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Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts
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“However, multihoming is a costly endeavor for complementors; it requires compliance with the technical specifications and esthetic standards unique to each platform (Armstrong and Wright 2007).”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“Multihoming carries substantial costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which must be weighed against the marginal benefits of joining yet another platform.”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
In the citing paper
“multihoming carries important costs for the complementors (Armstrong and Wright 2007) which tend to increase with the technological distance between platforms and different versions of platform architecture”
From Smart Timing for Smart Products? Complementor Multihoming in Nascent Platform Markets (2026) · cites this paper as Armstrong and Wright 2007
Citations
Cites
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Competition in two-sided markets
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- Rochet, J.-C., Tirole, J.: Defining two-sided markets. Rand J Econ 2006 (in press)
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Online and Offline Communities in the Sharing Economy
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Data analytics and firm performance: An empirical study in an online B2C platform
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“Finally, to develop a multisided market model 50 – 53 with additional opportunities to monetize data (Step 5) is based on what we learned is their desired state and where the case companies want to be although none of them are there yet.”
BackgroundPlatform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions
Jin, G. Z., & Rysman, M. (2015) · Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/joie.12088 · Cited by 41
“We base our work closely on the model of Armstrong (2006) and the extensions in Armstrong & Wright (2007).”
InfluentialPlatform design biases in ad‐funded two‐sided markets
Choi, J. P., & Jeon, D. (2023) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12436 · Cited by 39
Dou, G., Lin, X., & Xu, X. (2018) · Kybernetes · doi:10.1108/k-06-2017-0215 · Cited by 39
“In line with some of the existing studies, e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Anderson et al. (2013), we assume that both vk and fm are uniformly distributed Value-added service investment strategy D ow nl oa de d by U ni ve rs ity o f Sy dn ey L ib…”
ResultPositive, Negative, and Amplified Network Externalities in Platform Markets
Karhu, K., Heiskala, M., Ritala, P., & Thomas, L. D. W. (2024) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2023.0119 · Cited by 41
Three layers of abstraction: a conceptual framework for theorizing digital multi-sided platforms
Poniatowski, M., Lüttenberg, H., Beverungen, D., & Kundisch, D. (2021) · Information Systems and e-Business Management · doi:10.1007/s10257-021-00513-8 · Cited by 43
A co‐opetitive game analysis of platform compatibility strategies under add‐on services
Liang, Y., Liu, W., Li, K., Dong, C., & Lim, M. K. (2023) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.14049 · Cited by 38
“Both platforms connect two groups of agents on the supply and demand sides, with each group influ-encing the other through network externality (Armstrong & Wright, 2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialPrice disclosure by two-sided platforms
Belleflamme, P., & Peitz, M. (2019) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102529 · Cited by 38
“10For instance, if all gamers know about the fee charged to developers (β = 1), then ∂A∗/∂α < 0 for γb > γa and ∂B∗/∂α > 0 for γb > ( √ γ2a + 8− γa)/2, which is compatible with Condition (1) for γb > γa. and to increase readers’ participation.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHoming and platform responses to entry: Historical evidence from the U.S. newspaper industry
Park, K., Seamans, R., & Zhu, F. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3241 · Cited by 46
“…choose whether to switch to the new platform (single-homing) or to adopt both platforms (multi-homing) (e.g., Ambrus, Calvano, & Reisinger, 2016; Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Bresnahan, Orsini, & Yin, 2015; Corts & Lederman, 2009; Hagiu, 2006; Hagiu & Lee, 2011; Landsman & Stremersch, 2011;…”
Jiang, P., & Qin, S. (2024) · Cities · doi:10.1016/j.cities.2024.105092 · Cited by 41
Performance effects of innovation in two-sided markets: The paradigmatic case of OTAs
Raad, J., Sharma, A., & Nicolau, J. (2023) · Tourism Management · doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2022.104637 · Cited by 34
“In fact, Armstrong and Wright (2007) show that competitive bottlenecks emerge when one of the two sides do “multihoming” and the other does “singlehoming” because “platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers”.”
Optimal Fee Structures of Crowdsourcing Platforms
Wen, Z., & Lin, L. (2015) · Decision Sciences · doi:10.1111/deci.12201 · Cited by 33
“Research has found that in two-sided markets, it is often optimal for the platform to charge only one side of the market (see, among others, Armstrong & Wright, 2007 and Rochet & Tirole, 2006), which is widely observed in practice.”
