The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 13 of the 240 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Open Source Software: The New Intellectual Property Paradigm
Open accessAbstract
Open source methods for creating software rely on developers who voluntarily reveal code in the expectation that other developers will reciprocate. Open source incentives are distinct from earlier uses of intellectual property, leading to different types of inefficiencies and different biases in R&D investment. Open source style of software development remedies a defect of intellectual property protection, namely, that it does not generally require or encourage disclosure of source code. We review a considerable body of survey evidence and theory that seeks to explain why developers participate in open source collaborations instead of keeping their code proprietary, and evaluates the extent to which open source may improve welfare compared to proprietary development.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This essay argues that open source is a distinct intellectual property paradigm in which developers voluntarily disclose code because rewards come from complementary products, own-use, signaling, education, and social motives rather than direct appropriation. It concludes that open source often reduces agency problems, deadweight loss, and speeds disclosure, but it also tends to under-supply goods relative to patents and is only a partial solution.
Key findings
- The paper reports survey evidence that open source participation is driven by multiple motives: in Lakhani and Wolf (2005), the largest factor group was “Learning and Fun” at 29%, followed by “Hobbyists” (27%), “Professionals” (25%), and “Community Believers” (19%); among SourceForge developers, 41.3% cited improving skill and 44.9% cited intellectual stimulation.
- Open source contributions are highly concentrated: Ghosh et al. (2002) found 10% of SourceForge developers created 74% of code; Mockus et al. (2002) reported 15 core developers provided 83% of Apache contributions; Von Krogh et al. (2003) found about 1% of Freenet members accounted for 50% of developer e-mails.
- Corporate participation is substantial: the paper says roughly half of open source workers are directly or indirectly supported by corporations; Ghosh et al. (2002) report 54% of respondents were paid for open source work, and Lakhani and Wolf (2005) report 55% contributed code during work hours.
- The paper cites evidence that open source projects are often small and unevenly active: it notes 29% of projects have just one author, only 45% have more than two, and only 1% have more than fifty; elsewhere it says 80% of SourceForge projects show no activity since registration.
Methods
- This is a review/essay, not an original empirical study: it synthesizes survey evidence, case studies, and theoretical models on open source incentives, organization, and welfare implications.
- The paper draws on existing datasets and studies such as Ghosh et al. (2002), Lakhani and Wolf (2005), Hertel et al. (2003), Mockus et al. (2002), and others, using their reported percentages and counts as evidence.
- Its main analysis is conceptual and comparative: it contrasts open source with proprietary/IP regimes across incentives, organizational stability, efficiency, competition, and possible extensions beyond software.
Limitations
- The paper explicitly says open source “is not viable, and cannot operate in every environment where patent incentives do,” and that it is “a partial solution” because of undersupply.
- It states that many survey findings may reflect “politically correct opinions more than actual incentives” and notes that self-reports are a limitation; it also says empirical evidence is limited for some claims, such as crowding out and social psychology effects.
- Evident from the text: much of the argument relies on cited secondary studies and anecdotal evidence rather than new data from a single unified sample, so conclusions are heterogeneous across contexts.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
11 Valid · 12 Not valid · 175 Not checked · 127 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Commercial firms are less likely to participate in open source development where competition among them is significant (von Hippel, 2002, Harhoff et al., 2003).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites von Hippel, 2002 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The “Sources of benefit from free revealing” section says that stronger competition among innovation users increases the competitive advantage lost by revealing an innovation. This supports a disincentive to share, but the paper does not establish that commercial firms are less likely to participate in open-source development where competition among them is significant. (LLM, conf=0.83)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Harhoff et al., 2003 source
hedgedstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Signaling is also weak for such useful tasks as reporting bugs, submitting comments, suggesting new functionality, preparing documentation, building easy-touse interfaces, providing technical support, ensuring backwards compatibility, and writing programs for utilitarian tasks like power management or wizards (Rossi, 2004, Osterloh and Rota, 2004, Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2002).”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Rossi, 2004
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Could not verifycites Osterloh and Rota, 2004 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.3 (page unavailable) discusses how open-source contributions can signal programmers’ abilities, but does not say signaling is weak for the tasks listed. Searches for bug reporting, documentation, interfaces, technical support, and backwards compatibility found no passage in our copy making that distinction. (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Schmidt and Schnitzer, 2002 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard for software fosters a common pool of skilled workers, reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning, increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions, and avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons' (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005, Lerner and Tiro”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005 source
- Partly supportedcites Lerner and Tirole, 2004 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The section “What is the Relative Quality of Open Source Software?” (page unavailable) discusses open source programmers identifying bugs and users adapting code. “What Motivates Open Source Contributors?” (page unavailable) says projects may attract more programmers when programmers expect others to participate. Neither passage establishes that adopting a single industry-wide standard increases the number submitting bug reports and extensions. (LLM, conf=0.75)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard for software fosters a common pool of skilled workers, reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning, increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions, and avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons' (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005, Lerner and Tiro”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005 source
- Could not verifycites Lerner and Tirole, 2004 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Final Thoughts section notes that open-source projects can duplicate work because of poor coordination, but it does not say that adopting a single industry-wide standard reduces costs from unnecessary versioning. Searches for versioning, incompatible versions, and standardization found no passage in our copy establishing that specific claim; the retrieved passages have no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.72)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Adopting a single, industry-wide open source standard for software fosters a common pool of skilled workers, reduces costs associated with unnecessary versioning, increases the total number of programmers submitting bug reports and extensions, and avoids transactions costs associated with intellectual property such as 'patent thickets' and 'anticommons' (Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005, Lerner and Tiro”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rossi and Bonaccorsi, 2005 source
- Partly supportedcites Lerner and Tirole, 2004 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The ‘Can Open Source Work Beyond Software?’ section says open source can protect users against future price increases, supporting a narrower claim about avoiding hold-up. But it attributes avoidance of patent thickets to patent pools, not to adopting an industry-wide open-source standard. The discussion of software patents also says open-source projects remain vulnerable to patent claims; it does not establish that such a standard avoids anticommons costs. (LLM, conf=0.83)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
178 more claims · 3 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 325 claims and to verify the 6 references still open.
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Citations
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Cited by
Open collaboration for innovation: Principles and performance
Levine, S. S., & Prietula, M. J. (2014) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2013.0872 · Cited by 263
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Raasch, C., Herstatt, C., & Balka, K. (2009) · R and D Management · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00567.x · Cited by 162
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Bican, P. M., Guderian, C. C., & Ringbeck, A. K. (2017) · Journal of Knowledge Management · doi:10.1108/jkm-11-2016-0509 · Cited by 123
Biological Diversity in the Patent System
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Metadata
- Authors
- Maurer, S., & Scotchmer, S.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Corresponding author
- Maurer, Stephen
- ORCID
- Maurer, Stephen
- Venue
- NBER Working Paper No. 12148
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2006-04
- OpenAlex
- W2142745633
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 72
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 2
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- public-domain
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion, public-domain)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- National Bureau of Economic Research (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Open Source Software Innovations
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Intellectual Property and Patents
- Keywords
- open source software, intellectual property, source code disclosure, proprietary software, R&D investment, software development, welfare effects, open source collaboration
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-09-29, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-09-29 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.