A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
Citations
Cites
Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
Watts, D. J., & Strogatz, S. H. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/30918 · Cited by 43,060 · cited 1×
“Moreover, we find that the rule also holds for random graphs 25 and scale-free networks 26,27 , where individuals differ in the number of their neighbours.”
BackgroundEmergence of Scaling in Random Networks
Barabási, A.-L., & Albert, R. (1999) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.286.5439.509 · Cited by 36,135
Statistical mechanics of complex networks
Albert, R., & Barabási, A.-L. (2002) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.74.47 · Cited by 20,471
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Bollobás, B. (1985) · Cited by 6,196
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
Evolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
Self-citationAn introduction to population genetics theory
Crow, J. F., & Kimura, M. (1970) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,223
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Wilson, E. O. Sociobiology (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975)
Cited by
Items 401–500 of 1,003
A generalized Pólya's urn with graph based interactions
Benaı̈m, M., Benjamini, I., Chen, J., & Lima, Y. (2013) · Random Structures and Algorithms · doi:10.1002/rsa.20523 · Cited by 44
“biology [15], economics [9], mathematics [20], and sociology [19].”
BackgroundEvolution of cooperation on adaptively weighted networks
Cao, L., Ohtsuki, H., Wang, B., & Aihara, K. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.12.008 · Cited by 47
Self-citationCan natural selection favour altruism between species?
Wyatt, G. A. K., West, S. A., & Gardner, A. (2013) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/jeb.12195 · Cited by 47
Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games
Wu, B., Zhou, D., & Wang, L. (2011) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.84.046111 · Cited by 50
Li, J., Zhang, C., Sun, Q., Chen, Z., & Zhang, J. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2016.2628385 · Cited by 45
“2628385 understand and analyze the widespread cooperative behaviors among selfish individuals has become an active topic in recent decades [1]–[3].”
BackgroundSimple property of heterogeneous aspiration dynamics: Beyond weak selection
Zhou, L., Wu, B., de Vasconcelos, V. V. L., & Wang, L. (2018) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.98.062124 · Cited by 44
Collapse and rescue of cooperation in evolving dynamic networks
Akçay, E. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-05130-7 · Cited by 47
“…evolutionary theory, where most models deal with special kinds of networks (e.g., lattice structured, Rousset and Billiard, 2000), fixed networks (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Allen et al., 2017), or dynamic networks with random connections (Pacheco et al., 2006; Santos et al.,…”
BackgroundTransient amplifiers of selection and reducers of fixation for death-Birth updating on graphs
Allen, B., Sample, C., Jencks, R., Withers, J. F., Steinhagen, P., Brizuela, L., Kolodny, J., Parke, D., Lippner, G., & Dementieva, Y. A. (2020) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007529 · Cited by 44
“This is an interesting contrast to the study of games on graphs [4, 5, 9–15], which typically considers death-Birth updating—likely because Birth-death updating tends not to support cooperative behaviors [4, 15].”
MethodResultToward a Universal Model for Spatially Structured Populations
Marrec, L., Lamberti, I., & Bitbol, A. (2021) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.127.218102 · Cited by 55
“case, but not in the former [27–29].”
Calculating Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations
Nathanson, C., Tarnita, C. E., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615 · Cited by 45
“They do not hold, however, for games on graphs [32].”
BackgroundSelf-citationAnalysis and Control of Networked Game Dynamics via A Microscopic Deterministic Approach
Tan, S., Wang, Y., & Lü, J. (2016) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2016.2545106 · Cited by 44
“Remark 2: Note that there is beautiful similarity among different cooperation mechanisms, including the feedback rule, Hamilton’s rule [26], and network reciprocity rule [16].”
BackgroundMethodComplex Network Modeling With Power-Law Activating Patterns and Its Evolutionary Dynamics
Zeng, Z., Feng, M., Liu, P., & Kurths, J. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2025.3525465 · Cited by 49
“To uncover the condition for cooperation, [44] used the pair approximation method and discovered that population preference for cooperation is strongly correlated with the average number of neighbors.”
