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Cited by 300Religion, Spirituality, and PsychologyParanormal Experiences and BeliefsStudy and Philosophy of Religion

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 95 of the 95 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Cognitive biases explain religious belief, paranormal belief, and belief in life’s purpose

Willard, Aiyana K., Norenzayan, Ara·2013·Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.07.016
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Abstract

Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropomorphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs and belief in life's purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N=492 and N=920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological thinking. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthropomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life's-purpose beliefs. Alternative theoretical models were tested but did not find empirical support.

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Metadata

Authors
Willard, A. K., & Norenzayan, A.
Affiliations
University of British Columbia (CA)
Corresponding author
Willard, Aiyana K.
ORCID
Willard, Aiyana K.
Venue
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2013-11
Volume
129
Issue
2
Pages
379-391
ISSN
0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2013.07.016
OpenAlex
W2149140482
Cited by
300
References
94
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 41 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 9
FWCI
17.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Health › Religion, Spirituality, and Psychology
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Study and Philosophy of Religion
Keywords
cognitive biases, religious beliefs, supernatural beliefs, mentalization, mind-body dualism, teleological thinking, anthropomorphism, Christianity, individual differences, mediation
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Aged, 80 and over, Canada, Cognition, Female, Humans, Male, Middle Aged, Models, Psychological, Parapsychology, Religion and Psychology, United States, Young Adult, Theory of Mind

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