The DOI matches its Crossref record; 111 of the 111 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction
(2005) · IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks · doi:10.1109/tnn.2004.842673 · Cited by 24,496
Theory of games and economic behavior
(2019) · 100 Years of Math Milestones · doi:10.1090/mbk/121/32 · Cited by 16,632
Bellman, R. E. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400835386 · Cited by 14,588
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming
Puterman, M. L. (1994) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9780470316887 · Cited by 6,024
(1994) · Cited by 5,513
Watkins, C. (1989) · OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) · doi:10.17863/cam.132164 · Cited by 5,297
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Shapley, L. S. (1988) · The Shapley Value · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528446.003 · Cited by 4,954
Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency.
Schrijver, A. (2003) · UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) · Cited by 4,637
Planning and acting in partially observable stochastic domains
Kaelbling, L. P., Littman, M. L., & Cassandra, A. R. (1998) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0004-3702(98)00023-x · Cited by 4,149
Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization
Grötschel, M., Lovász, L., & Schrijver, A. (1988) · Algorithms and Combinatorics · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-97881-4 · Cited by 3,431
Game theory: analysis of conflict
(1992) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.29-2753 · Cited by 3,325
Groves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284
Multipart pricing of public goods
Clarke, E. H. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726210 · Cited by 3,246
Nash, J. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906951 · Cited by 3,177
(2003) · Selected Papers of Alan J Hoffman · doi:10.1142/9789812796936_others05 · Cited by 2,465
The Theory of Learning in Games
Drew Fudenberg, B., & Levine, D. K. (1998) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 2,455
The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
Schmeidler, D. (1969) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/0117107 · Cited by 1,868
Optimal Statistical Decisions.
Lindley, D. V., & de Groot, M. (1971) · Applied Statistics · doi:10.2307/2346640 · Cited by 1,802
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
The assignment game I: The core
Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1971) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753437 · Cited by 1,682
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Shapley, L. S. (1971) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753431 · Cited by 1,613
Graphs and Cooperation in Games
Myerson, R. B. (1977) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225 · Cited by 1,446
Alternating-time temporal logic
Alur, R., Henzinger, T. A., & Kupferman, O. (2002) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/585265.585270 · Cited by 1,394
Asymptotic methods in analysis
de Bruijn, N. G. (1958) · International Linear Collider · Cited by 1,332
Algorithmic Game Theory: Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria
Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Eva Tardos, D., & Vazirani, V. V. (2007) · Cited by 1,154
Algorithmic Game Theory: Computing in Games
Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Eva Tardos, D., & Vazirani, V. V. (2007) · Cited by 1,153
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Shehory, O., & Kraus, S. (1998) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0004-3702(98)00045-9 · Cited by 1,080
Coalitional game theory for communication networks
Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M., Hjorungnes, A., & Basar, T. (2009) · IEEE Signal Processing Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2009.000000 · Cited by 1,051
Shapley, L. S. (1967) · Naval Research Logistics Quarterly · doi:10.1002/nav.3800140404 · Cited by 1,045
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., & Whinston, M. D. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8 · Cited by 1,036
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Rothkopf, M. H., Pekeč, A., & Harstad, R. M. (1998) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1131 · Cited by 1,024
Howard, R. (1966) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tssc.1966.300074 · Cited by 995
Ausiello, G., Marchetti-Spaccamela, A., Crescenzi, P., Gambosi, G., Protasi, M., & Kann, V. (1999) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-58412-1 · Cited by 979
