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What intelligence tests miss: the psychology of rational thought
Abstract
Critics of intelligence tests-writers such as Robert Sternberg, Howard Gardner, and Daniel Goleman-have argued in recent years that these tests neglect important qualities such as emotion, empathy, and interpersonal skills. However, such critiques imply that though intelligence tests may miss certain key noncognitive areas, they encompass most of what is important in the cognitive domain. In this book, Keith E. Stanovich challenges this widely held assumption. Stanovich shows that IQ tests (or their proxies, such as the SAT) are radically incomplete as measures of cognitive functioning. They fail to assess traits that most people associate with good thinking, skills such as judgment and decision making. Such cognitive skills are crucial to real-world behavior, affecting the way we plan, evaluate critical evidence, judge risks and probabilities, and make effective decisions. IQ tests fail to assess these skills of rational thought, even though they are measurable cognitive processes. Rational thought is just as important as intelligence, Stanovich argues, and it should be valued as highly as the abilities currently measured on intelligence tests.
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Citations
Cited by
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Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
Managerial cognitive capabilities and the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities
Helfat, C. E., & Peteraf, M. A. (2015) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2247 · Cited by 2,056
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/jcpp.12001 · Cited by 1,381
Beyond Dichotomies: Competence Viewed as a Continuum
Blömeke, S., Gustafsson, J.-E., & Shavelson, R. J. (2015) · Zeitschrift für Psychologie · doi:10.1027/2151-2604/a000194 · Cited by 1,205
The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1 · Cited by 1,047
Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government
KAHAN, D. M., PETERS, E., DAWSON, E. C., & SLOVIC, P. (2017) · Behavioural Public Policy · doi:10.1017/bpp.2016.2 · Cited by 883
Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.844729 · Cited by 864
Consequences of Age-Related Cognitive Declines
Salthouse, T. (2012) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100328 · Cited by 818
From Mindless to Mindful Practice — Cognitive Bias and Clinical Decision Making
Croskerry, P. (2013) · New England Journal of Medicine · doi:10.1056/nejmp1303712 · Cited by 571
Climate‐Science Communication and the Measurement Problem
Kahan, D. M. (2015) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12244 · Cited by 559
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Deary, I. J. (2012) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100353 · Cited by 467
Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and Intelligence
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2013) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721413480174 · Cited by 427
West, R. F., Toplak, M. E., & Stanovich, K. E. (2008) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0012842 · Cited by 416
Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2010.521057 · Cited by 385
Dual‐Process and Dual‐System Theories of Reasoning
Frankish, K. (2010) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00330.x · Cited by 373
Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot.
West, R. F., Meserve, R. J., & Stanovich, K. E. (2012) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0028857 · Cited by 358
Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2011) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2011.07.007 · Cited by 351
Antecedents and consequences of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: A systematic review
van Mulukom, V., Pummerer, L. J., Alper, S., Bai, H., Čavojová, V., Farias, J., Kay, C. S., Lazarevic, L. B., Lobato, E. J. C., Marinthe, G., et al. (2022) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114912 · Cited by 337
The Science of Wisdom in a Polarized World: Knowns and Unknowns
Grossmann, I., Weststrate, N. M., Ardelt, M., Brienza, J. P., Dong, M., Ferrari, M., Fournier, M. A., Hu, C. S., Nusbaum, H. C., & Vervaeke, J. (2020) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2020.1750917 · Cited by 330
The brain in your pocket: Evidence that Smartphones are used to supplant thinking
Barr, N., Pennycook, G., Stolz, J. A., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.029 · Cited by 327
Toplak, M. E., Sorge, G. B., Benoit, A., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2010) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.04.002 · Cited by 326
Carruthers, P. (2013) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12014 · Cited by 319
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0034910 · Cited by 170
The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2013.865000 · Cited by 170
Stanovich, K. E. (2012) · The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0022 · Cited by 169
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
(2012) · College student journal · Cited by 127
Fletcher, L., & Carruthers, P. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0413 · Cited by 83
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011) · The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511977244.040 · Cited by 77
Generalization Bias in Science
Peters, U., Krauss, A., & Braganza, O. (2022) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.13188 · Cited by 63
“As a result, the human cognitive system needs to short-circuit its computations whenever possible, and displays a “strong bias to default to the simplest cognitive mechanism” (Stanovich, 2009, p. 64).”
BackgroundMethodLeighton, J. P. (2019) · Journal of Educational Measurement · doi:10.1111/jedm.12237 · Cited by 51
What Makes Everyday Scientific Reasoning So Challenging?
(2017) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/bs.plm.2016.11.006 · Cited by 29
Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion
Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2020) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500008135 · Cited by 23
Cabitza, F., Famiglini, L., Fregosi, C., Pe, S., Parimbelli, E., La Maida, G. A., & Gallazzi, E. (2025) · Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Intelligent User Interfaces · doi:10.1145/3708359.3712157 · Cited by 11
Sternberg, R. J., & Preiss, D. D. (2022) · Intelligence in Context · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-92798-1_17 · Cited by 5
Data-Informed Case Formulation with the Trier Treatment Navigator
Moggia, D., Schaffrath, J., Bommer, J., Weinmann-Lutz, B., & Lutz, W. (2022) · Revista de Psicoterapia · doi:10.33898/rdp.v33i123.35971 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2009-06-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 46-5908-46-5908
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W1827980533
- Cited by
- 547
- References
- 0
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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