Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape: Evaluation and Roadmap
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 12 of the 159 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Industrial IoT (IIoT) is a novel concept of a fully connected, transparent, automated, and intelligent factory setup improving manufacturing processes and efficiency. To achieve this, existing hierarchical models must transition to a fully connected vertical model. Since IIoT is a novel approach, the environment is susceptible to cyber threat vectors, standardization, and interoperability issues, bridging the gaps at the IT/OT ICS level. This research enables an understanding of converged/hybrid cybersecurity standards, reviews the best practices, and provides a roadmap for identifying, aligning, mapping, converging, and implementing the right cybersecurity standards and strategies for securing M2M communications in the IIoT.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper surveys cyber threats and security standards for Industrial IoT/Industry 4.0 and argues that current standards are fragmented across IT, OT, and M2M communication layers. It proposes a unified IIoT standards roadmap to identify, align, map, and implement complementary standards and controls for securing smart manufacturing environments.
Key findings
- The authors reviewed over 90 papers published between 2016–2021, and 52 were within scope for securing M2M communications in IIoT.
- They report that around 48% of manufacturing industries have suffered a cyberattack, while 89% understand the importance of data standards but only 11% invest in relevant security controls and standards.
- The paper argues that IIoT environments remain vulnerable because IT and OT use different priorities and metrics: for IT, security is assessed as CIA, while for OT it is prioritized as AIC.
- The roadmap is intended to reduce gaps by aligning hybrid standards such as IEC 62443, OneM2M, ISO 27001, NIST 800-82, and others, and by using threat intelligence frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK and IBM X-Force.
Methods
- Narrative review / survey of literature on standards, cybersecurity, and communications related to IIoT/I4.0.
- The paper is based on insights from an Industry 4.0 cybersecurity project; the authors say the work draws on that project’s insights.
- The main analysis is a qualitative comparison and mapping of cybersecurity standards, communication standards, threat landscapes, and IT/OT convergence issues, culminating in an author-designed unified IIoT standards roadmap.
Limitations
- The paper states that it is focused specifically on the IIoT/smart manufacturing industry, so its scope is not universal across all I4.0 sectors.
- It explicitly notes that gaps still exist even when standards and guidelines are implemented, because of issues such as lack of alignment, mapping, and understanding of the production environment.
- Evident from the text: the paper is a review and roadmap paper, not an empirical evaluation of the proposed roadmap in a real industrial deployment.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures



![Figure 4 Hybrid security standards and controls adapted from [40].](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/2e0297bd974d457bbcf8dff61a93e48d/industrial-iot-cyber-threats-and-standards-landscape-evaluation-and-roadmap-figure-4.jpg)
![Figure 5 Cybersecurity standards coverage adapted from [40].](https://figures.cochat.ai/paper-figures/886c8da1f211426ab597bb7465a3763b/industrial-iot-cyber-threats-and-standards-landscape-evaluation-and-roadmap-figure-5.jpg)



Verification
Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 22 Not valid · 97 Not checked · 73 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“There is a substantial gap between the existing information technology and operational technology (IT/OT) domains which makes the IIoT environment more vulnerable to existing security issues [5,6,7,8,9,10].”
§ Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape: Evaluation and Roadmap > 1. Industrial IoT (IIoT)
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [5] Leander, B., Čaušević, A., and Hansson, H. (2019, January 26–29). Applicability of the IEC 62443 standard in Industry 4.0/IIoT. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, Canterbury, UK. source
- Partly supportedcites [6] Gurtov, A., Liyanage, M., and Korzun, D. (2016). Secure Communication and Data Processing Challenges in the Industrial Internet. Balt. J. Mod. Comput., 4. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction identifies an OT/IT divide that makes the Industrial Internet challenging to develop. Section 3.1 says that adopting IP connectivity introduced new security challenges to formerly isolated industrial networks, but it does not say that the OT/IT divide itself makes IIoT more vulnerable to existing security issues. No page numbers were available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [7] Rak, J., and Hutchison, D. (2020). Guide to Disaster-Resilient Communication Networks, Springer. (Computer Communications and Networks). source
- Partly supportedcites [8] Martinez, 2019, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Complex Path for Wireless in the Manufacturing Industry, IEEE Commun. Mag. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper describes interoperability problems with legacy industrial equipment (B. Undervalued industrial interests, p. 4) and security risks from wireless connections (D. Security, p. 3). It does not identify a substantial IT/OT-domain gap or say that such a gap makes IIoT more vulnerable to security issues. (LLM, conf=0.79)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [9] Sengupta, 2020, A Comprehensive Survey on Attacks, Security Issues and Blockchain Solutions for IoT and IIoT, J. Netw. Comput. Appl. source
- Partly supportedcites [10] Hameed, 2019, Understanding Security Requirements and Challenges in Internet of Things (IoT): A Review, J. Comput. Netw. Commun. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4.1 (page not provided) says that bringing Modbus and SCADA systems into IP-based networks is expected to increase attacks, supporting the claim of increased security risk in industrial systems. It does not identify a substantial gap between IT and OT domains as the cause. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Different NIST standards are implemented in IIoT, such as NIST 800-53, NIST 800-82, and NIST Cybersecurity Framework [43,44].”
§ Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape: Evaluation and Roadmap > 4. Standards > 4.2. Standardization Bodies
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [43] Stouffer, K., Lightman, S., Pillitteri, V., Abrams, M., and Hahn, A. (2021, January 20). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 2, Available online: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-82/rev-2/final.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Partly supportedcites [44] Hogan, M., and Piccarreta, B. (2018). Status of International Cybersecurity Standardization for the Internet of Things (IoT)—NISTIR 8200, NIST. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Cybersecurity Objectives section says NIST SP 800-82’s industrial-control security objectives can be adapted for IoT, and the Figure 10 discussion says a Cybersecurity Framework manufacturing profile may help manage IoT risks. SP 800-53 appears in a list of NIST publications, but the report does not establish that it—or all three named resources—is implemented in IIoT. The claim overstates the report’s discussion of applicability as implementation. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Implementing SIEM and SOAR tools at this layer will provide insights on the reactive approach to detect, prevent, and quickly recover from ICS attacks/failures [8].”
§ Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape: Evaluation and Roadmap > 7. The Unified IIoT Standards Roadmap
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [8] Martinez, 2019, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Complex Path for Wireless in the Manufacturing Industry, IEEE Commun. Mag. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Security section (p. 3) discusses risks from wireless connections in factories, and Materializing security (p. 6) discusses secure wireless communications. Searches for SIEM, SOAR, ICS/SCADA, and incident response found no passage addressing whether those tools enable detection, prevention, or rapid recovery from ICS attacks or failures. (LLM, conf=0.75)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
In the paper
“Breaches happening in the industrial IoT domain would be critical due to specific exposures that are related to machine-to-machine (M2M) communication and environments [3].”
§ Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape: Evaluation and Roadmap > 1. Industrial IoT (IIoT)
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [3] Bartoli, A., Dohler, M., Kountouris, A., and Barthel, D. (2015). Advanced security taxonomy for machine-to-machine (M2M) communications in 5G capillary networks. Machine-To-Machine (M2M) Communications, Woodhead Publishing. source
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“M2M communication networks are an integral part of connected factories involving high dependency on next generation wireless communication systems (5G, time sensitive networking, etc.) [4,5] and involving self-automated, self-driven, and self-learning network characteristics.”
§ Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape: Evaluation and Roadmap > 1. Industrial IoT (IIoT)
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [4] Farkas, J., Varga, B., Miklós, G., and Sachs, J. (2019). 5G-TSN Integration Meets Networking Requirements for Industrial Automation, Ericsson.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [5] Leander, B., Čaušević, A., and Hansson, H. (2019, January 26–29). Applicability of the IEC 62443 standard in Industry 4.0/IIoT. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, Canterbury, UK. source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Adaptive approaches implemented protection through complementary mechanisms: network segmentation isolated vulnerable protocols within secure zones, boundary firewalls with deep packet inspection filtered malicious commands, and protocol-aware monitoring detected anomalous communication patterns [18].”
From Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments (2026) · cites this paper as [18]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Citations
Cites
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“The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards [43,62] are based on the best course of action and security controls to assist manufacturing industries to meet specific regulatory compliance requirements.”
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Sengupta, J., Ruj, S., & Das Bit, S. (2020) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2019.102481 · Cited by 844
A review of industrial wireless networks in the context of Industry 4.0
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“[95] outlines IWN (standards, QoS, real-time algorithms), security and data fusion issues in I4.”
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Riahi Sfar, A., Natalizio, E., Challal, Y., & Chtourou, Z. (2018) · Digital Communications and Networks · doi:10.1016/j.dcan.2017.04.003 · Cited by 480 · cited 1×
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“[83] discusses security of existing industrial and manufacturing systems and compares manufacturing and IT systems in terms of (systems, operations, security, and impact metrics) IIoT dependability metrics versus security metrics.”
BackgroundCurrent Standards Landscape for Smart Manufacturing Systems
Lu, Y., Morris, K., & Frechette, S. (2016) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8107 · Cited by 360 · cited 3×
“[28] discusses M2M standards (OneM2M, HyperCat, OMA Lightweight, ECLIPSE M2M, Weightless), cross-level standards (IEC 62443/ISA 99, ISO 9000, etc.) enabling technologies and key capabilities.”
