The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts
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“However, multihoming is a costly endeavor for complementors; it requires compliance with the technical specifications and esthetic standards unique to each platform (Armstrong and Wright 2007).”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“Multihoming carries substantial costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which must be weighed against the marginal benefits of joining yet another platform.”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“multihoming carries important costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
Citations
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Sorted by citations
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Cayseele, P. V., & Reynaerts, J. (2011) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1213 · Cited by 6
“This resembles the analysis of so-called competitive bottlenecks where platforms also have a local monopoly over the singlehoming agents they serve, and where cross-market agents have to multihome to realize network externalities, see Armstrong (2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007).”
Platform Networks - Core Concepts Executive Summary
Eisenmann, T. R., PARKER, G. G., & Alstyne, M. V. (2007) · Cited by 6
Platform Pricing Choice: Exclusive Deals or Uniform Prices
Shekhar, S. (2021) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.1515/rne-2017-0016 · Cited by 6
“Armstrong and Wright (2007) look at the possibility of exclusive deals in a competitive bottleneck setting.”
Search engine competition with a knowledge-sharing service
Kim, K., & Tse, E. T. S. (2014) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2014.07.002 · Cited by 6
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HAAN, M. A., Zwart, G., & Stoffers, N. E. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3847216 · Cited by 6
“…our argument is about ex-ante strategic choices, influencing consumers’ homing patterns in order to exploit market power on the other side, rather than about exploiting cross-platform network externalities, taking those strategic choices as given (as in Armstrong and Wright, 2007, for example).”
Armstrong, M., & Wright, J. (2008) · The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics · doi:10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2758-1 · Cited by 6
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“A central characteristic of a platform ecosystem from an economic point of view is multi-sidedness (Armstrong & Wright, 2004; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2003).”
Chai, Z., Feng, N., Wang, H. J., & Feng, H. (2025) · Journal of Retailing · doi:10.1016/j.jretai.2025.01.004 · Cited by 5
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Pricing Analysis of Online Shopping Platforms Considering Consumer Information Levels
Chen, H., Xiong, W., & Xiong, P. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.821979 · Cited by 5
Guo, L., & Guo, X. (2022) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph192316060 · Cited by 5
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BackgroundMethodInfluentialCournot platform competition with mixed-homing
Tremblay, M. J., Adachi, T., & Sato, S. (2023) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.103002 · Cited by 5
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Davola, A., & Malgieri, G. (2023) · Emerald Group Publishing Limited eBooks · doi:10.1108/s0193-589520240000031003 · Cited by 5
Sevak, K. Y., & GEORGE, B. P. (2023) · Journal of Digital Economy · doi:10.1016/j.jdec.2024.05.002 · Cited by 8
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Li, L., & Li, G. (2024) · Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research · doi:10.3390/jtaer20010003 · Cited by 5
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Amir, R., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Resende, J. (2013) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/jpet.12081 · Cited by 5
“N2;t+1 = 1 N1;t+1: (2) Incorporating equation (2) into equation (1), the network size of club 1 at period t+ 1 may be re-written as”
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Blockchains als Grundlage digitaler Geschäftsmodelle
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Wulfert, T., & Schütte, R. (2022) · SN Computer Science · doi:10.1007/s42979-022-01098-w · Cited by 7
“, one side of the market subsidizing the other [8, 94]).”
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“A high specificity of assets required for building complementary products therefore results for instance in high multihoming costs [2].”
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Ribeiro, V. M. (2017) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.2865 · Cited by 5
The Control of Porting in Platform Markets
Pollock, R. (2009) · The Journal of Economic Asymmetries · doi:10.1016/j.jeca.2009.02.011 · Cited by 5
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Two-Sided Adoption of Mobile Marketing Platforms: Towards an Integrated Conceptual Model
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“Such a mobile marketing platforms is typically characterized as a two-sided market [6], where the two user groups (consumers and merchants) are inter-dependent with regard to platform value.”
BackgroundWang, X., & Yin, Z. (2017) · International Conference on Industrial Economics System and Industrial Security Engineering (IEIS) · doi:10.1109/ieis.2017.8078584 · Cited by 5
“Armstrong focused on the cross externality of the platform cross-network externality: Two groups of participants need to trade through the intermediate organization, and both side participants’ profits depend on the number of the other groups [9].”
BackgroundCompetition, bargaining power and pricing in two-sided marketsPreprint
Bolt, W., & Soramäki, K. (2007) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 5
Unique Equilibrium in Two-Part Tariff Competition between Two-Sided PlatformsPreprint
Reisinger, M. (2010) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13246 · Cited by 5
“In our case imposing this restriction would only complicate the analysis without giving new insights over and above Armstrong and Wright (2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialPlatform Standards, Collusion and Quality IncentivesPreprint
Salim, C. (2009) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13295 · Cited by 5
“Proof of Proposition 2: If platforms operate exclusively, agents’ utilities are given by (1) and (2).”
BackgroundThe role of the interchange fee in card payment systemsPreprint
Keszy-Harmath, É., Kóczán, G., Kováts, S., Martinovic, B., & Takács, K. (2012) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 5
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Gardner, G., & Stone, A. (2009) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 5
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Cennamo, C., & Santaló, J. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1540131 · Cited by 4
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“This assumption has been adopted by models that study platform competition in two-sided markets (e.g., Armstrong, 2006, Armstrong and Wright, 2007, Jeitschko and Tremblay, 2020, Rochet and Tirole, 2003).”
Are dominant platforms good for consumers?