Virtual power plant and system integration of distributed energy resources
Pudjianto, D., Ramsay, C., & Strbac, G. (2007) · IET Renewable Power Generation · doi:10.1049/iet-rpg:20060023 · Cited by 954
(2014) · A Primer on Auction Design, Management, and Strategy · doi:10.7551/mitpress/8637.003.0011 · Cited by 923
Cooperative games with coalition structures
Aumann, R. J., & Dreze, J. H. (1974) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766876 · Cited by 853
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
Bogomolnaia, A., & Jackson, M. O. (2002) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.2001.0877 · Cited by 822
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Sandholm, T., Larson, K., Andersson, M., Shehory, O., & Tohmé, F. (1999) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/s0004-3702(99)00036-3 · Cited by 740
Potential, Value, and Consistency
Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911054 · Cited by 728
The Shapley value : essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley
Roth, A. E. (1991) · Cited by 716
(1992) · Cited by 691
Threshold logic and its applications
Muroga, S. (1971) · CERN Document Server (European Organization for Nuclear Research) · Cited by 677
On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
Deng, X., & Papadimitriou, C. H. (1994) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.19.2.257 · Cited by 629
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
(2007) · Theory and Decision Library · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7 · Cited by 538
Distributed intelligent agents
Sycara, K., Pannu, A., Willamson, M., Zeng, D., & Decker, K. (1996) · IEEE Expert · doi:10.1109/64.546581 · Cited by 535
The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction
Ausubel, L. M., & Milgrom, P. (2005) · Combinatorial Auctions · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002 · Cited by 525
Core in a simple coalition formation game
Banerjee, S., Konishi, H., & Sönmez, T. (2001) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s003550000067 · Cited by 523
A Theory of Learning and Generalization
Vidyasagar, M. (1997) · Springer eBooks · Cited by 492
A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games
Pauly, M. (2002) · Journal of Logic and Computation · doi:10.1093/logcom/12.1.149 · Cited by 466
Values of Games with a Priori Unions
Owen, G. (1977) · Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45494-3_7 · Cited by 448
VALUES OF GAMES WITH A PRIORI UNIONS
Lli, G. I., & Owen, E. (1977) · Cited by 431
Agent-based micro-storage management for the Smart Grid
Vytelingum, P., Voice, T. D., Ramchurn, S. D., Rogers, A., & Jennings, N. R. (2010) · International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems · doi:10.65109/vfcg7219 · Cited by 318
Multiagent negotiation under time constraints
Kraus, S., Wilkenfeld, J., & Zlotkin, G. (1995) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/0004-3702(94)00021-r · Cited by 299
Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)
Nisan, N. (2007) · Algorithmic Game Theory · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511800481.011 · Cited by 298
Core-selecting package auctions
Day, R., & Milgrom, P. (2008) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7 · Cited by 270
Algebraic Decision Diagrams and Their Applications
Bahar, R. I., Frohm, E. A., Gaona, C. M., Hachtel, G. D., Macii, E., Pardo, A., & Somenzi, F. (1997) · Formal Methods in System Design · doi:10.1023/a:1008699807402 · Cited by 267
Coalition formation as a dynamic process
Konishi, H., & Ray, D. (2003) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00004-8 · Cited by 266
Secure or insure?: a game-theoretic analysis of information security games
Grossklags, J., Christin, N., & Chuang, J. (2008) · Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web · doi:10.1145/1367497.1367526 · Cited by 247
Optimal learning: computational procedures for bayes-adaptive markov decision processes
Duff, M. O., & Barto, A. G. (2002) · ScholarWorks@UMassAmherst (University of Massachusetts Amherst) · Cited by 239
Trading agents for the smart electricity grid
Vytelingum, P., Ramchurn, S. D., Voice, T., Rogers, A., & Jennings, N. R. (2010) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.65109/sjny2150 · Cited by 231
Model-Based Bayesian Exploration
Dearden, R., Friedman, N., & André, D. (2013) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1301.6690 · Cited by 221
Task allocation via coalition formation among autonomous agents
Shehory, O. M., & Kraus, S. (1995) · Cited by 220
A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
