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Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission
Open accessAbstract
Why do powerful states often channel coercive policies through international organizations (IOs)? The article explains this phenomenon by theorizing the political advantages of working through a neutral institution, defined as one with heterogeneous and representative member preferences. The argument centers on the notion of strategic information transmission. IO involvement sends information about the coercer's intentions and the consequences of the coercive policy to foreign leaders and their publics, information that determines the level of international support offered to the coercing state. The logic helps explain why the United Nations Security Council plays a unique role in approving and disapproving the use of force. A case study of the 1990–91 Gulf War shows how these information transmission mechanisms work in practice and that the rationalist information argument provides more traction than a legitimacy-based alternative explanation.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Thompson, A.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2006-01
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 01
- Pages
- 1-34
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2155713066
- Cited by
- 297
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 49.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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