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Executive compensation and corporate governance in China
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Metadata
- Authors
- Conyon, M. J., & He, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-09
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1158-1175
- ISSN
- 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125326244
- Cited by
- 592
- References
- 65
- FWCI
- 94.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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