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Two Dogmas of Empiricism

Open access
van Orman Quine, Willard·1976·Can Theories be Refuted?
DOI 10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_2
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Abstract

Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which aresynthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill-founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as we shall see, a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science. Another effect is a shift toward pragmatism.

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Research works printed but not linked: 14

  1. Carnap, Rudolf: Meaning and Necessity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947.
  2. Carnap, Rudolf: ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950a), 20–40.
  3. Carnap, Rudolf: Logical Foundations of Probability, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950b.
  4. Duhem, Pierre: La Théorie Physique: Son Objet et Sa Structure, Paris, 1906.
  5. Hempel, C. G.: ‘Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950), 41–63.
  6. Hempel, C. G.: ‘The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration’, Proceedings of American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80 (1951), 61–77. · DOI
  7. Lewis, C. I.: A Survey of Symbolic Logic, Berkeley, 1918. · DOI
  8. Lewis, C. I.: An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Open Court, Le Salle, III., 1946.
  9. Lowinger, Armand: The Methodology of Pierre Duhem, Columbia University Press, New York, 1941.
  10. Martin, R. M.: ‘On “Analytic”’, Philosophical Studies 3 (1952), 42–47. · DOI
  11. Meyerson, Émile: Identité et Realité, Paris, 1908; 4th ed., 1932.
  12. Quine, W. V.: Mathematical Logic, Norton, New York, 1940; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1947; rev. ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951.
  13. Quine, W. V.: Mathematical Logic, Norton, New York, 1940; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1947; rev. ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1951. · DOI
  14. White, Morton: ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism’, in Sidney Hook (ed.), John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, Dial Press, New York, 1950, pp. 316–330.

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Metadata

Authors
van Orman Quine, W.
Venue
Can Theories be Refuted?
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published
1976
Volume
33
Issue
2
Pages
41-64
ISSN
2075-6461 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_2
OpenAlex
W1751175273
Cited by
2,709
References
0
FWCI
103.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
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