BackgroundA survey of cyber security management in industrial control systems
Knowles, W., Prince, D., Hutchison, D., Disso, J. F. P., & Jones, K. (2015) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2015.02.002 · Cited by 344 · cited 6×
“This is necessary because risk classification and security metrics need to be aligned with the industry’s Based on past attacks on IIoT ICS (shown in Figure 3) where Black Energy and Triton [46] affected huge amounts of manufacturing industries, it has become necessary to implement different security strategies and se…”
BackgroundInfluentialMachine-to-Machine Communications: Architectures, Standards and Applications
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“[97] mentions challenges associated with cellular M2M and capillary M2M communications using wireless standards.”
MethodCyber security risk assessment for SCADA and DCS networks
Ralston, P. A. S., Graham, J. H., & Hieb, J. L. (2007) · ISA Transactions · doi:10.1016/j.isatra.2007.04.003 · Cited by 267 · cited 1×
“ICS integrity is critical to OT security and the priority is to detect various security events and incidents, such as failure of devices and services exhausting resources early [100].”
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Hameed, S., Khan, F. I., & Hameed, B. (2019) · Journal of Computer Networks and Communications · doi:10.1155/2019/9629381 · Cited by 219 · cited 4×
“With the increased usage of IoT-based devices, assessing, monitoring, and securing the end-points of these devices is subject to various security-based challenges (e.g., lack of standard regulations for all IoT devices from different vendors [9,10], trusting third-party cloud vendors).”
BackgroundInfluentialComparative Examination on Architecture and Protocol of Industrial Wireless Sensor Network Standards
Wang, Q., & Jiang, J. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2548360 · Cited by 182 · cited 2×
“This can be accomplished by implementing industrial blockchain technology to meet the required levels of security, openness, and decentralization [37].”
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Ahmad, I., Kumar, T., Liyanage, M., Okwuibe, J., Ylianttila, M., & Gurtov, A. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Conference on Standards for Communications and Networking (CSCN) · doi:10.1109/cscn.2017.8088621 · Cited by 181 · cited 3×
“[70] provides analyzing of 5G threats (DoS, hijacking, security keys exposure, signaling storms, etc.) and possible solutions.”
BackgroundNIST framework and roadmap for smart grid interoperability standards, release 4.0
Gopstein, A., Nguyen, C., O'Fallon, C., Hastings, N., & Wollman, D. (2021) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.1108r4 · Cited by 178
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“0 domain and highlight how these unresolved issues [12,13] leave the industrial environment susceptible to security breaches.”
BackgroundSmart manufacturing standardization: Architectures, reference models and standards framework
Li, Q., Tang, Q., Chan, I., Wei, H., Pu, Y., Jiang, H., Li, J., & Zhou, J. (2018) · Computers in Industry · doi:10.1016/j.compind.2018.06.005 · Cited by 139 · cited 3×
“Each of the threats and vulnerabilities discussed may lead/link directly or indirectly with the cybersecurity controls and standards [47].”
BackgroundMethodM2M Communications in 5G: State-of-the-Art Architecture, Recent Advances, and Research Challenges
Mehmood, Y., Haider, N., Imran, M., Timm-Giel, A., & Guizani, M. (2017) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.2017.1600559 · Cited by 115 · cited 5×
“5G’s network architecture implements the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard and is equipped with radio access, core transport networks, and service capabilities, providing complete system specifications required to support IIoT [50,51].”
BackgroundInfluentialVirtual IoT HoneyNets to Mitigate Cyberattacks in SDN/NFV-Enabled IoT Networks
Zarca, A. M., Bernabe, J. B., Skarmeta, A., & Alcaraz Calero, J. M. (2020) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2020.2986621 · Cited by 115 · cited 2×
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BackgroundMethodFlatt, H., Schriegel, S., Jasperneite, J., Trsek, H., & Adamczyk, H. (2016) · 2016 IEEE 21st International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA) · doi:10.1109/etfa.2016.7733634 · Cited by 101 · cited 1×
“[86] demonstrated cybersecurity analysis based on reference architecture model (RAMI 4.”
MethodIBM: 2021 X-Force Threat Intelligence Index
(2021) · Network Security · doi:10.1016/s1353-4858(21)00026-x · Cited by 99
Guide to Disaster-Resilient Communication Networks
(2020) · Computer Communications and Networks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-44685-7 · Cited by 84
Applicability of the IEC 62443 standard in Industry 4.0 / IIoT
Leander, B., Čaušević, A., & Hansson, H. (2019) · Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security · doi:10.1145/3339252.3341481 · Cited by 82 · cited 9×
“Authors in [50] point out limitations in existing standards, whereas [5,15,74] underline IT/OT convergence and interoperability issues [28,41].”