Voter model with non-Poissonian interevent intervals
Takaguchi, T., & Masuda, N. (2011) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.84.036115 · Cited by 43
A homoclinic route to asymptotic full cooperation in adaptive networks and its failure
Zschaler, G., Traulsen, A., & Groß, T. (2010) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/12/9/093015 · Cited by 45
Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games
Wu, Y., Zhang, B., & Zhang, S. (2017) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2017.06.015 · Cited by 45
Reward regulation in plant–frugivore networks requires only weak cues
Albrecht, J., Hagge, J., Schabo, D. G., Schaefer, H. M., & Farwig, N. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-07362-z · Cited by 43
Voter Model Perturbations and Reaction Diffusion Equations
Cox, J. T., Durrett, R. T., & Perkins, E. (2018) · Astérisque · doi:10.24033/ast.921 · Cited by 43
“This was noted in [38] as further evidence for their b/c > k rule.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialReputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game
Podder, S., Righi, S., & Pancotto, F. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0293 · Cited by 46
Why Are There Six Degrees of Separation in a Social Network?
Samoylenko, I., Aleja, D., Primo, E., Alfaro-Bittner, K., Vasilyeva, E. E., Kovalenko, K., Мусатов, Д. В., Raigorodskii, A. M., Criado, R., Romance, M., et al. (2023) · Physical Review X · doi:10.1103/physrevx.13.021032 · Cited by 55
“Related research also covered game theoretical models as the basis for cooperation on networks [20], for network formation and growth [21 – 24], as well as for agents to achieve a position of high centrality while minimizing the number of contacts they have to maintain [25].”
BackgroundRaxworthy, J. (2006) · QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) · Cited by 43
Limitation of Time Promotes Cooperation in Structured Collaboration Systems
Zhang, Y., Wang, J., Wen, G., Guan, J., Zhou, S., Chen, G., Chatterjee, K., & Perc, M. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2024.3481434 · Cited by 52
“In that case, the consequence may be different [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26] – a finding rooted in the seminal paper by Nowak and May [27], observing clusters of cooperators on a square lattice that protected them from invading defectors.”
Evolution of cooperation with interactive identity and diversity
Su, Q., Li, A., & Wang, L. (2018) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.01.021 · Cited by 45
Understanding spatial public goods games on three-layer networks
Su, Q., Wang, L., & Stanley, E. (2018) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/aae6dd · Cited by 46
Aspiration-dependent strategy persistence promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Zhang, L., Huang, C., Li, H., & Dai, Q. (2019) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/126/18001 · Cited by 43
Glynatsi, N. E., & Knight, V. A. (2021) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-021-00718-9 · Cited by 37
Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
Nakamaru, M., & Dieckmann, U. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.09.004 · Cited by 45
“…1998) and selection shaped by local interactions (e.g., Matsuda, 1987; Nowak and May, 1992; Nakamaru et al., 1997, 1998; Le Galliard et al., 2003, 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006) may advance cooperation in ways that can often be interpreted as generalizations of kin selection (Lehmann et al., 2007a).”
BackgroundDirectionality of contact networks suppresses selection pressure in evolutionary dynamics
Masuda, N. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.01.025 · Cited by 42
“ycle, the directed cycle, the weighted undirected star, undirected and directed random graphs, and undirected and directed scale-free (SF) networks. Motivated by previous studies (Antal et al., 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Sood etal., 2008), we examine the effects of several update rules on the…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEvolutionary Dynamics on Scale-Free Interaction Networks
Payne, J. L., & Eppstein, M. J. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2009.2019825 · Cited by 44
“2019825 cooperation [2]–[5], species invasiveness [6], disease propagation [7]–[9], energy transfer in food webs [10], predator-prey dynamics [11], the maintenance of genetic diversity [12]–[14],”
BackgroundThe mechanics of stochastic slowdown in evolutionary gamesPreprint
Traulsena, A., & Galla, T. (2012) · Cited by 42
Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information
Wang, X., Zhou, L., McAvoy, A., & Li, A. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-43048-x · Cited by 58
Evolution of collective action in adaptive social structures
Moreira, J. A. G., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01521 · Cited by 44
Random diffusion and cooperation in continuous two-dimensional space
Antonioni, A., Tomassini, M., & Buesser, P. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.11.018 · Cited by 41
“By using theoretical models and simulations, it has been found that some network structures appear to be more conducive to cooperation than others, albeit this result is contingent upon the evolutionary dynamics of the model (Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Santos et al., 2006a; Roca et al., 2009; Ohtsuki et al., 2006).”
ResultThe simplest formal argument for fitness optimization
Grafen, A. (2008) · Journal of Genetics · doi:10.1007/s12041-008-0064-9 · Cited by 46
Edge effects in game-theoretic dynamics of spatially structured tumours
Kaznatcheev, A., Scott, J. G., & Basanta, D. (2015) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2015.0154 · Cited by 44
Co-Operative Punishment Cements Social Cohesion
Jaffé, K., & Zaballa, L. (2010) · Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation · doi:10.18564/jasss.1568 · Cited by 43
“Recent research has shown that mutualism and reciprocity among non related individuals emerges if cooperation provides synergies which will benefit all actors (Trivers 1971, Axelrod 1984, Nowak and Sigmund 1998, Panchanathan and Boyd 2004 , Ohtsuki et al. 2006).”
