The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts
Open accessOverview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“However, multihoming is a costly endeavor for complementors; it requires compliance with the technical specifications and esthetic standards unique to each platform (Armstrong and Wright 2007).”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“Multihoming carries substantial costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which must be weighed against the marginal benefits of joining yet another platform.”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“multihoming carries important costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
Citations
Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Competition in two-sided markets
Armstrong, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x · Cited by 3,315
Self-citationTwo-sided markets: A progress report
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x · Cited by 2,994
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799
Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries
Evans, D. S. (2003) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1026 · Cited by 605
Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages
Rysman, M. (2004) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00512 · Cited by 527
The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets
Evans, D. S. (2003) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 499
The theory of access pricing and interconnection
Armstrong, M. (2001) · Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) · Cited by 359
Self-citationOne-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets
Wright, J. (2004) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1042 · Cited by 299
Self-citationBernheim, B. D., & Whinston, M. D. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250003 · Cited by 288
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Rochet, J.-C., Tirole, J.: Defining two-sided markets. Rand J Econ 2006 (in press)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 401–500 of 687
Two-Sided Platform Competition in Sharing EconomyPreprint
Zhang, C., Chen, J., & Raghunathan, S. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3555993 · Cited by 3
The Control of Porting in Two-Sided MarketsPreprint
Pollock, R. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1018902 · Cited by 3
“Seen in this light, the closest work to ours in the existing two-sided literature are the papers of Armstrong and Wright (2005) and Choi (2006).”
InfluentialPlatform Pricing with Strategic Buyers: The Impact of Future Production CostPreprint
Lin, M. J., Pan, X. A., & Zheng, Q. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2372461 · Cited by 3
Towards Efficient Information Sharing in Network MarketsPreprint
Martens, B., PARKER, G. G., Petropoulos, G., & Alstyne, M. V. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3954932 · Cited by 3
“As a result, consumers are forced to single-home, giving rise to a competitive bottleneck market failure (Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong and Wright, 2007): By attracting consumers, the platform extracts excessive rents on the supply side by charging a monopoly price.”
BackgroundExclusive Dealing in Asymmetric Platform CompetitionPreprint
Cong, J., Yao, H., & Zhou, W. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4129788 · Cited by 3
“…value is independent of seller preferences for platforms (i.e., a seller’s location on the Hotelling line) as well as the number of buyers on a platform (i.e., the magnitude of the cross-side network effect) (Armstrong and Wright, 2007; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019; Bakos and Halaburda, 2020).”
Neighbor Billing and Network NeutralityPreprint
Hurwitz, J. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1650380 · Cited by 3
“Platform Holdup” and Platform Regulation
Huang, J., & Xie, D. (2025) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.irle.2025.106266 · Cited by 2
Zhang, X., Sui, R., Dan, B., Zha, X., & Liu, M. (2025) · Journal of the Operational Research Society · doi:10.1080/01605682.2025.2541038 · Cited by 2
“This assumption aligns with the majority of existing literature exploring operational decisions in two-sided platforms (Anderson et al., 2014; Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Bakos & Halaburda, 2020; Yoo et al., 2002), which makes researchers to derive optimised platform equilibrium strategies under…”
Can digital M&As promote green innovation? Evidence from manufacturing companies in China
Wang, X., & Huang, W. (2025) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0339665 · Cited by 2
Two-sided dynamics in duopolistic ridesourcing markets with private and pooled rides
de Ruijter, A., Dandl, F., Engelhardt, R., Bogenberger, K., Geržinič, N., van Lint, H., & Cats, O. (2026) · npj Sustainable Mobility and Transport · doi:10.1038/s44333-025-00077-x · Cited by 2
Multilayer Two-Sided Platforms: The Role of Exclusive Contracts
MacCrory, F., & Shivendu, S. (2013) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2013.414 · Cited by 2
“[4] and [12] have analyzed the decision to enter the market as a new OS vendor; [3] have examined pricing mechanisms in detail; and [1] looks at entire systems as if the OS and carrier are owned by the same firm.”