BackgroundPlatform Collusion in Two-Sided Markets
Ruhmer, I. (2010) · Econstor (Econstor) · Cited by 33
Early adopters of Manufacturing-as-a-Service (MaaS): state-of-the-art and deployment models
Tedaldi, G., & Miragliotta, G. (2023) · Journal of Manufacturing Technology Management · doi:10.1108/jmtm-01-2022-0052 · Cited by 32
Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing
Katz, M. L. (2019) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.12304 · Cited by 31
Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competition
Teh, T., Liu, C., Wright, J., & Zhou, J. (2023) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20210324 · Cited by 31
Self-citationVertical and horizontal complementarities in platform ecosystems
Thomas, L. D. W., Ritala, P., Karhu, K., & Heiskala, M. (2025) · Innovation · doi:10.1080/14479338.2024.2303593 · Cited by 34
“…that platform scholars have tended to interpret complementarities in a variety of ways, leveraging not only insights from multi-sided markets (e.g., Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Rochet & Tirole, 2006), but also from strategy (e.g., Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Williamson, 1985) and the…”
Privacy and platform competition
Dimakopoulos, P. D., & Sudaric, S. (2018) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.01.003 · Cited by 30
Li, J., & Zhang, Y. (2020) · Electronic Commerce Research and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.elerap.2020.100995 · Cited by 31
The "Waterbed" Effect and Price Regulation
Schiff, A. (2008) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1155 · Cited by 30
“Alternatively, Armstrong (2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007) consider competition among two-sided platforms that charge subscription fees rather than perinteraction fees.”
Coopetition in Infomediation: General Analysis and Application to e-Tourism
Belleflamme, P., & Neysen, N. (2009) · Physica-Verlag eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-7908-2124-6_14 · Cited by 28
“In order to shed some light on this platform competition, we can rely on the industrial organization theory and its concept of two-sided market [21] [30] [2].”
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Platform Compatibility and Developer Multihoming: A Trade-off Perspective
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Assessing data access issues in online platforms
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Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation
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“The insights of this paper are robust to changes in the extensive form and of some modeling details, and so may be applied to multiple markets like newsprint, operating systems or video game consoles, and even healthcare and education (see Bardey and Rochet 2010a and Bardey et al. 2010b). The results also extend where…”
BackgroundSupplier, Tailor, and Facilitator: Typology of Platform Business Models
Kim, J., & Min, J. (2019) · Journal of Open Innovation Technology Market and Complexity · doi:10.3390/joitmc5030057 · Cited by 29
Innovation process in the business ecosystem: the four cooperations practices in the media platform
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The tension between market shares and profit under platform competition
Belleflamme, P., Peitz, M., & Toulemonde, É. (2021) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102807 · Cited by 27
“We adapt the models of Armstrong (2006) and Armstrong and Wright (2007).”
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Architectural Convergence and Platform Evolution: Empirical Test of Complementor Moves in Videogames
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“Our aim is to understand complementors’ multihoming preferences in the spirit of studies that have recently sought to understand platform-based competition [11]–[13], [15], [18].”
Knowledge Mapping of Platform Research: A Visual Analysis Using VOSviewer*
Ding, X. (2019) · International Conference on Economics, Management, Law and Education (EMLE) · doi:10.2991/aebmr.k.191225.081 · Cited by 26
“Armstrong and Wright analyses two-sided markets when competition exists between two platforms, they introduce "competitive bottlenecks" into the two-sided markets framework [35].”
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“To mitigate this risk, ISVs need to develop and maintain their applications on multiple, competing platforms (known as “multihoming”, Armstrong and Wright 2007).”
BackgroundCompatibility and the Product Life Cycle in Two-Sided Markets
Maruyama, M., & Zennyo, Y. (2013) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.1515/rne-2013-0011 · Cited by 26
Platform Growth Model: The Four Stages of Growth Model
Kim, J., & Yoo, J. (2019) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su11205562 · Cited by 27
“A two-sided market, otherwise called a two-sided network, is an economic platform with various distinct actors or stakeholders that provide each other with system benefits [23].”
BackgroundSubsidy strategy of pharmaceutical e-commerce platform based on two-sided market theory
Li, C., & Huang, Z. (2019) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0224369 · Cited by 25
“When two groups of participants in a market need to trade through an intermediate platform, and one party’s profit depends on the number of participants on the other, the market becomes a two-sided market [1, 2].”