Wang, S., & Liu, J. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2017.2742522 · Cited by 41
“Combined with network theory, plenty of attention has been paid to evolutionary games on networks [10], [21], [22], [23], and the structures and properties of networks clearly impact on the ability in maintaining the cooperators.”
BackgroundMemory-based stag hunt game on regular lattices
Dong, Y., Xu, H., & Fan, S. (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.12.025 · Cited by 41
Effects of cost threshold and noise in spatial snowdrift games with fixed multi-person interactions
Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2010) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/90/38003 · Cited by 41
Diversity of rationality affects the evolution of cooperation
Chen, Y.-Z., Huang, Z., Wang, S.-J., Zhang, Y., & Wang, Y.-H. (2009) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.79.055101 · Cited by 41
Evolution of prisoner's dilemma strategies on scale-free networks
Chen, Y.-S., Lin, H. T., & Wu, C. (2007) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2007.06.008 · Cited by 41
Evolution of cooperation driven by zealotsPreprint
Masuda, N. (2012) · Cited by 40
Tanimoto, J. (2008) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2008.11.004 · Cited by 40
Fitness, inclusive fitness, and optimization
Lehmann, L., & Rousset, F. (2014) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-013-9415-x · Cited by 46
GROUP FORMATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIALITY
Garcia, T., & Monte, S. D. (2012) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2012.01739.x · Cited by 45
Quan, J., Yang, X., & Wang, X. (2018) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2018.04.031 · Cited by 42
Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size
McAvoy, A., Fraiman, N., Hauert, C., Wakeley, J., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2018.01.004 · Cited by 44
Self-citationEleven mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation
Zaggl, M. A. (2013) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137413000374 · Cited by 44
“A general approximation for a rule for the stability of cooperation on regular graphs can be derived analytically (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006): b/c > k.”
BackgroundPopulation viscosity can promote the evolution of altruistic sterile helpers and eusociality
Lehmann, L., Ravigné, V., & Keller, L. (2008) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.0276 · Cited by 40
“…life-history conditions (e.g. overlapping generations) known to promote the evolution of costly helping (Taylor & Irwin 2000; Irwin & Taylor 2001; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Grafen 2007b), because it was usually found that introducing isolation by distance in this case (Lehmann et al. 2007) does not…”
BackgroundManaging the wildlife tourism commons
Pirotta, E., & Lusseau, D. (2014) · Ecological Applications · doi:10.1890/14-0986.1 · Cited by 39
“This result confirmed previous work showing that any form of structure in the interactions between the different players can lead to cooperation fixation in populations (Ohtsuki et al. 2006).”
ResultEmergence of cooperative behaviours in the management of mobile ecological resources
Touza, J., Drechsler, M., Smart, J. C. R., & Termansen, M. (2012) · Environmental Modelling & Software · doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2012.03.015 · Cited by 42
Patterns of cooperation: fairness and coordination in networks of interacting agents
Do, A.-L., Rudolf, L., & Groß, T. (2010) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/12/6/063023 · Cited by 44
Evolutionary games on isothermal graphs
Allen, B., Lippner, G., & Nowak, M. A. (2019) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-019-13006-7 · Cited by 44
“This generalizes, to all isothermal graphs, the previous finding that birth-death updating does not support cooperation on regular graphs [14, 15, 19, 20, 18, 23].”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationHost–microbiome coevolution can promote cooperation in a rock–paper–scissors dynamics
Lewin‐Epstein, O., & Hadany, L. (2020) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2019.2754 · Cited by 42
Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks
Li, Z., Chen, X., Yang, H.-X., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0084178 · Cited by 42
Coevolution of Quantum and Classical Strategies on Evolving Random Networks
Li, Q., Iqbal, A., Perc, M., Chen, M., & Abbott, D. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423 · Cited by 39
Coevolution of aspirations and cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Chen, W., Wu, T., Li, Z., & Wang, L. (2015) · Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/2015/01/p01032 · Cited by 38
A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
Allen, B., & McAvoy, A. (2019) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-018-1305-z · Cited by 37
Sun, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2023.3279094 · Cited by 57
“We first derive the dynamical equation for characterizing the dynamical changes of the fraction of cooperators by using the pair approximation approach [10], [47], [48].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCooperation percolation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Yang, H.-X., Rong, Z., & Wang, W.-X. (2014) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/16/1/013010 · Cited by 39
Characterizing the effect of population heterogeneity on evolutionary dynamics on complex networks
Tan, S., & Lü, J. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep05034 · Cited by 37
Evolution of Interactions and Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Zhang, C., Zhang, J., Xie, G., Wang, L., & Perc, M. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724 · Cited by 37
Semi-tensor product approach to networked evolutionary games
Cheng, D., Qi, H., He, F., Xu, T., & Dong, H. (2014) · Control Theory and Technology · doi:10.1007/s11768-014-0038-9 · Cited by 37
“In the last decades, the investigation of evolutionary games (EG) attracts a great attention from scientists in cross disciplines, because evolutionary game has wide background from biological systems [6, 7], economical systems [8], social systems [9], physical systems [10], etc.”
