Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 55 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored.
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“This is more firmly established by demonstrating that autopoietic systems can also show adaptivity, an operational property that allows an organism to regulate its coupling with the environment according to its own conditions of viability (Di Paolo 2005).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Di Paolo, E. A.
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 429-452
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2068670723
- Cited by
- 806
- References
- 55
- Citations by year
- 2026: 61 · 2025: 53 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 93 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 49 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 43 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 48 · 2015: 38 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 16
- FWCI
- 6.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- figshare.com
- Licence
- cc-by
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- autopoiesis, sensemaking, adaptivity, agency, enaction, self-regulation, viability, temporality, sense construction
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