The Evolution of Conventions
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Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
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InfluentialAlós-Ferrer, C., & Netzer, N. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.004 · Cited by 207
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“This model, in spirit, is similar to the insight recently discovered in evolutionary game theory that shows that an evolutionary process is more likely to select a risk-dominant equilibrium rather than a Pareto-dominant equilibrium in a 2 × 2 game (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993 ).”
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“The structure of interaction between players in our model does not correspond to random matching of pairs selected from a certain population, as in the evolutionary literature (see, for instance, [4, 12, 24 ]).”
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Dynamic coalition formation and the core
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“An analogous result holds in many other evolutionary learning models (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993; Blume, 1995b; van Damme and Weibull (1999). following example.”
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Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
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“Alternatively, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) specify noisy models of evolution, and show that behavior converges to the risk-dominant equilibrium in the limit as the noise vanishes.”
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“Background on regular perturbed processes For a detailed review of the theory of resistance trees, please see Young (1993).”
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“Seminal work by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) triggered intense interest in the question of equilibrium selection in coordination games.”
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“Variations of this approach have been used by Peyton Young (1993), Claus and Boutilier (1998), and Wang and Sandholm (2003).”
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“When the enforcers’ resources are limited, the cheating equilibrium can be stochastically stable (80).”
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Establishing conventional communication systems: Is common knowledge necessary?
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“Using analytical techniques, Young (1993) showed that social conventions can emerge even in populations in which agents lack complete knowledge or sometimes make irrational choices.”
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“Dynamic models of coordination behavior can be roughly divided into evolutionary models (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Crawford, 1991; Anderson et al., 2004), adaptive learning models (Crawford, 1995; Van Huyck et al., 1997), and " noisy " learning models (Battalio et al., 2001; Camerer and…”
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Chapter 19 Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments
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“26 One can find predecessors with regards to specific architectures, usually lattices or complete mixings, such as Conway's (1970) "game of life," and various agent-based models that followed such as the "voter model" (e.g., see Clifford and Sudbury (1973) and Holley and Liggett (1975) ), as well as models of stochast…”
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Sugden, R. (2001) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/13501780010023289 · Cited by 127
A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm ValuePreprint
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“For example, Young (1993) develops an adaptive learning model to show that the coordinating conventions designed to meet the unforeseen contingencies come from a defer-to-seniors norm.”
MethodBELIEFS, RATIONAL CHOICE AND BAYESIAN LEARNING
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Sport as a Common Property Resource
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Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
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Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors
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“We are grateful to one of the referees for pointing out the connection between cycles in our model and this type of cycle identified, for instance, in Young (1993).”
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Social Influence, Binary Decisions and Collective Dynamics
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“In fact, the stochastic component of learning models can actually reduce the number of possible outcomes as compared to the equivalent deterministic one (Foster and Young 1990, Young 1993).”
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“Recently, attention has shifted to the role of mutation and stochasticity in further refining the notion of stability in evolutionary games (Foster and Young 1990, Young 1993, Kandori, et al. 1993, Binmore and Samuelson 1993).”
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“…for the case of selfish workers, x = b/n. 15By contrast, certain models without pre-play communication instead lead to the long-run prediction, for generic 2× 2 coordination games, that it instead the risk-dominant equilibrium that is selected, see Kandori, Mailath and Rob (2003) and Young (1993).”
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Evolution and Revolution: The Dynamics of Corruption
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“systems. In two influential papers Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] and Young [1993]”
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Marden, J. R., Young, H. P., & Pao, L. Y. (2014) · SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization · doi:10.1137/110850694 · Cited by 108
“We know from [26] that the computation of the stochastically stable states can be reduced to an analysis of rooted trees on the vertex set consisting solely of the recurrence classes.”
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“Papers with such lessons include Binmore and Samuelson [1], Binmore, Samuelson and Vaughan [2], Ely [4], Kandori, Mailath and Rob [7], Robson and Vega-Redondo [14], Sandholm and Pauzner [16] and Young [ 20 ].”
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“See, for example, Brock and Durlauf (1995), De Vany (1996), Ioannides (1997), and Young (1993).”
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Watts, A. C., & Jackson, M. O. (2001) · OpenSIUC (Southern Illinois University Carbondale) · Cited by 104
Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination Games
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An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment
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“All games are acyclic (Young, 1993) and the unique strict Nash equilibrium coincides with the maximin prediction.”
Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
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“and Rob [30] and Young [ 37 ], see also Fudenberg and Levine [15].) Among”
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“(iv) Π-IV (Π-V ): Myopic best response adjustment rule [24]:”
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“The right coordination game in Table 7 is due to Young, who showed that the limiting distribution of his stochastic process puts all mass on (M;C).”
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“3 are related to the notion of weak acyclicity of games (Young, 1993).”
InfluentialRapid innovation diffusion in social networks
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“…each agent is chosen to revise with equal probability; hence the expected change in the population adoption rate is We wish to bound expression [ 2 ] from below, because this provides a lower bound on the expected change in the adoption rate for all configurations that have a minority of adopters.”
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Contagion and coordination in random networks
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Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks
Lelarge, M. (2012) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.009 · Cited by 115
Alós‐Ferrer, C., & Weidenholzer, S. (2008) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.003 · Cited by 98
Game Theory with Engineering Applications
Bauso, D. (2016) · Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics eBooks · doi:10.1137/1.9781611974287 · Cited by 99
Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
Goswami, G., Noe, T. H., & Rebello, M. J. (1996) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/9.3.757 · Cited by 88
Too Many Cooks: Bayesian Inference for Coordinating Multi‐Agent Collaboration
Wu, S. A., Wang, R. E., Evans, J. A., Tenenbaum, J. B., Parkes, D. C., & Kleiman‐Weiner, M. (2021) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12525 · Cited by 92
Giovanni Dosi, A., & Kaniovski, Y. M. (1994) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01200140 · Cited by 92
Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
Riedl, A. M., Rohde, I. M. T., & Strobel, M. (2011) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdv040 · Cited by 110
“We use the method introduced by Young (1993,1998) to show that the state with the complete network and the minimum effort played by all players is the only stochastically stable one.”
InfluentialSocial hierarchies and social networks in humans
Redhead, D., & Power, E. A. (2022) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0440 · Cited by 136
“Individuals are better able to calibrate their behaviour when interactions are structured by rules, or behavioural regularities, that rest on easily distinguishable attributes [55].”
BackgroundPeer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates
Sacerdote, B. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7469 · Cited by 114
Decentralization and the coordination problem
Oechssler, J. (1997) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(96)00022-4 · Cited by 106
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.