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“Some other scholars focus on the two-sided pricing controls in the presence of product differentiation [24], heterogeneity preferences [25], heterogeneity network externalities [26], or power structure between the leader and follower [27] and how such key factors affect pricing decisions and…”
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“…as well as the Bertrand competition model by Caillaud and Jullien [25], laid the groundwork for understanding pricing strategies in a competitive environment, while Armstrong and Wright’s product differentiation model [26] showed that platforms often indirectly compete through subsidies to buyers.”
The impact of antitrust enforcement on China’s digital platforms: Evidence from SAMR v. Alibaba
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“And, cross-side network effects refers to that value accretion on one market side depends on participant characteristics and scale on the opposing side [24].”
Choi, J. P., Jeon, D., & Whinston, M. D. (2025) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20240461 · Cited by 4
Search Diversion, Rent Extraction and Competition
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Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities
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“The unconditional winner-take-all outcome has also been questioned by other scholars, as it has been shown that several platforms may co-exist partly because of differentiated consumer preferences (Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Eisenmann et al., 2006).”
ResultClemons, E. K., & Wilson, J. (2016) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2016.645 · Cited by 4
“For a more complete treatment of two-sided markets, see works by Rochet and Tirole [21, 22] and others [1, 4, 5, 6, 11, 17].”
BackgroundSpatial competition among multiple platforms
Kodera, T. (2010) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 4
Han, H., Yang, H., & Kim, K. (2015) · Journal of the Korea society of IT services · doi:10.9716/kits.2015.14.4.015 · Cited by 4
“이러한 IT 플랫폼 은 다양한 유형이 존재하는데(<Table 1> 참조), 이 들 플랫폼의 공통적인 특징은 고객 시장이 단일 시장이 아니라 공급자와 수요자를 모두 포용하는 양면 시장을 갖고 있다는 점이다(Armstrong and Wright, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Yoffie and Cusumano, 2015).”
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Panzar, J. C. (2006) · Cited by 4
A search model of rental markets: Who should pay the commission?
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Verdier, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.942992 · Cited by 4
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Jullien, B., & Pavan, A. (2013) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 4
Competition in the health care market: a two-sided approach
Pezzino, M., & Pignataro, G. (2008) · Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) · Cited by 4
Editorial: Workshop on the Role of Platforms for Enterprise Ecosystems (3EP)
Beimborn, D., Mädche, A., & Müller, B. (2011) · Cited by 4
Usage Lock-In and Platform CompetitionPreprint
Sato, S. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3864942 · Cited by 4
Complementary PlatformsPreprint
Cayseele, P. J. G. V., & Reynaerts, J. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1021705 · Cited by 4
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Governance and Regulation of Platforms
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A Dynamic Analysis of Cross-Category Innovation in Digital Platform Ecosystems with Network Effects
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“These findings corroborate the discoveries of Armstrong’s research on bilateral market theory [49].”
Chen, W., Hu, Y., Sui, R., Guan, Z., & Liu, Y. (2025) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.129466 · Cited by 3
Wu, Y., & Ma, H. (2022) · Land · doi:10.3390/land12010095 · Cited by 3
“Based on two-sided market theory [45,46], the optimal scale and price of farmland transfer in China can be determined, which is important information for China’s farmland transfer market.”
BackgroundDesigning mobile operator’s tariff package pricing scheme based on user’s internet behavior
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Li, C., Guan, Z., & Xie, X. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3298956 · Cited by 3
“These two platforms located at the two end points of a Hotelling line with platform A located at 0, and platform B at 1 [56], [57], [58].”
BackgroundZhu, X., Li, L., & Li, J. (2024) · Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services · doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2024.104083 · Cited by 3
Study on Regional Logistics Information Platform Pricing Strategy Based on Bilateral Market Theory
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Manchanda, M., & Deb, M. (2022) · Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing · doi:10.1108/jbim-01-2021-0061 · Cited by 3
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Liu, R., & Hou, Z. (2023) · ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM) · doi:10.1145/3583780.3615100 · Cited by 3
“Much of the recent literature [2, 7, 25] on two-sided market pays particular attention to pricing strategies for single platforms or competition between interme-diaries.”
BackgroundPlatforms Competition: An Ecosystem-View Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Ma, L., Zhao, W., Dong, L.-Z., & Du, Y. (2023) · SAGE Open · doi:10.1177/21582440231217847 · Cited by 4
“The literature on inter-platform competition (Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Church & Gandal, 1992, 1993) usually builds a four-sided game model that includes platforms A and B (representing two different technology standards), the complementary product providers, and the final consumers.”
BackgroundCompetition of multiplatform firms: Implications for the Internet of Things
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“…can price its services to one side below costs, and compensate for these local losses by increasing the prices on the other side, that is by cross-subsidization (armstrong and wright, 2007). when determining whether or not to subsidize a side, a platform provider must consider several factors.”
BackgroundOn Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets
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Bakó, B., & Horváth, D. (2020) · Közgazdasági Szemle · doi:10.18414/ksz.2020.1.1 · Cited by 3
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Two-sided platforms with endogenous quality differentiation
Viecens, M. F. (2006) · e-Archivo (Carlos III University of Madrid) · Cited by 3
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Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, M., & Wright, J.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- Corresponding author
- Wright, Julian
- Venue
- Economic Theory
- Published
- 2006-05-05
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 353-380
- ISSN
- 0938-2259 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0479
- OpenAlex
- W3124640067
- Cited by
- 690
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 69 · 2021: 45 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 62.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- National University of Singapore (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- two-sided markets, exclusive contracts, product differentiation, platform competition, gains from trade, platform heterogeneity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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