BackgroundLin, J.-S., & Himelboim, I. (2018) · Journal of Political Marketing · doi:10.1080/15377857.2018.1478661 · Cited by 41
“Reciprocity is also found to be associated with strong ties (Gilbert and Karahalios 2009; Granovetter 1973) along with cooperation among its members (Flor ıa et al. 2009; Ohtsuki et al. 2006), social contagion (Harrigan, Achananuparp, and Lim 2012), and social capital (Onyx and Bullen 2000).”
BackgroundGeneralized Social Dilemmas: The Evolution of Cooperation in Populations with Variable Group Size
Broom, M., Pattni, K., & Rychtář, J. (2018) · Bulletin of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s11538-018-00545-1 · Cited by 45
“This is the process by which spatial structures (see, for example, Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Nowak et al. 2010; Peña et al. 2015; Li et al. 2016) can lead to the evolution of cooperation.”
BackgroundInformation fusion based on reputation and payoff promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game
Quan, J., Zhou, Y., Wang, X., & Yang, J. (2019) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.124805 · Cited by 43
Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals
Foley, M., Smead, R., Forber, P., & Riedl, C. (2021) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008847 · Cited by 40
Evolution of cooperation with contextualized behavior
Su, Q., McAvoy, A., & Plotkin, J. B. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abm6066 · Cited by 43
“Historically, these kinds of networks were studied as a proxy for more realistic structures, when analytical approaches were limited to regular graphs alone ( 13 , 40 ).”
BackgroundLarge fluctuations and fixation in evolutionary games
Assaf, M., & Mobilia, M. (2010) · Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/2010/09/p09009 · Cited by 41
Questioning the cultural evolution of altruism
André, J., & Morin, O. (2011) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2011.02398.x · Cited by 38
“Interestingly, this occurs even if cultural transmission is subject to the same (or similar) selective forces than genetic transmission (i.e. under ‘payoff-biased’ transmission; e.g. Boyd et al., 2003; Ohtsuki et al., 2006).”
Wu, Z.-X., Rong, Z., & Yang, H.-X. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.91.012802 · Cited by 37
“com (PD) [8, 9]: in pairwise interactions, cooperation provides a benefit b to the partner at some cost c to the cooperator (b > c), while defection neither bears any costs nor provides any benefits.”
BackgroundEvolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration
Wang, X., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.05.020 · Cited by 39
Novak, S., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.05.029 · Cited by 42
Self-citationDynamics of collective cooperation under personalised strategy updates
Meng, Y., Cornelius, S. P., Liu, Y., & Li, A. (2024) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-024-47380-8 · Cited by 54
A Tag-Based Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Networks with Different Topologies
Kim, J.-W. (2010) · Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation · doi:10.18564/jasss.1584 · Cited by 37
“This is consistent with the rule that cooperation can survive if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the average number of neighbors (i.e. the average degree of the network) in structured populations of unconditional cooperators and defectors (Ohtsuki et al. 2006) [6] .”
InfluentialPublic goods games with reward in finite populations
Forsyth, P. A. I., & Hauert, C. (2010) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-010-0363-7 · Cited by 37
“If the mutation rate is small, then the mutant strategy will either have fixated or disappeared before the next mutation arises (Antal and Scheuring 2006; Nowak et al. 2004; Ohtsuki et al. 2006).”