BackgroundMergers Between On-Demand Service Platforms: The Impact on Consumer Surplus and Labor Welfare
Lin, X., Lu, T., Wang, X., & Kou, G. (2025) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2022.0553 · Cited by 25
Dynamic Competition Strategy for Online Knowledge-Sharing Platforms
Kim, K., & Tse, E. T. S. (2010) · International Journal of Electronic Commerce · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1095170 · Cited by 25
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Platform Intermediation in a Market for Differentiated ProductsPreprint
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Market entry strategy for a digital platform provider
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Platform Adoption Factors in the Internet Industry
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“” In this context, research on platform strategy to build a two-sided market [5,6] should be conducted to ensure a successful platform business, as no influential studies have been conducted since the study on cross-subsidy strategy [7].”
BackgroundDoes Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental EvidencePreprint
Luca, M., Wu, T., Couvidat, S., Frank, D., & Seltzer, W. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2667143 · Cited by 26
Platform competition with complementary products
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Short-term subsidy strategy for new users of ride-hailing platform with user base
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Two-sided platform competition with multihoming agents: An empirical study on the daily deals market
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“Despite several theoretical works on two-sided platform competition with multihoming agents (e.g., Armstrong and Wright, 2007; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001; Gabszewicz and Wauthy, 2004; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003), there has been relatively little empirical work that examines how platforms compete on…”
Platform strategies: how the position in the network drives success
Pellizzoni, E., Trabucchi, D., & Buganza, T. (2018) · Technology Analysis and Strategic Management · doi:10.1080/09537325.2018.1524865 · Cited by 24
“Multiple platforms can coexist because of: asymmetric or local network effects (Shankar and Bayus, 2003); low costs of adopting multiple platforms (Evans and Schmalansee, 2016); or differentiated consumer preferences (Armstrong and Wright, 2007).”
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Exclusive Content in Two-Sided Markets
Ishihara, A., & Oki, R. (2017) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.12427 · Cited by 23
Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions
Choi, J. P., & Zennyo, Y. (2019) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.12305 · Cited by 22
Optimal Pricing and Quality Decisions Under Cooperative Promotion of Cross-Market Service Platforms
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Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet
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Song, H., Jung, J., & Cho, D. (2017) · Journal of Media Economics · doi:10.1080/08997764.2018.1449750 · Cited by 22
“By securing complementary applications with exclusivity agreements, and thereby denying access to rivals, a platform might reduce its competitors ’ effective participation in the content and consumer markets (Armstrong & Write, 2007; Mantena et al., 2007; Prieger & Hu, 2006).”
BackgroundRedundancy in the sharing economy
Rong, K., Xiao, F., & Yong, W. (2019) · Resources Conservation and Recycling · doi:10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.104455 · Cited by 23
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Free shipping policy for imported cross-border e-commerce platforms
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“In the early stages of competition, when major retailers aim to maximize profits and adopt preferential means to attract many consumers (Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Taleizadeh et al., 2016), e-commerce companies start “price wars” in various ways, such as launching discounts, price-break discounts,…”
Service quality and price competition in crowdsourced delivery markets
He, S., & Ma, Z. (2022) · International Transactions in Operational Research · doi:10.1111/itor.13192 · Cited by 20
Bike-sharing duopoly competition under government regulation
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Who benefits from increased competition among sellers on B2C platforms?
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“Using expressions (1) and (2) as the equilibrium payoffs resulting from the market interaction that takes place in stages 3 and 4, we solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium in stages 1 and 2 of the game.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPricing mode selection for the online short video platform
Chi, X., Fan, Z., & Wang, X. (2021) · Soft Computing · doi:10.1007/s00500-020-05513-3 · Cited by 20
“Armstrong (2007) considers the impact of multi-homing behavior of users on platform pricing decisions.”
BackgroundImperfect Platform Competition: A General Framework ∗
White, A., & Weyl, E. G. (2010) · Faculty Digital Archive (New York University Florence) · Cited by 20
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Exploring the Success Factors of Mobile Business Ecosystems
Winter, J., Battisti, S., Burström, T., & Luukkainen, S. (2018) · International Journal of Innovation and Technology Management · doi:10.1142/s0219877018500268 · Cited by 19
Nuanced but important: A literature-based comparison between B2B and B2C platforms
Feike, M., & Rösch, J. (2023) · Decision Analytics Journal · doi:10.1016/j.dajour.2023.100383 · Cited by 20
Digital platform compatibility strategies in platform co-opetition
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Platform-based service innovation and system design: research opportunities
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A UNIFIED PRESENTATION OF COMPETITION ANALYSIS IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS
Ribeiro, E. P., & Golovanova, S. V. (2020) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12362 · Cited by 19
Zhao, Y., & Du, Y. (2021) · Technology in Society · doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2021.101794 · Cited by 19
Concurrence et régulation sur les marchés de plate-forme : une introduction
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The Impact of Consumer Multi-Homing on Advertising Markets and Media CompetitionPreprint
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Bonus Competition in the Gig EconomyPreprint
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Competition in Ride-Hailing MarketsPreprint
Ahmadinejad, A., Nazerzadeh, H., Saberi, A., Skochdopole, N., & Sweeney, K. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3461119 · Cited by 19
Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform CompetitionPreprint
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“bottleneck theory (Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong and Wright, 2007) in that buyer-side multihoming can be seen as “removing” the competitive bottleneck initially faced by the seller side in a per-transaction fee environment.”
