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Testing guilt aversion
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Tjøtta, S., & Torsvik, G.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-01
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 95-107
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2061757045
- Cited by
- 273
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 47.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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