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The Scope of IMF Conditionality
Abstract
International organizations are governed by two parallel sets of rules: formal rules, which embody consensual procedures, and informal rules, which allow exceptional access for powerful countries. A new data set drawn from the IMF's records of conditionality provides an opportunity to study the bargaining process within an important international organization and answer questions about the institution's autonomy. I find evidence of U.S. influence, which operates to constrain conditionality, but only in important countries that are vulnerable enough to be willing to draw on their influence with the United States. In ordinary countries under ordinary circumstances, broad authority is delegated to the IMF, which adjusts conditionality to accommodate local circumstances and domestic political opposition. The IMF has refrained from exploiting the vulnerability of particular countries to maximize the scope of conditionality.
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“…or donors, possibly even created specially to dispense false legitimacy to counter the criticisms of other monitors+ 63+ Alesina and Dollar 2000+ 64+ Stone 2008+ reports that chronicle serious irregularities, but then praise the progress and endorse the outcome+ Russia in the mid- to late-1990s…”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Stone, R. W.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2008-10
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 589-620
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W1966735226
- Cited by
- 449
- References
- 64
- FWCI
- 128.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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