The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Abstract
The paper begins with a brief overview of the theory of incentives, with special attention to issues that are important in the public sector, in general and human capital in particular. It then reviews some case studies and empirical studies of incentives in the public sector, examining how these studies relate to the theory. Some implications for reform and design of organizations are drawn.
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Citations
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Cited by
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201413 · Cited by 1,389
Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens
Le Grand, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199266999.001.0001 · Cited by 922
Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India
Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2011) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/659655 · Cited by 823
The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization
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Chen, Y. J., Li, P., & Lu, Y. (2018) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.02.001 · Cited by 678
Metadata
- Authors
- Dixit, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Human Resources
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 696
- ISSN
- 0022-166X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1525356028
- Cited by
- 1,104
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 132.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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