Reasoning about causal relationships: Inferences on causal networks.
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Abstract
Over the last decade, a normative framework for making causal inferences, Bayesian Probabilistic Causal Networks, has come to dominate psychological studies of inference based on causal relationships. The following causal networks-[X→Y→Z, X←Y→Z, X→Y←Z]-supply answers for questions like, "Suppose both X and Y occur, what is the probability Z occurs?" or "Suppose you intervene and make Y occur, what is the probability Z occurs?" In this review, we provide a tutorial for how normatively to calculate these inferences. Then, we systematically detail the results of behavioral studies comparing human qualitative and quantitative judgments to the normative calculations for many network structures and for several types of inferences on those networks. Overall, when the normative calculations imply that an inference should increase, judgments usually go up; when calculations imply a decrease, judgments usually go down. However, 2 systematic deviations appear. First, people's inferences violate the Markov assumption. For example, when inferring Z from the structure X→Y→Z, people think that X is relevant even when Y completely mediates the relationship between X and Z. Second, even when people's inferences are directionally consistent with the normative calculations, they are often not as sensitive to the parameters and the structure of the network as they should be. We conclude with a discussion of productive directions for future research.
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Nilufa, A., Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (2011) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.02.005 · Cited by 78
Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society
Malhotra, G., Pickering, M. J., Branigan, H. P., & Bednar, J. A. (2008) · Cited by 75
Waldmann, M. R. (2007) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1080/15326900701221231 · Cited by 69 · cited 5×
“Hagmayer and Waldmann (2007) and Luhmann and Ahn (2007; Experiment 3) examined whether people believe that C1 is independent from an unobserved C2.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHow to Improve Bayesian Reasoning without Instruction
Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Adaptive Thinking · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195153729.003.0006 · Cited by 63
Causal learning in rats and humans: A minimal rational model
Waldmann, M. R., Cheng, P. W., Hagmayer, Y., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2008) · Cited by 59
A quantitative causal model theory of conditional reasoning.
Fernbach, P. M., & Erb, C. D. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/a0031851 · Cited by 57
Causal conditional reasoning and strength of association: The disabling condition case
Neys, W. D., Schaeken, W., & d’Ydewalle, G. (2003) · The European Journal of Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1080/09541440244000058 · Cited by 50
The role of learning data in causal reasoning about observations and interventions
Meder, B., Hagmayer, Y., & Waldmann, M. R. (2009) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/mc.37.3.249 · Cited by 44
Causal status and coherence in causal-based categorization.
Rehder, B., & Kim, S. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/a0019765 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“Rehder and Kim (2010) investigated how people infer the marginal probability of a mediator and effect; P(m !”
BackgroundInferring interventional predictions from observational learning data
Meder, B., Hagmayer, Y., & Waldmann, M. R. (2008) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/pbr.15.1.75 · Cited by 43 · cited 2×
“The first step is simply the definition of a conditional probability, which equals the joint probability of the two variables (C and E) divided by the marginal probability of the variable that is conditioned upon (E).”
BackgroundHuman judgments of positive and negative causal chains.
Baetu, I., & Baker, A. G. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Animal Behavior Processes · doi:10.1037/a0013764 · Cited by 39 · cited 1×
“0) Baetu and Baker (2009) had participants learn the contingencies between C and M and between M and E separately and then asked about the relationship between C and E.”
BackgroundCognitive shortcuts in causal inference
Fernbach, P. M., & Rehder, B. (2012) · Argument & Computation · doi:10.1080/19462166.2012.682655 · Cited by 39
BUCKLE: A model of unobserved cause learning.
Luhmann, C. C., & Ahn, W. (2007) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.114.3.657 · Cited by 38 · cited 1×
“The most commonly cited inspiration for this research tactic is David Marr’s (1982) threelevel framework, which distinguished between a Computational Level (a functional analysis, often a normative model, including the actor’s goals), an Algorithmic-Representational Level (the descriptive-psychological model), and an…”
BackgroundInferring non-observed correlations from causal scenarios: The role of causal knowledge
Perales, J. C., Catena, A., & Maldonado, A. (2003) · Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0023-9690(03)00042-0 · Cited by 37 · cited 2×
“Perales et al. (2004) reported a similar set of experiments.”
