, by Theorem 2 in Young (1993), that every stochastically stable state is contained in SBA ∪ SAB .”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialStochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games
Kosfeld, M. (2002) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s001990100223 · Cited by 31
“The original assumption of KMR (1993) and Young (1993) is that agents adjust their strategy by playing perturbed best{response.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialAdaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations
Kaniovski, Y. M., Kryazhimskii, A. V., & Young, H. P. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1999.0736 · Cited by 31
Self-citationMonotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight DynamicsPreprint
Oyama, D., Takahashi, S., & Hofbauer, J. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.779864 · Cited by 31
“One is to consider the stability of Nash equilibria in the context of evolutionary dynamics (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Young (1993), Kandori and Rob (1995) for stochastic models; Hofbauer (1999) for a deterministic model); the other is to embed the original game in a static incomplete…”
InfluentialHistory, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms
Acemoğlu, D., & Jackson, M. O. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17066 · Cited by 31
An experimental study of exclusive contracts
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Dynamics and stability for a class of evolutionary games with time delays in strategies
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“This new alternative can be copied and become an accepted or conventional coping strategy (David, 1994; Boyer, 1990; Storper and Salais, 1997; Young, 1993; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; Cidell, 2012).”
BackgroundInter-cognitive representations in business networks
Mouzas, S., & Henneberg, S. C. M. (2015) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2015.03.009 · Cited by 35
The Effects of Norms on Environmental Behavior
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Choice of Transaction Channels: The Effects of Product Characteristics on Market Evolution
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“There are different ways of adaptive play that are mostly influenced by the players’ cognitive abilities and the information or memory the players possess [45].”
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van der Laan, G., & Tieman, X. (1998) · De Economist · doi:10.1023/a:1003253925406 · Cited by 30
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Of Social Norms and Sanctioning
Villatoro, D., Sen, S., & Sabater-Mir, J. (2010) · International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems · doi:10.4018/jats.2010120101 · Cited by 30
“These hypotheses are also shared by Young (2008), who claims that there are three mechanisms by which norms emerge: • Pure Coordination: These are “social” phenomena, because they are held in place by shared expectations about the appropriate solution to a given coordination problem, but there is no need for social en…”
BackgroundCycles of Learning in the Centipede Game
Ponti, G. (2000) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0707 · Cited by 31
Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I): Reaching the set of Nash equilibria
Zhu, M., & Martı́nez, S. (2009) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2009.5399545 · Cited by 30
“In our companion paper [29], we present an asynchronous distributed learning algorithm which converges in probability to the set of global optima of certain coverage performance metric.”
The effect of hysteresis on equilibrium selection in coordination games
Romero, J. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.12.029 · Cited by 30
“Since this however, a growing amount of support for the risk dominant equilibrium has emerged (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993; Carlsson and Damme, 1993).”
The Price of Selfishness in Network Coding
Marden, J. R., & Effros, M. (2012) · IEEE Transactions on Information Theory · doi:10.1109/tit.2011.2177576 · Cited by 30
“Once this interaction framework is established, we can employ a variety of well-established learning algorithms that provide convergence to various forms of equilibria [22, 18, 35, 36, 34].”
BackgroundMethodSocial interactions in small groups
Krauth, B. V. (2006) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · doi:10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00353.x · Cited by 35
Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior
Schipper, B. C. (2004) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s001820400170 · Cited by 30
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Cressman, R. (2008) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0148-z · Cited by 30
“…breakdown when there are more than two pure strategies as shown by examples of three-strategy symmetric games in Kandori and Rob (1998) (see also Young 1993).7 When applied to a symmetric game with a continuous strategy space S, x∗ is p∗-dominant if and only if x∗ is a best reply against P ∈…”
Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements
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Akerlof, R. J. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.022 · Cited by 39
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“Kandori (1992), Klein (1997), Koford and Miller (1991), Lichbach (1995, 1996), Misztal (1996), Olson (1965), Petit (1995), Schotter (1981), Sugden (1986), Ullmann-Margalit (1977), and Young (1993) .”
Equilibrium Selection and Public-good Provision: The Development of Open-source Software
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“The evolutionary stochastic adjustment dynamics literature, typified by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993), also provides independent theoretical justification for the selection of risk-dominant equilibria. a wider class of 2 × 2 games.”