BackgroundSelf-citationOn Cooperative and Efficient Overlay Network Evolution Based on a Group Selection Pattern
Wang, Y., & Nakao, A. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Part B (Cybernetics) · doi:10.1109/tsmcb.2009.2027221 · Cited by 36
Decentralized incentives for general well-being in networked public goods game
Wang, S., Chen, X., Xiao, Z., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2022.127308 · Cited by 46
Mechanisms for similarity based cooperation
Traulsen, A. (2008) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2008-00031-3 · Cited by 38
Nhim, T., Richter, A. P., & Zhu, X. (2018) · Ecological Complexity · doi:10.1016/j.ecocom.2018.06.001 · Cited by 36
Spiekermann, K. (2008) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9424-5 · Cited by 35
“Many new contributions in theoretical biology systematically explore the impact of different network topologies, for instance Hauert and Szabo (2003), Lieberman et al. (2005), Ohtsuki and Nowak (2006a,b), Ohtsuki et al. (2006), Santos and Pacheco (2006), and further references in these papers.”
BackgroundCooperatives and happiness. Cross-country evidence on the role of relational capital
Bruni, L., Rosa, D. D., & Ferri, G. (2019) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036846.2019.1575944 · Cited by 14
“For example, several game theoretical basedmathematical models show that increasing population size – at least beyond a certain threshold – makes cooperation less likely to evolve (e.g., Nowak et al. 2004; Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Rand and Nowak 2012).”
BackgroundReinforcement Learning Can Be a Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation on Higher-Order Networks
Xu, Y., Zhao, D., Benko, T. P., Xia, C., & Perc, M. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2025.3624366 · Cited by 35
“These microscopic rules determine whether cooperation can evolve [26], [27], thereby further influencing the system’s final cooperation level [28].”
Selection pressure transforms the nature of social dilemmas in adaptive networks
Segbroeck, S. V., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pacheco, J. M. (2011) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/13/1/013007 · Cited by 38
Universality of fixation probabilities in randomly structured populations
Adlam, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep06692 · Cited by 38
“It is well known that population structure can affect the behavior of evolutionary processes under both constant selection [29, 28, 16, 30, 8, 19], on which we focus here, and frequency dependent selection [40, 25, 37, 11, 9].”
BackgroundSelf-citationConventions under Heterogeneous Behavioural Rules
Newton, J. (2020) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdaa063 · Cited by 35
“Indeed Peski (2010) defines asymmetry and proves Theorem P for such environments.”
BackgroundNakamaru, M., & Yokoyama, A. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108423 · Cited by 36
Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games
Peña, J., & Rochat, Y. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0044514 · Cited by 36
The Power of Two Choices on Graphs
Gast, N. (2015) · ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review · doi:10.1145/2825236.2825263 · Cited by 35
Collaboration in social networks
Dall’Asta, L., Marsili, M., & Pin, P. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105757109 · Cited by 40
Cooperation in N-person evolutionary snowdrift game in scale-free Barabási–Albert networks
Lee, K. H., Chan, C.-H., Hui, P. M., & Zheng, D. (2008) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2008.05.045 · Cited by 35
Wang, Y., Fan, R., Chen, R., Xie, X., & Ke, C. (2024) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.125235 · Cited by 35
Escaping the tragedy of the commons via directed investments
Vukov, J., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.022 · Cited by 35
“…been initially 68 addressed by means of regular lattices and graphs, exploring the role of space in the 69 emergence of collective behaviors (Nowak and May, 1992; Nowak et al., 1994; Szabó 70 and Hauert, 2002; Szabó et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Taylor 71 et al., 2007).”
BackgroundAsymmetric interdependent networks with multiple-dependence relation
Zhang, H., Zhou, J., Zou, Y., Tang, M., Xiao, G., & Stanley, E. (2020) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.101.022314 · Cited by 35
Emergence of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional participation
Li, M., Jia, C.-X., Liu, R.-R., & Wang, B.-H. (2012) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2012.12.022 · Cited by 34
Qiu, T., Hadzibeganovic, T., Chen, G., Zhong, L.-X., & Wu, X.-R. (2010) · Computer Physics Communications · doi:10.1016/j.cpc.2010.08.018 · Cited by 34
Shimao, H., & Nakamaru, M. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059894 · Cited by 35
Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation
Horváth, G., Kovářík, J., & Mengel, F. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.034 · Cited by 41
Zheng, X.-D., Li, C., Yu, J., Wang, S.-C., Fan, S.-J., Zhang, B., & Tao, Y. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.02.036 · Cited by 34
Origin and Structure of Dynamic Cooperative Networks
Wardil, L., & Hauert, C. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep05725 · Cited by 33
Self-citationAn interpretable approach for social network formation among heterogeneous agents
Yuan, Y., Alabdulkareem, A., & Pentland, A. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-07089-x · Cited by 35
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.