Fatima, S. S., Wooldridge, M., & Jennings, N. R. (2008) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2008.05.003 · Cited by 219
Self-citationOperations research games: A survey
Borm, P., Hamers, H., & Hendrickx, R. (2001) · Top · doi:10.1007/bf02579075 · Cited by 212
On Group Stability in Hierarchies and Networks
Demange, G. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421171 · Cited by 209
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Ieong, S., & Shoham, Y. (2005) · Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/1064009.1064030 · Cited by 192
A PROBLEM IN THE SEQUENTIAL DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
Bellman, R. (1954) · Cited by 190
Dynamic coalition formation and the core
Arnold, T., & Schwalbe, U. (2002) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00015-x · Cited by 186
A stable and efficient buyer coalition formation scheme for e-marketplaces
Yamamoto, J., & Sycara, K. (2001) · Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents · doi:10.1145/375735.376452 · Cited by 166
Han, Z., & Poor, H. V. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Communications · doi:10.1109/tcomm.2009.0901.060661 · Cited by 166
Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
Suijs, J., Borm, P., De Waegenaere, A., & Tijs, S. (1999) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/s0377-2217(97)00421-9 · Cited by 159
Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
Demange, G. (1994) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(94)90035-3 · Cited by 157
Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis
Bachrach, Y., Markakis, E., Resnick, E., Procaccia, A. D., Rosenschein, J. S., & Saberi, A. (2009) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-009-9078-9 · Cited by 139
A SURVEY OF ALGORITHMS FOR CALCULATING POWER INDICES OF WEIGHTED MAJORITY GAMES
Matsui, T., & Matsui, Y. (2000) · Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan · doi:10.15807/jorsj.43.71 · Cited by 134
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Matsui, Y., & Matsui, T. (2001) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/s0304-3975(00)00251-6 · Cited by 118
An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
Solymosi, T., & Raghavan, T. E. S. (1994) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01240179 · Cited by 118
Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Coalition Formation under Uncertainty
Chalkiadakis, G., & Boutilier, C. E. (2004) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.1109/aamas.2004.74 · Cited by 117
Self-citationMulti-agent coordination through coalition formation
Shehory, O. M., Sycara, K. P., & Jha, S. (1998) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/bfb0026756 · Cited by 115
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., Markakis, E., Polukarov, M., & Jennings, N. R. (2010) · ePrints Soton (University of Southampton) · Cited by 112
Self-citationA Priori Voting Power: What is it All about?
Felsenthal, D. S., & Machover, M. (2004) · Political Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1478-9299.2004.00001.x · Cited by 110
Simple Priorities and Core Stability in Hedonic Games
Dimitrov, D., Borm, P. E. M., Hendrickx, R., et al. (2006) · Social Choice and Welfare · doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0104-4 · Cited by 107
RoboCup Rescue: a grand challenge for multi-agent systems
Kitano, H. (2002) · International Conference on Multi Agent Systems · doi:10.1109/icmas.2000.858425 · Cited by 99
Cooperative games with imcomplete information
Myerson, R. B. (1984) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01769817 · Cited by 98
Strongly balanced cooperative games
Breton, M. L., Owen, G., & Weber, S. (1992) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01271134 · Cited by 96
On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
Wooldridge, M., & Dunne, P. E. S. (2004) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.002 · Cited by 93
Self-citationStochastic Cooperative Games: Superadditivity, Convexity, and Certainty Equivalents
Suijs, J., & Borm, P. E. M. (1999) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1998.0672 · Cited by 92
Game theoretical multi-agent modelling of coalition formation for multilateral trades
Yeung, C., Poon, A. S. Y., & Wu, F. F. (1999) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/59.780905 · Cited by 89
Coalition Formation: From Software Agents to Robots
Vig, L., & Adams, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems · doi:10.1007/s10846-007-9150-0 · Cited by 88
NP-completeness of some problems concerning voting games