BackgroundEmergence of Shared Intentionality Is Coupled to the Advance of Cumulative Culture
Angus, S. D., & Newton, J. (2015) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004587 · Cited by 32
“Thus a methodological implication of our model is that adaptive dynamics of norm selection driven by a behavioral rule [21, 33], together with the evolution of a trait that affects the behavioral rule, lead to interesting results, even when the trait in question is mutualistic.”
Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations
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“On the one hand it reinforced the bridge between agent-based modeling and evolutionary game theory (see Peyton-Young 1993; Dawid 2007).”
BackgroundHistory as a coordination device
Argenziano, R., & Gilboa, I. (2011) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-011-9264-5 · Cited by 27
“Other types of considerations attempted to embed the game in a dynamic process (Young (1993), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001)) or in incomplete information set-up (Carlsson and van Damme (1994)).”
BackgroundНеформальная экономика в России: краткий обзор
Барсукова, С. Ю., & Радаев, В. (2012) · Journal of Economic Sociology · doi:10.17323/1726-3247-2012-2-99-111 · Cited by 64
Global versus local interaction in coordination games: an experimental investigationPreprint
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Core and Periphery in Endogenous NetworksPreprint
Hojman, D. A., & Szeidl, Á. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.902378 · Cited by 29
“…formally, we study stochastically stable equilibria under a perturbed best response dynamics in the spirit of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993).12 The main idea behind these dynamics is that most of the time, players are randomly called to adjust and choose a myopic best response…”
BackgroundConvergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregation
Echzell, H., Friedrich, T., Lenzner, P., Molitor, L., Pappik, M., Schöne, F., Sommer, F., & Stangl, D. (2019) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_12 · Cited by 28
The Dynamics of Statistical Discrimination
Blume, L. E. (2006) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01133.x · Cited by 31
“(1993) and Young (1993) take a time which increases without bound in the size of the population of”
InfluentialStochasticity and Time Delays in Evolutionary Games
Miȩkisz, J., & Wesołowski, S. (2011) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-011-0028-1 · Cited by 30
“Stochastic dynamics of well-mixed populations of a fixed number of players interacting in discrete moments of time were discussed in [12, 13, 16, 17, 22, 23, 25, 27].”
BackgroundFazeli, A., & Jadbabaie, A. (2012) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2012.6426222 · Cited by 27
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia for Potential Games
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The Dynamics of Costly Signaling
Wagner, E. O. (2013) · Games · doi:10.3390/g4020163 · Cited by 33
“Jacobsen et al. showed that in Young’s [19] stochastic dynamic, the Riley equilibrium is the only separating equilibrium with any weight in the system’s limiting distribution.”
BackgroundInfluentialHeterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences
Hernández, P., Muñoz‐Herrera, M., & Sánchez, Á. (2013) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.004 · Cited by 33
Carvalho, J. (2016) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0990-3 · Cited by 32
“…outrage at even contemplating certain taboo transactions, including buying and selling of human body parts for medical transplant operations, surrogate motherhood contracts, adoption rights for orphans, votes in elections for political office, the right to become a US citizen and sexual favors.”
BackgroundStability and stabilization of a class of finite evolutionary games
Wang, Y., & Cheng, D. (2016) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/j.jfranklin.2016.12.007 · Cited by 28
Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Dynamics
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Fischer, S., Güth, W., Müller, W., & Stiehler, A. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-1468-0 · Cited by 28
Successes and failures in coordinating expectations
Guesnerie, R. (1993) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(93)90015-3 · Cited by 28
p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
Oyama, D. (2002) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2955 · Cited by 28
Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence
Sandholm, W. H., & Pauzner, A. (1998) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0575 · Cited by 28
“In the stochastic evolutionary model of Young (1993), as in that of KMR, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected in 2 x 2 coordination games.”
