A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
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“Here we emphasize that when dynamic transitions occur between two random networks or two random scale-free networks that lack community structure, then cooperation is impeded (relative to a static random or a static scale-free network) - for the intuitive reason that random switches disrupt cooperative clusters [1].”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“The mechanism underlying this cooperation-promoting effect is that spatial structure enables the formation of cooperative clusters of individuals, who have high payoffs and are capable of resisting invasion by defectors.”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“A well-known and illustrative finding [1] is that population structure can favor cooperation provided the ratio of the benefit from cooperative behavior, b , to its cost, c , exceeds the average number of neighbors, d .”
From Strategy evolution on dynamic networks (2023) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [2]
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Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
Salahshour, M. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-45272-2 · Cited by 21
Wang, Y., Yao, Z., Wang, C., Ren, J., & Chen, Q. (2019) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.124923 · Cited by 19
The evolution of morality and the role of commitment
Akdeniz, A., & van Veelen, M. (2021) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2021.36 · Cited by 25
“For example, interactions can happen locally on networks (Allen et al.,197 2017; Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Santos and Pacheco, 2005;198 Santos et al., 2008; Taylor et al., 2007), or within groups (Akdeniz and van199 Veelen, 2020; Luo, 2014; Simon et al., 2013; Traulsen and…”
InfluentialNetwork analysis of intra- and interspecific freshwater fish interactions using year-around tracking
Vanovac, S., Howard, D., Monk, C. T., Arlinghaus, R., & Giabbanelli, P. J. (2021) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0445 · Cited by 19
“For example, they determine population development and growth [8], invasion success [9], cooperation [10], social hierarchies [11], information flow [12], resource competition [13] or predation [2].”
BackgroundThe Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2015) · Games · doi:10.3390/g6030231 · Cited by 18
“This depends on the costs and benefits of cooperation [5,16,27,28], on the population structure [27,28] and on the environment [29–31].”
BackgroundConformity-based cooperation in online social networks: The effect of heterogeneous social influence
Xu, B., Wang, J., & Zhang, X. (2015) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2015.08.019 · Cited by 18
Ultimate causes and the evolution of altruism
Marshall, J. A. R. (2010) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-010-1110-1 · Cited by 24
“This agrees with the analysis of Lehmann et al. (2007), who use a population genetical approach to show that the conditions for altruism to be favoured on graphs presented in Ohtsuki et al. (2006) can be derived as special cases of an inclusive fitness formulation of those models.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialOscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility
Suzuki, S., & Kimura, H. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.019 · Cited by 21
“The maintenance of cooperation in our model cannot be attributed only to network or spatial reciprocity (Masuda, 2007; Nakamaru and Matsuda, 1997; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Santos and Pacheco, 2005, 2006a, 2006c, 2008).”
BackgroundHeterogenous allocation of chips promotes fairness in the Ultimatum Game
Chen, W., Wu, T., Li, Z., Wu, N., & Wang, L. (2015) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/109/68006 · Cited by 18
Evolutionary Stability and the Evolution of Cooperation on Heterogeneous Graphs
Zhang, B., Li, C., & Tao, Y. (2015) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-015-0146-2 · Cited by 20
“In this paper, we consider so-called “pairwise comparison” updating [17], [18], [19].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games with heterogeneous relationships
Xu, B., Li, M., & Deng, R. (2015) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2015.01.028 · Cited by 18
Enhanced cooperation and harmonious population in an evolutionary N -person snowdrift game
Ji, M., Xu, C., Zheng, D., & Hui, P. M. (2009) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.017 · Cited by 18
Fixation Times in Deme Structured, Finite Populations with Rare Migration
Hauert, C., Chen, Y.-T., & Imhof, L. A. (2014) · Journal of Statistical Physics · doi:10.1007/s10955-014-1022-y · Cited by 22
“Traditional models for population structures include viscous populations [16,42], lattices or networks [17,21,25], island models [11,32,39] or deme structured populations [14,24,30,37,41] with a particular focus on diffusion approximations [5,26,40].”
BackgroundSelf-citationCoevolution of Cooperation and Partner Rewiring Range in Spatial Social Networks
Khoo, T., Fu, F., & Pauls, S. D. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep36293 · Cited by 18
“Interactions among individuals are not random, but often exquisitely structured, for example, through social networks [29].”
Coevolution of nonlinear group interactions and strategies in well-mixed and structured populations
Zhou, L., Li, A., & Wang, L. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.12.004 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2006-05
- Volume
- 441
- Issue
- 7092
- Pages
- 502-505
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- PMC
- PMC2430087
- OpenAlex
- W2040301417
- Cited by
- 2,208
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 111 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 128 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 101 · 2021: 113 · 2020: 92 · 2019: 107 · 2018: 136 · 2017: 103 · 2016: 116 · 2015: 122 · 2014: 133 · 2013: 126 · 2012: 132
- FWCI
- 277.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Harvard University
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, structured populations, graphs, social networks, benefit-cost ratio, spatial games, yeast competition, cheaters, scale-free networks, random regular graphs
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Costs and Cost Analysis, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic, Social Support
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