BackgroundTo Connect Idle Capacity with Users - on Business and Digital Platform Aspects for Sharing Services
Markendahl, J. I., Hossain, M. I., & Jonsson, A. (2018) · doi:10.1109/pctdde.2018.8624874 · Cited by 3
“Papers focus on higher level strategic issues for platform providers or in a B2B context, see e.g. a typical paper [19].”
BackgroundJiang, Y., & Xiao, T. (2020) · Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization · doi:10.3934/jimo.2020155 · Cited by 2
Platform coopetition in two-sided markets
Raizonville, A. (2020) · Revue d économie industrielle · doi:10.4000/rei.9399 · Cited by 2
Exclusivity decision of platforms’ first-party products in a competitive market
Gao, J., & Bi, G. (2021) · Information Technology and Management · doi:10.1007/s10799-021-00345-5 · Cited by 2
“Many studies explore the pricing strategy of competing platforms [4, 6, 10, 14].”
BackgroundUnlocking Growth Potential in Kenya
World Bank Group (2015) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/25789 · Cited by 2
Mariniello, M. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198831471.003.0013 · Cited by 4
Wang, C., Li, M., Feng, H., & Feng, N. (2023) · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · doi:10.1080/10864415.2023.2226902 · Cited by 2
Pricing Models for Crowdsourced Logistics Platforms: A Two-Sided Market Perspective
Song, X., Li, S., Liu, H.-L., & Zhao, G. (2024) · Systems · doi:10.3390/systems12040119 · Cited by 2
The choice of suppliers and consumers: the evolutionary game equilibrium of platforms
Ma, L., Zhao, W., Dong, L.-Z., & Du, Y. (2024) · Technology Analysis & Strategic Management · doi:10.1080/09537325.2024.2330562 · Cited by 3
“The literature on inter-platform competition (Armstrong and Wright 2007; Church and Gandal 1992, 1993) usually builds a four-sided game model that includes platforms A and B (representing two different bases of technology standards), the complementary product providers, and the final consumers.”
The impact of digital platform pricing algorithms on market equilibrium
Kolesnik, G. (2024) · Финансовая аналитика: проблемы и решения · doi:10.24891/fa.17.2.143 · Cited by 2
Navigating the complex terrain: An in-depth analysis of the challenges of the metaverse
Sachdeva, P., & Mitra, A. (2025) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-24132-1.00002-8 · Cited by 2
The economics of Constant Function Market Makers
Fabi, M., & Prat, J. (2025) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102737 · Cited by 2
The Pricing of Cloud Computing with Preferential Policies
Rui, Z., & Bingyong, T. (2016) · IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE) · doi:10.1109/icebe.2016.047 · Cited by 2
Barriers to entry and two-sided markets: a research in a shopping mall in Istanbul
Dilek, S., & Çolakoğlu, N. (2013) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2
Iurkov, V. (2013) · Cited by 2
Do exclusivity arrangements harm consumers?
Chen, J., & Fu, Q. (2017) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/s11149-017-9325-y · Cited by 2
The Internet Sector and Network Neutrality: Where Does the EU Stand?
Mu, H., & Reggiani, C. (2011) · Nomos eBooks · doi:10.5771/9783845230719-115 · Cited by 2
A Two-Sided Market Model of Optimal Price Structure for Instant Messenger
Xu, J. (2013) · Journal of Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1155/2013/768168 · Cited by 2
“By relaxing product differentiation on both sides of platform, Armstrong and Wright [10] generalized the model of Armstrong [5] and proved “competitive bottleneck” may arise endogenously rather than exogenously as assumed by previous literature.”
MethodResultExploiting Internet-of-Things: Platforms and Business Models
Abbate, T., Césaroni, F., Cinici, M. C., & Villari, M. (2017) · Springer proceedings in business and economics · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66036-3_6 · Cited by 2
Jiang, H., Shi-lin, Z., & Shu, Z. (2017) · doi:10.3968/10126 · Cited by 2
“Armstrong and Wright (2004) assume that the platform charges transaction fee for users, and construct a “competitive bottlenecks” transaction structure by restricting the seller’s multi-homing affiliation and the buyer’s single-homing affiliation.”
BackgroundTirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics
Fudenberg, D. (2015) · Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12117 · Cited by 2
PRICE OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR PLATFORM’S GOODS AND SERVICES IN MULTI-SIDED MARKETS
Ignatyuk, A., Honcharuk, I., & Богданович, Я. Б. (2020) · Baltic Journal of Economic Studies · doi:10.30525/2256-0742/2020-6-5-89-95 · Cited by 2
Mariniello, M. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198831471.003.0005 · Cited by 2
Adverse inclusion of asymmetric advertisers in position auctions
Xu, Z., Zhu, Y., & Dutta, S. (2023) · International Journal of Research in Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.ijresmar.2023.01.001 · Cited by 2
Relevant markets and market power of mobile apps
Kawaguchi, K., Kuroda, T., & Sato, S. (2023) · Japan and the World Economy · doi:10.1016/j.japwor.2023.101209 · Cited by 2
Bourai, S., Arora, R., & Yadav, N. (2024) · Journal of economic and administrative sciences. · doi:10.1108/jeas-10-2023-0287 · Cited by 3
Chen, H., & Xu, Q. (2024) · Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research · doi:10.3390/jtaer19020061 · Cited by 2
“Existing research, often from a platform-centric viewpoint, largely ignores the broader implications on the platform supply chain’s overall revenue distribution [23–34].”
BackgroundMonetarisierungsstrategien für Mobilitätsplattformen
Schreieck, M., Kolbe, F., Pflügler, C., Wiesche, M., & Krcmar, H. (2018) · Informationsmanagement und digitale Transformation · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-21214-8_6 · Cited by 2
An Appraisal of Aadhaar and Digital Payments Strategies in India
Dayanandan, A., & Many, R. (2021) · Advances in e-business research series · doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-5015-1.ch007 · Cited by 2
Search Engine Competition with a Knowledge-Sharing ServicePreprint
Kim, K., & Tse, E. T. S. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1350647 · Cited by 2
COMPETITION BETWEEN PAYMENT SYSTEMS: RESULTSPreprint
Gardner, G., & Stone, A. (2009) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 2
Platform Preannouncement Strategies: A Duopoly of Two-Sided MarketsPreprint
Chellappa, R. K., & Mukherjee, R. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2705238 · Cited by 2
Cross-Platform Effects: Towards a Measure for Platform Integration BenefitPreprint
Hoelck, K., Cremer, S., & Ballon, P. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 2
Intermediation and Investment IncentivesPreprint
Belleflamme, P., & Peitz, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.949719 · Cited by 2
“We consider four specific types of investments: sellers can invest in order to (1) reduce their marginal cost of production, (2) improve the quality of their product, (3) enhance their ability to price discriminate, or (4) expand demand.”
InfluentialMarket Dominance and Quality of Search Results in the Search Engine MarketPreprint
Lianos, I., & Motchenkova, E. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2163244 · Cited by 2
Consumer Privacy Concerns, Multihoming, and Platform Competition in Two-Sided MarketsPreprint
Zhang, X., Hong, X., Yue, W. T., & Yu, Y. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4163335 · Cited by 2
Competition for Exclusivity of a Superior Product and Quality ImplicationsPreprint
Bedre-Defolie, Ö., & Biglaiser, G. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4278448 · Cited by 2
Influencing user perceptions: A platform strategy to tip the marketPreprint
Katsamakas, E. G., & Sanchez-Cartas, J. M. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4888188 · Cited by 2
Taxonomy of platform envelopment: A case- study of Apple and Samsung
Heikkilä, L. I. (2015) · Cited by 2
Dutta, I., Pezzino, M., & Song, Y. (2022) · Health Economics · doi:10.1002/hec.4580 · Cited by 1
Introduction of ride-sourcing markets
Ke, J., Yang, H., Wang, H., & Yin, Y. (2023) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-18937-1.00013-9 · Cited by 1
Welfare Effects of Platforms’ Exclusivity Clauses
Holler, M. (2022) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.1515/rne-2023-0014 · Cited by 1
Sustainable Development of Platform Enterprises: A Synthesis Framework
Zhou, H., Xie, H., & Chen, X. (2024) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su16114677 · Cited by 2
Feike, M., Rösch, J., & Neuhüttler, J. (2024) · IEEE Conference on Business Informatics · doi:10.1109/cbi62504.2024.00022 · Cited by 1
“A central feature of a platform ecosystem from an economic perspective is its multi-sidedness [28–32].”