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Security issues in SCADA based industrial control systems
Babu, B., Ijyas, T., Muneer, P., & Varghese, J. (2017) · 2017 2nd International Conference on Anti-Cyber Crimes (ICACC) · doi:10.1109/anti-cybercrime.2017.7905261 · Cited by 73 · cited 2×
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“Since network segmentation [110,111] is considered as a good security practice, it can be achieved by implementing BP1-CPNI [109], IEC”
MethodStandards landscape and directions for smart manufacturing systems
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BackgroundMethodInfluentialComparison of industrial WSN standards
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“Authors in [50] point out limitations in existing standards, whereas [5,15,74] underline IT/OT convergence and interoperability issues [28,41].”
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Gurtov, A., Liyanage, M., & Korzun, D. (2016) · Baltic Journal of Modern Computing · doi:10.22364/bjmc.2016.4.4.28 · Cited by 34 · cited 1×
“The use-case examples presented in [6,11,77] bring attention to wireless communication security and performance metrics for I4.”
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SCADA System Forensic Analysis Within IIoT
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A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Complex Path for Wireless in the Manufacturing Industry
Martinez, B., Cano, C., & Vilajosana, X. (2019) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.2019.1800570 · Cited by 32 · cited 5×
“[8] highlights ICS concerns (i.e., gaps between legacy equipment and new communications systems (retrofitting, interoperability, and reliability issues) between industrial requirements and wireless standards).”
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Wegner, A., Graham, J., & Ribble, E. (2017) · Springer Series in Advanced Manufacturing · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-50660-9_3 · Cited by 30
Standards for Smart Manufacturing: A review
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“To mitigate such risks, it is recommended to thoroughly understand and implement cybersecurity standards [27,28].”
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“IEC 62443 Security Capabilities for ICS components [46] IEC 61784-1:2019 Industrial Communication Networks (Communication Profile) [104] ISO 27001 Information Security Management Systems—Requirements (Annex A.”
BackgroundResultApplication of IEC 62443 for IoT Components
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“[42] discusses IEC 62443 implementation at the component level improving security for IoT devices.”
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Hybrid Cloud SLAs for Industry 4.0: Bridging the Gap
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“Service level agre ments [1] are of high importance for asessing, aligni g, and controlling the s curity, privacy, and quality of service (QoS) metrics associated with the I4.”
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“[73] provides analysis of security standards for ICS.”
BackgroundSecurity assessment of data management systems for cyber physical system applications
Chaudhry, N., Yousaf, M. M., & Khan, M. T. (2020) · Journal of Software: Evolution and Process · doi:10.1002/smr.2241 · Cited by 11 · cited 3×
“[25] addresses the need of security solutions for data management systems in CPS.”
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Challenges in Cybersecurity and Privacy - the European Research Landscape
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Ethical Dilemmas and Privacy Issues in Emerging Technologies: A Review
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“…such as: NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), Risk Management Framework (RMF), etc. fit in. Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape [14] Provides insights on Industry 4.0’s cybersecurity threat landscape and provides a roadmap for aligning data security standards and mitigating…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationApplication of Internet of Things (IoT) in Sustainable Supply Chain Management
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“The IoT virtual network is created with the help of integrating products, processes, objects, workers, and systems that ensure communication in real-time [27].”
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Cyber Threats Detection in Smart Environments Using SDN-Enabled DNN-LSTM Hybrid Framework
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“Along with numerous benefits, the heterogeneous and prevalent nature of IoT also makes it susceptible to a variety of crucial security threats e.g. Denial of Services (DoS) attacks, data sniffing, spoofing, and network resource occupancy, etc [4, 5].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Dhirani, L. L., Armstrong, E., & Newe, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Limerick (IE)
- Corresponding author
- Dhirani, Lubna Luxmi
- Venue
- Sensors
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2021-06-05
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 3901
- ISSN
- 1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8200965
- OpenAlex
- W3167618552
- Semantic Scholar
- 3bb2ae803b96dbd05f1840e0b2707838bcdbd25e
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 57
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 34 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 6
- FWCI
- 2.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Arrow@dit (Dublin Institute of Technology) (acceptedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- University of Limerick Institutional Repository (University of Limerick) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-sa)
- Funders
- Science Foundation Ireland (16/RC/3918)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering › Digital Transformation in Industry
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- Industrial Internet of Things, cyber threats, cybersecurity standards, interoperability, IT-OT convergence, industrial control systems, machine-to-machine communication, 5G, time-sensitive networking, self-driving networks, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, Industry 4.0
- MeSH terms
- Automobile Driving, Industry, Reference Standards, Technology, Computer Security
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.