The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Abstract
The paper begins with a brief overview of the theory of incentives, with special attention to issues that are important in the public sector, in general and human capital in particular. It then reviews some case studies and empirical studies of incentives in the public sector, examining how these studies relate to the theory. Some implications for reform and design of organizations are drawn.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dixit, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Human Resources
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 696
- ISSN
- 0022-166X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1525356028
- Cited by
- 1,104
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 132.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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