BackgroundMethodDynamic Club Formation with Coordination
Arnold, T., & WOODERS, M. H. (2002) · Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.269414 · Cited by 28
Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics
Hofbauer, J., et al. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 28
Energy‐efficient resource allocation for device‐to‐device communication with WPT
Dai, H., Huang, Y., Li, C., Li, S., & Yang, L. (2016) · IET Communications · doi:10.1049/iet-com.2015.1192 · Cited by 27
Similarity Caching: Theory and Algorithms
Garetto, M., Leonardi, E., & Neglia, G. (2020) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) · doi:10.1109/infocom41043.2020.9155221 · Cited by 28
Resource Allocation in NOMA-Based Self-Organizing Networks Using Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandits
Youssef, M.-J., Veeravalli, V. V., Farah, J., Nour, C. A., & Douillard, C. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Communications · doi:10.1109/tcomm.2021.3092767 · Cited by 33
“The proof relies on the theory of resistance trees for regular perturbed Markov chains [35].”
BackgroundBilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., & Wu, J. (2017) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.001 · Cited by 29
“We note that the basins of attraction of different equilibria can be potentially used to apply a stochastic stability analysis ( Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993 ) in order to obtain equilibrium selection.”
MethodWill reasoning improve learning?
Vriend, N. J. (1997) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00059-1 · Cited by 27
Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Young's Regret TestingPreprint
Germano, F., & Lugosi, G. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.678622 · Cited by 27
Melting pot or salad bowl: the formation of heterogeneous communities
Reich, B., & Advani, A. (2015) · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2015.1530 · Cited by 30
“H. Sandholm (2008): “Cultural Integration and its Discontents,” Review of Economic Studies, 75, 201–228.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialConflict and convention in dynamic networks
Foley, M., Forber, P., Smead, R., & Riedl, C. (2018) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0835 · Cited by 29
“Although some accounts of convention involve agents’ expectations or beliefs about the behavior of other agents (29, 51, 57), our model shows that learners with no such beliefs or expectations can establish convention-like behavior (i.”
BackgroundIndirect genetic effects allow escape from the inefficient equilibrium in a coordination game
Bernard, A., Bredèche, N., & André, J. (2020) · Evolution Letters · doi:10.1002/evl3.155 · Cited by 27
“The first hypothesis is based on stochastic effects (Foster and Young 1990; Kandori et al. 1993; Young 1993; see also Nowak et al. 2004 in a different setting).”
An efficient and robust negotiating strategy in bilateral negotiations over multiple items
Hao, J., Song, S., Leung, H.-F., & Ming, Z. (2014) · Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.engappai.2014.05.008 · Cited by 26
“Another concept for analyzing the stability of the strategy profiles is best reply cycle [3], which is a subset of strategy profiles in which, for any strategy profile within this subset, there is no single-agent best deviation path leading to any strategy profile outside the cycle.”
BackgroundCorporate culture: a review and directions for future research
Grennan, J., & Li, K. (2023) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781802204179.00015 · Cited by 31
Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma
Dolgopolov, A. (2024) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.004 · Cited by 26
The demand for distinction and the evolution of the prestige car
Swann, G. M. P. (2001) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-04528-2_5 · Cited by 26
Private provision of discrete public goods
Makris, M. (2008) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.003 · Cited by 29
“For equilibrium-selection models where the noise stems from mistakes/mutations see Young (1993, 1998), Kandori, et. al.”
BackgroundTeaching and leading an ad hoc teammate: Collaboration without pre-coordination
Stone, P., Kaminka, G. A., Kraus, S., Rosenschein, J. S., & Agmon, N. (2013) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.003 · Cited by 38
“Young [38, 39] explored a related concept called “adaptive play”, which similarly models a dynamic process whereby agents, each employing bounded-memory best-response algorithms based upon a random sample of past plays of the game, may gradually move towards an equilibrium (the specific choice of equilibrium by a popu…”
BackgroundImitation with asymmetric memory
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Shi, F. (2010) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-010-0554-x · Cited by 26
“In order to solve the multiplicity problem, and following the literature (see e.g. KMR; Young 1993b; Ellison 2000), we perform a stability analysis.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe Evolutionary Game of Pressure (or Interference), Resistance and Collaboration
Kolokoltsov, V. N. (2017) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2016.0838 · Cited by 28
“As shown in [50] (with similar result in [87]), introducing mutation of strength λ and then passing to the limit λ → 0 allows one to choose a certain particular Nash equilibrium, called a long run equilibrium (or statistically stable, in the terminology of [38]) that for some coordination games turns out to coincide w…”
Result
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.