A Bayesian Network Model of Causal Learning
Waldmann, M. R., & Martignon, L. F. (2022) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315782416-198 · Cited by 36
Second-order conditioning of human causal learning
Jara, E., Vila, J., & Maldonado, A. (2006) · Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/j.lmot.2005.12.001 · Cited by 33
Repeated causal decision making.
Hagmayer, Y., & Meder, B. (2012) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/a0028643 · Cited by 30
Inferences about unobserved causes in human contingency learning
Hagmayer, Y., & Waldmann, M. R. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470210601002470 · Cited by 30 · cited 2×
“Hagmayer and Waldmann (2007) also asked people to make summary judgments of P(c2 !”
BackgroundWhen one model casts doubt on another: A levels-of-analysis approach to causal discounting.
Khemlani, S., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2010) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0021809 · Cited by 29
Observing and Intervening: Rational and Heuristic Models of Causal Decision Making
Meder, B., Gerstenberg, T., Hagmayer, Y., & Waldmann, M. R. (2010) · The Open Psychology Journal · doi:10.2174/1874350101003010119 · Cited by 29
When Learning Order Affects Sensitivity to Base Rates: Challenges for Theories of Causal Learning
Reips, U., & Waldmann, M. R. (2007) · Experimental Psychology (formerly Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie) · doi:10.1027/1618-3169.55.1.9 · Cited by 25
Is inferential reasoning just probabilistic reasoning in disguise?
Markovits, H., & Handley, S. J. (2005) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03193231 · Cited by 19
Structured Correlation from the Causal Background
Mayrhofer, R., Goodman, N. D., Waldmann, M. R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2008) · Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society · Cited by 19
Walsh, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. (2004) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 17
The conceptual centrality of causal cycles
Kim, N. S., Luhmann, C. C., Pierce, M. L., & Ryan, M. M. (2009) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/mc.37.6.744 · Cited by 16
Agents and Causes: A Bayesian Error Attribution Model of Causal Reasoning
Mayrhofer, R., Hagmayer, Y., & Waldmann, M. R. (2010) · Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society · Cited by 16
A transitivity heuristic of probabilistic causal reasoning
von Sydow, M., Meder, B., & Hagmayer, Y. (2009) · Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics · Cited by 11
A Generative Model of Causal Cycles
Rehder, B., & Martin, J. B. (2011) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 9
How causal reasoning can bias empirical evidence
von Sydow, M., Hagmayer, Y., Meder, B., & Waldmann, M. R. (2010) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 9
A Causal Model Theory of Judgment
Sussman, A. B., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2011) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 8
Decision Making Using Learned Causal Structures
Nichols, W. R., & Danks, D. J. (2007) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 8
Causal Learning through Repeated Decision Making
Hagmayer, Y., & Meder, B. (2008) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 8
Reasoning with Conjunctive Causes
Rehder, B. (2011) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e520602012-064 · Cited by 8
The effect of explanation in simple binary decision tasks
Taylor, E. G., Landy, D. H., & Ross, B. H. (2012) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470218.2012.656664 · Cited by 7
A Rational Model of Elemental Diagnostic Inference
Mayrhofer, R., Meder, B., & Waldmann, M. R. (2009) · eScholarship (California Digital Library) · Cited by 7
Human Deviations from Normative Causal Reasoning
Rehder, B. (2006) · Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society · Cited by 3
Cited by
Conviction Narrative Theory: A theory of choice under radical uncertainty
Johnson, S. G. B., Bilovich, A., & Tuckett, D. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22001157 · Cited by 131
Hagmayer, Y., & Engelmann, N. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01303 · Cited by 38
“Empirical investigations to test these predictions with Western students using artificial scenarios yielded mostly confirmatory evidence (see Rottman and Hastie, 2014, for a comprehensive overview).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Rottman, B. M., & Hastie, R.
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2014
- Volume
- 140
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 109-139
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2161055006
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 138
- FWCI
- 15.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.