Digital Content Provision Under Virtual Tipping
Wang, W. (2024) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.4432 · Cited by 1
Economics of Content Aggregation: Pricing and Advertising Competition in a Multi‐Channel Structure
Jakhu, G., & Jain, T. (2025) · Naval Research Logistics (NRL) · doi:10.1002/nav.22248 · Cited by 1
Should Both Platforms Be Kept Operational After a Merger of Two Social Media Businesses?
Mishra, S. K., Sarkar, S., & Guha, A. (2025) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.4508 · Cited by 1
Sequential pricing on multisided platforms
Bontems, P., Hamilton, S. F., & Lepore, J. J. (2025) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112543 · Cited by 1
Deng, W., Xing, S., Zhang, Y., & Zhang, Z. (2025) · Technology Analysis and Strategic Management · doi:10.1080/09537325.2025.2566141 · Cited by 1
Taxing platforms with multi-homing
Saito, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2025) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2025.102478 · Cited by 1
Liu, Y., Luo, R., & Yu, H. (2026) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2026.103268 · Cited by 1
Adoption of Electronic and Personal Health Records: An Ecconomic Analysis
Özdemir, Z. D., Bandyopadhyay, S., & Barron, J. M. (2009) · Journal of the Association for Information Systems · Cited by 1
When to Allow Buyers to Sell?- Bundling in Mixed Two-Sided Markets
Gaoy, M. (2009) · Cited by 1
Study on pricing level of C2C electronic commerce platform
Li-liang, P., & Jiang, T. (2011) · International Conference on Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE) · doi:10.1109/icmse.2011.6070001 · Cited by 1
A competition model of bilateral platform enterprise with overlapping business
zhang, R. (2010) · IEEE International Conference on Management of Innovation and Technology (ICMIT) · doi:10.1109/icmit.2010.5492784 · Cited by 1
Linking Turkish Credit Card Market as Two-Sided Market
Dilek, S., Uluçay, K., & Şimşek, L. (2012) · Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.09.1035 · Cited by 1
Morabito, V. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-04307-4_7 · Cited by 1
PRICE STRUCTURE IN A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM
Katiyar, A. (2011) · Cited by 1
THREE ESSAYS ON BUNDLING AND TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Jeon, J. Q. (2006) · Cited by 1
Brühn, T., & Götz, G. (2018) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.2928 · Cited by 1
The Platform Strategy of Global IT Firms
Kim, K., Lee, S., & 최정일 (2015) · Productivity Review · doi:10.15843/kpapr.29.2.201506.25 · Cited by 1
Amos, A. P., & Akawu, F. A. (2018) · Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal · doi:10.14738/assrj.512.5706 · Cited by 1
Commuting service platform: Concept and analysis
Fan, R., & Ban, X. J. (2022) · Transportation Research Part B Methodological · doi:10.1016/j.trb.2022.01.006 · Cited by 1
Research on the Revolution of the Catering Industry in the Platform Economy
Peiyi, Z. (2021) · Advances in economics, business and management research/Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research · doi:10.2991/aebmr.k.210319.005 · Cited by 1
“Armstrong [11] focus on the network externality: two groups of participants traded through a platform or intermediary, and the profit of one group of participants from the platform depended on the number of participants in the other group.”
BackgroundEntering Complementary Markets on Software Platforms—The Third-Party Perspective
Bender, B., & Thim, C. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-34799-4_7 · Cited by 1
Clement, R., Schreiber, D., Bossauer, P., & Pakusch, C. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-59829-0_10 · Cited by 1
An Introduction to Online Platforms
Mariniello, M. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198831471.003.0008 · Cited by 2
Mariniello, M. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198831471.003.0012 · Cited by 1
Research on the Revenue Management of Network Video Platform Based on Game Theory
Li, B., & Li, H. (2022) · Mathematical Problems in Engineering · doi:10.1155/2022/8516961 · Cited by 1
Qian, Z., Wei, C., Chao, T., & Luo, Y. (2022) · Journal of Electronic Business & Digital Economics · doi:10.1108/jebde-09-2022-0029 · Cited by 1
Competitive Optimal Pricing of O2O On-demand Platform with Multihoming Delivery Riders
Wang, W., Jiang, L., & Xie, L. (2022) · IFAC-PapersOnLine · doi:10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.09.512 · Cited by 1
Diffusion of Electric Vehicles and Public and Home Charging Stations in a Two-Sided Market
Kishi, S., Kotani, H., & Matsushima, K. (2023) · Conference proceedings/Conference proceedings - IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/smc53992.2023.10393916 · Cited by 1
“Examples of two-sided markets include compact disk (CD) players and CD titles [8]; credit cards [9]; and video games and game consoles [10] [11].”