Prasad, K., & Kelly, J. S. (1990) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753703 · Cited by 88
Voting power in the European Union enlargement
Bilbao, J. M., Fernández, J. R., Jiménez, N., & López, J. J. (2002) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/s0377-2217(01)00334-4 · Cited by 81
Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently
Bilbao, J. M., Fernández, J. R., Jiménez-Losada, A., & López, J. J. (2000) · Top · doi:10.1007/bf02628555 · Cited by 81
Sequentially optimal repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
Chalkiadakis, G., & Boutilier, C. E. (2010) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-010-9157-y · Cited by 72
Self-citationManipulating the quota in weighted voting games
Zuckerman, M., Faliszewski, P., Bachrach, Y., & Elkind, E. (2012) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2011.12.003 · Cited by 71
Self-citationPower in threshold network flow games
Bachrach, Y., & Rosenschein, J. S. (2008) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-008-9057-6 · Cited by 66
Coalition formation under uncertainty: bargaining equilibria and the Bayesian core stability concept
Chalkiadakis, G., Markakis, E., & Boutilier, C. E. (2007) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems · doi:10.1145/1329125.1329203 · Cited by 63
Self-citationVirtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
Myerson, R. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.002 · Cited by 61
Mechanisms for coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace
Li, C., Rajan, U., Chawla, S., & Sycara, K. P. (2003) · International Conference on Electronic Commerce · doi:10.1145/948005.948015 · Cited by 61
Cooperative games with incomplete information
Myerson, R. B. (2005) · Studies in economic theory · doi:10.1007/3-540-26979-7_25 · Cited by 56
Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
Albizuri, M. J., Aurrecoechea, J., & Zarzuelo, J. M. (2005) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.016 · Cited by 56
Computational complexity of stable partitions with B-preferences
Hajdukov�, J., & Cechl�rov�, K. �. (2003) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/s001820200124 · Cited by 49
Ieong, S., & Shoham, Y. (2008) · National Conference on Artificial Intelligence · Cited by 41
Brânzei, S., & Larson, K. S. (2011) · International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/ijcai11-027 · Cited by 41
Network Formation: Bilateral Contracting and Myopic Dynamics
Arcaute, E., Johari, R., & Mannor, S. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2009.2024564 · Cited by 40
The complexity of power-index comparison
Faliszewski, P., & Hemaspaandra, L. A. (2008) · Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2008.09.034 · Cited by 37
Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False‐Name Manipulations
Conitzer, V., & Yokoo, M. (2010) · AI Magazine · doi:10.1609/aimag.v31i4.2315 · Cited by 34
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games
Aziz, H., Brandt, F., & Seedig, H. G. (n.d.) · Cited by 18
A bayesian approach to multiagent reinforcement learning and coalition formation under uncertainty
Chalkiadakis, G. (2007) · Cited by 16
Self-citationOn Hierarchies and CommunicationPreprint
van den Brink, R. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.913967 · Cited by 6
Cited by
Shapley values for feature selection: the good, the bad, and the axioms
Fryer, D., Strumke, I., & Nguyen, H. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3119110 · Cited by 347
The Shapley Value in Machine Learning
Rozemberczki, B., Watson, L., Bayer, P., Yang, H.-T., Kiss, O., Nilsson, S., & Sarkar, R. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2202.05594 · Cited by 312
The Shapley Value in Machine Learning
Rozemberczki, B., Watson, L., Bayer, P., Yang, H.-T., Kiss, O., Nilsson, S., & Sarkar, R. (2022) · Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.24963/ijcai.2022/778 · Cited by 296
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Hammond, L., Chan, A., Clifton, J., Hoelscher-Obermaier, J., Khan, A., McLean, E., Smith, C., Barfuss, W., Foerster, J., Gavenčiak, T., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.14143 · Cited by 305
Metadata
- Authors
- Chalkiadakis, G., Elkind, E., & Wooldridge, M.
- Venue
- Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
- Publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- Published
- 2012
- ISSN
- 1939-4608 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-4616
- OpenAlex
- W2102152964
- Cited by
- 337
- References
- 111
- FWCI
- 49.48
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.