BackgroundSelf-citationDiscriminatory Pricing and Spatial Competition in Two-Sided Media Markets
Kodera, T. (2015) · The B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy · doi:10.1515/bejeap-2013-0178 · Cited by 18
Platform’s Recommendation Strategy Considering Limited Consumer Awareness and Market Encroachment
Bi, G., Wang, X., & Xu, Y. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management · doi:10.1109/tem.2022.3172694 · Cited by 18
“[18] M. Armstrong and J. Wright, “Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts,” Econ.”
BackgroundAPPLICATIONS BARRIER TO ENTRY AND EXCLUSIVE VERTICAL CONTRACTS IN PLATFORM MARKETS
Prieger, J. E., & Hu, W. (2010) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00355.x · Cited by 18
“Foreclo-sure of competitors can result (Armstrong and Wright, 2007).”
InfluentialOptimal Pricing Decisions for the Online Video Platform Under Customer Choice
Cheng, X., Mu, L., Sun, Y., & Bian, Y. (2018) · Asia Pacific Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1142/s0217595918500021 · Cited by 18
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Platforms: A Systematic Review Of The Literature Using Algorithmic Historiography
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Either or Both Competition: A 'Two-Sided' Theory of Advertising with Overlapping ViewershipsPreprint
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Frenemies in Platform Markets: The Case of Apple's iPad vs. Amazon's KindlePreprint
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Content Length Limit: How Does It Matter for a Consumer-to-Consumer Media Platform?
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Platform Competition with Endogenous MultihomingPreprint
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Optimal homing policy of the manufacturer facing competing platforms: the effect of selling formats
Pu, X., Wang, Z., & Zhang, W. (2023) · International Journal of Production Research · doi:10.1080/00207543.2023.2208393 · Cited by 16
“Based on the research of Arm-strong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007) highlight the influence of product differentiation on buyers’ equilibrium homing strategy and then explore the mechanisms of competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts in two-sided markets.”
Pricing models of two-sided markets incorporating service quality
Xue, Z., Cheng, S., Yu, M., & Zou, L. (2018) · Kybernetes · doi:10.1108/k-06-2018-0287 · Cited by 16
A Contest Model of a Professional Sports League with Two-Sided Markets
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“More general models have been proposed by Rochet and Tirole (2003b), Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009).”
MethodHua, X., & Spier, K. E. (2025) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20230282 · Cited by 16
Wiegand, N., Peers, Y., & Bleier, A. (2022) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-022-00893-4 · Cited by 15
Gui, Y., Tan, D., Liu, Z., & Dong, F. (2023) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2023.121683 · Cited by 15
Recommender Systems and Supplier Competition on Platforms
Fletcher, A., Ormosi, P. L., & Savani, R. (2023) · Journal of Competition Law & Economics · doi:10.1093/joclec/nhad009 · Cited by 17
The Digital Divide and Other Economic Considerations for Network Neutrality
Connolly, M. P., Lee, C. M., & Tan, R. (2016) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-016-9554-8 · Cited by 15
“The formal economic analysis of last-mile fees relies on the standard two-sided market model (Armstrong 2006; Armstrong and Wright 2007).”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, M., & Wright, J.
- Affiliations
- University College London (GB)
- National University of Singapore (SG)
- Corresponding author
- Wright, Julian
- Venue
- Economic Theory
- Published
- 2006-05-05
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 353-380
- ISSN
- 0938-2259 (ISSN-L)
- 1432-0479
- OpenAlex
- W3124640067
- Cited by
- 690
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 69 · 2021: 45 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 50 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 62.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Economic Theory (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- National University of Singapore (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- two-sided markets, exclusive contracts, product differentiation, platform competition, gains from trade, platform heterogeneity
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