Backgroundde Souza, D. K., & CRAVEIRO, P. (2024) · Revista de Defesa da Concorrência · doi:10.52896/rdc.v12i1.1080 · Cited by 1
Do Non-competing Data Intermediaries Matter? A Property Rights Perspective
Chi, C., Chen, W., & He, J. (2023) · International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN) · doi:10.1109/msn60784.2023.00129 · Cited by 1
“The standardized property rights framework of big data exchanges enables stakeholders to compare the property rights of different data transactions, helping to identify best practices and areas for improvement [33], [38].”
BackgroundLiu, W., & Han, Y. (2024) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su162310269 · Cited by 1
Integrating a Free Online Service: Advertisements and Competitive Implications
Jakhu, G. (2025) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.70012 · Cited by 1
A Comparative Analysis of Data-Driven Monopolization: Different Pathways and Regulatory Implications
Zhang, M., & Wu, X. (2025) · Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Research and Practice · doi:10.1080/13876988.2025.2578005 · Cited by 1
“Traditional network effect theories also tend to assume relatively stable user–value relationships (Armstrong 2006; Armstrong and Wright 2006).”
Tying to Foreclose in Two-Sided Markets
Shim, S., & Kwak, J. (2015) · The B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy · doi:10.1515/bejeap-2014-0116 · Cited by 1
Tiwana, A. (2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-408066-9.00002-3 · Cited by 1
Complementor-side Ecology and its Implications on Platform Strategy
Lee, S., Bae, S. J., Rhee, M., & Park, M. (2018) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.24251/hicss.2018.622 · Cited by 1
“would reduce differentiation between platforms [17, 33].”
Study of bilateral trading platform competition in consideration of suppliers’ spatial network
Xu, Y., Tao, X., & Sun, Y. (2018) · International Journal of Modern Physics C · doi:10.1142/s012918311840003x · Cited by 1
Monetarisierung von Mobilitätsplattformen
Schreieck, M., Pflügler, C., Halbherr, J., Wiesche, M., & Krcmar, H. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-25210-6_5 · Cited by 1
Ducci, F. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108867528.004 · Cited by 1
Competencia económica en mercados digitales: la experiencia en México
Coy, L. G. G. S., Pavía, J. K., & Fregoso, R. E. (2020) · THEMIS Revista de Derecho · doi:10.18800/themis.202002.022 · Cited by 1
İktisat Teorisinde İki Taraflı Piyasalar
Kar, M. (2021) · Finans Ekonomi ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi · doi:10.29106/fesa.948372 · Cited by 1
Sobota, V., van de Kaa, G., de Reuver, M., & Prajapati, R. (2022) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.24251/hicss.2022.810 · Cited by 1
“The economic perspective sees platforms as two (or multi-sided) markets and has a strong interest in the dynamics and mechanisms related to platform competition [20, 21].”
Steur, A. (2022) · Schwerpunkt Business Model Innovation · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-38202-5_2 · Cited by 1
Hoffmann, P., Shmagina, V., Halckenhaeusser, A., & Lueker, N. (2023) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.24251/hicss.2023.727 · Cited by 2
“Thus, multihoming in platform markets is facilitated by the existence of competing platforms (Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, M., & Wright, J.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- Corresponding author
- Wright, Julian
- Venue
- Economic Theory
- Published
- 2006-05-05
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 353-380
- ISSN
- 0938-2259 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0479
- OpenAlex
- W3124640067
- Cited by
- 690
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 69 · 2021: 45 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 62.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- National University of Singapore (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- two-sided markets, exclusive contracts, product differentiation, platform competition, gains from trade, platform heterogeneity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review