The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts
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In the citing paper
“However, multihoming is a costly endeavor for complementors; it requires compliance with the technical specifications and esthetic standards unique to each platform (Armstrong and Wright 2007).”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“Multihoming carries substantial costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which must be weighed against the marginal benefits of joining yet another platform.”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“multihoming carries important costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, M., & Wright, J.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- Corresponding author
- Wright, Julian
- Venue
- Economic Theory
- Published
- 2006-05-05
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 353-380
- ISSN
- 0938-2259 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0479
- OpenAlex
- W3124640067
- Cited by
- 690
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 69 · 2021: 45 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 62.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- National University of Singapore (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- two-sided markets, exclusive contracts, product differentiation, platform competition, gains from trade, platform heterogeneity
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